The URL can be used to link to this page

Browse Search

Home My WebLink About20161668.tiff I Brownstein Hyatt 1 Farber Schreck RECEIVED MAY 2 3 2016 Carolynne C . White May 18 , 2016 Attorney at Law ` WELD COUNTY 303 . 223 . 1197 tel 303 . 223 . 0997 fax COMMISSIONERScwhite@bhfs. com VIA E-MAIL BBARKER@CO.WELD. CO . US Bruce Barker County Attorney 1150 O Street Greeley, CO 80631 Mailing Address : P . O . Box 758 , Greeley, CO 80632 RE : Weld County Sign Code Dear Bruce : I Since 2012 , we've been in discussions with the Planning Department on behalf of our client Lamar Northern Advertising (and its predecessor NextMedia) about proposing amendments to the Weld County sign code related to dwell time for digital signage within the County. In October 2013 , we met with Planning Manager Michelle Martin and Assistant County Attorney Brad Yatabe . Following that meeting , Lamar provided the County with the attached letter detailing additional information in support of our request to reduce the County' s current 3- hour dwell time . We were informed that Planning was evaluating the issue and anticipated to finish its independent review by January 2015 . 4 We understand from Michelle Martin that other code changes moved to the top of the list during 2015 , but that the sign code is a County priority for 2016 (as it is for many local jurisdictions post-Reed v. Gilbert) . As the County proceeds , we would like to pick up the conversation on dwell time in hopes of reaching resolution on the issue by year's end . * As Lamar' s 2013 letter describes , the County' s 3-hour dwell time has resulted in a lack of flexibility in messaging that has undermined the efficacy of the County' s digital advertising rules by greatly reducing the contract renewal rates of local , regional , and national clients . Further, the County' s 3-hour dwell time is not ai correlated to impacts on driver safety given that 48 states have restrictions on dwell time that range from 4 to 8 seconds . In order to get the ball rolling again , we request scheduling a presentation before the Board of County Commissioners at an upcoming meeting . Knowing that the Board regularly meets at 9 AM on Mondays and Wednesdays , we would like to present to the Board no later than July 31 . We appreciate your prompt attention to this matter and look forward to hearing from you . Sincerely, �C , i f I ipsc, 2016- 1668 Carolynne C . W ite 410 Seventeenth Street, Suite 2200 Denver, CO 80202-4432 emen) &,40,640 Mail r main 303 . 223 . 1100 g a5-0loe&i bhfs.com Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, LLP Bruce Barker May 18 , 2016 Page 2 Attachments : • ; November 1 , 2013 Letter Reed v. Gilbert 17 47 With Copies To : Board of County Commissioners — jfuller@weldgov . com Commissioner Freeman , District 1 — mfreeman@weldgov . com Commissioner Cozad , District 2 — jcozad@weldgov. com Commissioner Kirkmeyer, District 3 — bkirkmeyer@weldgov. com Commissioner Conway, At- Large — sconway@weldgov . com Commissioner Moreno , At- Large — smoreno@weldgov . com LAA4bitt R NORTHERN COLORADO Michelle Martin Planning Mangager Weld County Dept of Planning Services Hi Michelle — As a follow up to our meeting, here is some information regarding our request to change Weld Counties sign code to allow for 8 second hold times versus the current 3 hour hold time . This information draws from our experience with digital billboards in Garden City and Longmont, CO and Cheyenne, WY . - The average number of different commercial messages per day/per client for Garden City and Cheyenne is 4. For Longmont, the average is 1 . - The average number of different commercial messages per month/per client for Garden City and Cheyenne is 12 . For Longmont, the average is 2 . - The average contract renewal rate of local clients for Garden City and Cheyenne is 90% . For Longmont the average is 35 % . - Conclusion : Shorter hold times allow for greater flexibility in messaging which equates to more successful advertising campaigns . Below is a list of clients that have advertised on digital billboards in these three markets over the last two years. I have broken it into the following categories : Local ( Business is located in the market where the billboard(s) exist), Regional (Northern Colorado Businesses that do not have a location where the billboard exists or feature advertising that is intended to serve locations beyond the given market), and National (not market or region specific) . You ' ll notice that the percentage of local businesses, while a significant majority for all three markets, is far smaller for Longmont than for the other two cities . We attribute this entirely to the lack of flexibility due to a 3 hour hold time . Garden City Community Messaging Local Regional National Town of Garden City Buderus Farms Lee ' s Cyclery Alpha USA Red Cross (Flood Recovery) IBMC Greeley Campus Law Tigers Amber Alert Ehrlich Subaru KMGH Channel 7 Gazelle Transportation Carl ' s Jr Front Range Devoe Contracting PE Shows AFNI Big R of Greeley Rio Grande Restaurant United Way of Weld Cnty Taco John ' s of Greeley 2649 East Mulberry Street, Unit A20 • Fort Collins, CO 80524 • Phone: 970-493-4411 • Fax: 970-493-4595 www.Lamar.com Boot Barn Breeze Thru Car Wash Kress Theatre Wild Animal Sanctuary Local = 74% Regional = 22% National = 4% Longmont Community Messaging Local Regional National Amber Alert Breeze Thru Car Wash Bud Event Center Geico Red Cross ( Flood Recovery) B and G Equipment Peak Kia Allstate Affordable Pet Health PE Shows First Transit Longmont City of Greeley Skybeam High Coutry Beverage Frontier Honda Century Link Pilgrim Communications Champion Windows Rocky Mtn Kawasaki Gebhardt VW Ehrlich I25 Kia McDonald ' s Longmont KEXS Radio 1570 Public Service Credit Union Hajek Insurance Group Dwight Jackson Epic Motor Sports Local = 67% 26% = Regional 7% = National Cheyenne Community Messaging Local Regional National Cheyenne Police Dept Big D Oil Co Bud Event Cntr WY Children ' s Society America' s Best Value Inn Engaging Loveland Wyoming Epilepsy Fndtn Pure Lipo Sculpt PE Shows Comm Action/Laramie Cnty Cheyenne Reg Med Cntr Applebee ' s WY Quality Counts College Dr Urgent Care Union Cellular Cheyenne Jr League BB Biolife Plasma College America WY Quality Counts Jonah Bank Loaf and Jug Youth Alternatives Alpine Dental Laramie Cnty Sheriff Dept Adora Day Spa Breeze Thru Car Wash 2649 East Mulberry Street, Unit A20 • Fort Collins, CO 80524 • Phone: 970-493-4411 • Fax: 970-493-4595 www.Lamar.com Cheyenne Stampede Wallick & Volk Farmers Insurance-Jeff Teasley Good Times LLC Cheyenne Warriors Ozymandian Theater Kolbin Inc Polaris Suzuki Cheyenne State Farm -Anthony Ortiz Unified Peoples First Cheyenne WY Hearing Clinic Laramie Cnty Fair Western Vista Credit Union Frontier Mall Wild West Apple Adventures Cheyenne Shrine Circus Sierra Trading Post Taco John ' s Cheyenne Complete Nutrition Cheyenne Frontier Days Epitome Boutique Big O Tire Cheyenne Meridian Trust Fed Cred Union Gateway Construction Kolt' s Fine Spirits IBMC Cheyenne Halladay Motors Specialty Counseling & Consulting Creation Highway LCCC - Wind Energy Tech Property Exchange Group Cheyenne Light. Fuel & Power Local = 88% Regional = 12% National = 0% What makes billboards so enticing to local advertisers is that they enable businesses to target the people who live and work in the community where those businesses reside . The advantage of digital billboards is that those same businesses have the ability to create multiple messages that can be tailored to specific times of the day, events, holidays, weather, promotions, etc . without incurring any additional costs for production . It enables messaging to be relevant to their potential customers . This is evidenced by our historical contract renewal rate for local clients as mentioned above . In fact, every local client that has chosen not to renew their contract for our Longmont digital billboard has shared with us that the reason they are not renewing is because it they are not being provided the flexibility to change their message frequently, and in a timely manner. 2649 East Mulberry Street, Unit A20 • Fort Collins, CO 80524 • Phone: 970-493-4411 • Fax: 970-493-4595 www.Lamar.com Secondly, by significantly decreasing the hold time it would have the effect of increasing our digital "inventory". While we would not increase the number of advertisers, allowing only the current maximum of 6 advertisers per face, we would instead dramatically increase the number of advertising messages for each advertiser. In addition, this access to inventory gives us much greater flexibility for allowing emergency and community messaging to occur. You will notice in the list above that organizations in Cheyenne have made extensive use of this opportunity . This is made possible because of an 8 second hold time . Finally, there have been numerous studies exploring the impact of digital billboards on traffic safety, none of which have shown any correlation between digital billboards and an increase in traffic accident. There have not, however, been any studies that focus on the impact that hold times have on traffic safety. However, given that 48 states have restrictions on hold time that range of 4-8 seconds, it would stand to reason that hold time, by extension of the afore mentioned studies, does not impact traffic safety negatively . We are requesting a revision of code to allow for 8 second, the upper end of national averages . This should keep the maximum number of messages viewed by motorists on our Hwy 119 board to 2 when sight distance and speed limit are taken into account. Even at the current 3 hour dwell time, any given motorist has the chance to view the sign at the time of message change, thereby viewing the number. Given the potential opportunity for local businesses to maximize their marketing efforts, the increased opportunity for community messaging, as well as the seemingly innocuous impact to driver safety, we feel this is a reasonable request that will benefit the community as a whole. Please let me know if there is any additional information I can provide as you consider our request. I thank you for your time . Sincerely, Trevin Bensko- Wecks Market Manager 2649 East Mulberry Street, Unit A20 • Fort Collins, CO 80524 • Phone: 970-493-4411 • Fax: 970-493-4595 www.Lamar.com Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz. , 135 S. Ct. 2218 ( 2015 ) 192 L. Ed . 2d 236 , 83 USLW 4444, 15 Cal . Daily Op . Serv. 6239. . . 135 S.Ct. 2218 West Headnotes ( 21 ) Supreme Court of the United States Clyde REED , et al. , Petitioners [ 11 Constitutional Law v. Viewpoint or idea discrimination TOWN OF GILBERT, ARIZONA, et al. Constitutional Law Content-Based Regulations or Restrictions No. 13-5O2 . I Argued Jan. 12 , Under the First Amendment, a government, 2O15. I Decided June 18, 2O15. including a municipal government vested with Synopsis state authority, has no power to restrict Background : Church and pastor seeking to place temporary expression because of its message, its ideas, signs announcing services filed suit claiming that town's its subject matter, or its content. U .S.C .A . sign ordinance, restricting size, duration, and location Const.Amend. 1 . of temporary directional signs violated the right to free Cases that cite this headnote speech . The United States District Court for the District of Arizona, Susan R. Bolton, J ., denied church's motion for preliminary injunction barring enforcement of ordinance. [21 Constitutional Law Church appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the _ Content-Based Regulations or Restrictions Ninth Circuit, M . Margaret McKeown, Circuit Judge, 587 Constitutional Law F .3d 966, affirmed in part and remanded in part.On remand, Strict or exacting scrutiny ; compelling the District Court, Bolton, J ., 832 F . Supp.2d 1070, granted interest test town summary judgment. Church and pastor appealed. The Content-based laws, that is, those that target Court of Appeals, Callahan, Circuit Judge, 707 F .3d 1057, speech based on its communicative content, affirmed. Certiorari was granted. are presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if the government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state Holdings: The Supreme Court, Justice Thomas, held that: interests. U . S .C .A . Const.Amend. 1 . 3 Cases that cite this headnote [ 1 ] sign code was subject to strict scrutiny, and [2] sign code violated free speech guarantees. 131 Constitutional Law - Content- Based Regulations or Restrictions Government regulation of speech is "content Reversed and remanded. based," and thus presumptively unconstitutional, if a law applies to particular speech because Justice Alito filed concurring opinion in which Justices of the topic discussed or the idea or message Kennedy and Sotomayor joined. expressed, and this commonsense meaning of the phrase "content based" requires a court to Justice Breyer filed opinion concurring in the judgment. consider whether a P regulation of speech on its g face draws distinctions based on the message a Justice Kagan filed opinion concurring in the judgment, in speaker conveys. U . S .C .A . Const.Amend. 1 . which Justices Ginsburg and Breyer joined. 9 Cases that cite this headnote 141 Constitutional Law WestlawNext Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz. , 135 S .Ct. 2218 (2015 ) 192 L. Ed . 2d 236, 83 USLW 4444 , 15 Cal . Daily Op . Serv. 6239. . . f- Strict or exacting scrutiny ; compelling out signs bearing a particular message, i .e., the interest test time and location of a particular event. U . S.C .A . Constitutional Law Const.Amend. I . - Strict or exacting scrutiny ; compelling 4 Cases that cite this headnote interest test Some facial distinctions based on a message are obvious, defining regulated speech by 171 Constitutional Law particular subject matter, and others are more Content-Neutral Regulations or Restrictions subtle, defining regulated speech by its function The crucial first step in the content-neutrality or purpose, but both are distinctions drawn analysis in a free speech challenge is determining based on the message a speaker conveys, and, whether the law is content neutral on its face. therefore, are subject to strict scrutiny . U . S .C .A . U. S .C.A . Const.Amend. 1 . Const.Amend. 1 . Cases that cite this headnote 2 Cases that cite this headnote 181 Constitutional Law 151 Constitutional Law -- Strict or exacting scrutiny ; compelling Governmental disagreement with message interest test conveyed A law that is content based on its face is subject Constitutional Law to strict scrutiny regardless of the government's Strict or exacting scrutiny ; compelling benign motive, content-neutral justification, or interest test lack of animus toward the ideas contained in the Laws that, though facially content neutral, regulated speech. U .S.C .A . Const.Amend. 1 . cannot be justified without reference to the 2 Cases that cite this headnote content of the regulated speech, or that were adopted by the government because of disagreement with the message the speech [9 ! Constitutional Law conveys, like those laws that are content based on er Freedom of Speech, Expression, and Press their face, must satisfy strict scrutiny . U . S .C .A . Constitutional Law Const.Amend. I . r Censorship 4 Cases that cite this headnote Illicit legislative intent is not the sine qua non of a violation of the First Amendment's free speech guarantee, and a party opposing the government 161 Constitutional Law need adduce no evidence of an improper Temporary signs censorial motive. U . S .C .A . Const.Amend. 1 . Town's sign code, which subjected ideological signs to certain restrictions, subjected political Cases that cite this headnote signs to greater restrictions, and subjected temporary directional signs relating to events to 1101 Constitutional Law even greater restrictions, was content based on . Strict or exacting scrutiny ; compelling its face, and thus was subject to strict scrutiny interest test in free speech challenge by church seeking to may purpose Although a content-based be place temporary signs announcing its services; in y sufficient in certain circumstances to show that any innocent motives on part of town did are regulation of speech is content based and thus not eliminate danger of censorship, sign code g p subject to strict scrutiny, it is not necessary . singled out specific subject matter for differential U . S .C. A . Const.Amend. I . treatment even if it did not target viewpoints within that subject matter, and sign code singled West lawNex: z Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz. , 135 S .Ct. 2218 ( 2015 ) 192 L. Ed . 2d 236, 83 USLW 4444 , 15 Cal . Daily Op . Serv. 6239. . . A speech regulation targeted at specific subject 1 Cases that cite this headnote matter is content based, and thus subject to strict scrutiny, even if it does not discriminate among 1111 Constitutional Law viewpoints within that subject matter. U . S .C .A . Strict or exacting scrutiny ; compelling Const.Amend. 1 . interest test 1 Cases that cite this headnote An innocuous justification cannot transform a facially content-based law regulating speech into one that is content neutral and thus subject to [ 15 ] Constitutional Law a lower level of scrutiny than strict scrutiny . Content-Neutral Regulations or Restrictions U . S .C .A . Const.Amend . 1 . The fact that a speech-related distinction is speaker based does not automatically render the 8 Cases that cite this headnote distinction content neutral and thus subject to a lower level of scrutiny than strict scrutiny . [ 12 ] Constitutional Law U . S .C .A . Const.Amend. 1 . �— Content-Neutral Regulations or Restrictions Cases that cite this headnote Constitutional Law 4_ Strict or exacting scrutiny ; compelling interest test [ 16 ] Constitutional Law Because strict scrutiny applies either when a law Strict or exacting scrutiny ; compelling is content based on its face or when the purpose interest test and justification for the law are content based, Because speech restrictions based on the identity a court must evaluate each question before it of the speaker are all too often simply a means concludes that the law is content neutral and thus to control content, laws favoring some speakers subject to a lower level of scrutiny in a free over others demand strict scrutiny when the speech challenge. U .S.C.A . Const.Amend. 1 . legislature's speaker preference reflects a content preference. U . S.C.A . Const.Amend. 1 . Cases that cite this headnote 1 Cases that cite this headnote [ 13 ] Constitutional Law Content-Based Regulations or Restrictions [ 17] Constitutional Law \e/- Content-Neutral Regulations or Restrictions Government discrimination among viewpoints, or the regulation of speech based on the The fact that a speech-related distinction is event specific motivating ideology or the opinion or based does not render it content neutral and thus perspective of the speaker, is a more blatant subject to a lower level of scrutiny than strict and egregious form of content discrimination, scrutiny . U . S .C .A . Const.Amend. 1 . but the First Amendment's hostility to content- Cases that cite this headnote based regulation extends not only to restrictions on particular viewpoints, but also to prohibition of public discussion of an entire topic. U . S .C .A . [ 18 ] Constitutional Law Const.Amend. I . __-- Strict or exacting scrutiny ; compelling interest test 1 Cases that cite this headnote Strict scrutiny requires the Government to prove q that a restriction on speech furthers a compelling [ 14 ] Constitutional Law interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that Strict or exacting scrutiny ; compelling interest. U . S.C .A . Const.Amend. 1 . interest test WestlawNe;; t - _ - - Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz. , 135 S .Ct. 2218 (2015 ) 192 L. Ed .2d 236, 83 USLW 4444 , 15 Cal . Daily Op . Serv. 6239. . . Not all speech-related distinctions are subject to l Cases that cite this headnote strict scrutiny, only content-based ones are; laws that are content neutral are instead subject to [ 19 [ Constitutional Law lesser scrutiny . U .S .C .A . Const.Amend. 1 . , Temporary signs 2 Cases that cite this headnote Municipal Corporations Billboards, signs, and other structures or devices for advertising purposes Town's content-based sign code, which subjected ideological signs to certain *2221 Syllabus * restrictions, subjected political signs to greater restrictions, and subjected temporary directional The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the signs relating to events to even greater Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions restrictions, did not survive strict scrutiny, for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. and thus violated free speech guarantees; even Detroit Timber & Lumber Co. , 200 U . S. 321 , 337, 26 if town had compelling government interests S .Ct. 282, 50 L. Ed. 499. in preserving town's aesthetic appeal and Gilbert, Arizona (Town), has a comprehensive code ( Sign traffic safety, sign code's distinctions were Code or Code) that prohibits the display of outdoor signs underinclusive, and thus were not narrowly without a permit, but exempts 23 categories of signs, tailored to achieve that end, in that temporary including three relevant here. "Ideological Signs," defined directional signs were no greater an eyesore than as signs "communicating a message or ideas" that do not fit ideological or political ones, and there was no in any other Sign Code category, may be up to 20 square reason to believe that directional signs posed feet and have no placement or time restrictions. "Political a greater threat to safety than ideological or Signs," defined as signs "designed to influence the outcome political signs. U . S.C .A . Const.Amend. L of an election," may be up to 32 square feet and may only be 3 Cases that cite this headnote displayed during an election season. "Temporary Directional Signs," defined as signs directing the public to a church or other "qualifying event," have even greater restrictions: No [201 Constitutional Law more than four of the signs, limited to six square feet, may be Freedom of Speech, Expression, and Press on a single property at any time, and signs may be displayed A law cannot be regarded as protecting an no more than 12 hours before the "qualifying event" and 1 interest of the highest order, and thus as hour after. justifying a restriction on truthful speech, when it leaves appreciable damage to that Petitioners, Good News Community Church (Church) and its supposedly vital interest unprohibited. U . S.C .A . pastor, Clyde Reed, whose Sunday church services are held Const.Amend. 1 . at various temporary locations in and near the Town, posted signs early each Saturday bearing the Church name and the Cases that cite this headnote time and location of the next service and did not remove the signs until around *2222 midday Sunday . The Church was [21 Constitutional Law cited for exceeding the time limits for displaying temporary Strict or exacting scrutiny ; compelling directional signs and for failing to include an event date on interest test the signs. Unable to reach an accommodation with the Town, petitioners filed suit, claiming that the Code abridged their Constitutional Law freedom of speech. The District Court ' Content-Neutral Regulations or Restrictions denied their motion for a preliminary injunction, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, 111 Constitutional Law ultimately concluding that the Code's sign categories were Strict or exacting scrutiny ; compelling content neutral, and that the Code satisfied the intermediate interest test scrutiny accorded to content-neutral regulations of speech. WestlawNex t Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz. , 135 S . Ct. 2218 (2015 ) 192 L. Ed . 2d 236 , 83 USLW 4444 , 15 Cal . Daily Op . Serv . 6239. . . must evaluate each question whether a law is content based Held : The Sign Code's provisions are content-based on its face and whether the purpose and justification for regulations of speech that do not survive strict scrutiny . Pp. the law are content based before concluding that a law 2226 — 2233 . is content neutral . Ward does not require otherwise, for its framework applies only to a content-neutral statute. (a) Because content-based laws target speech based on its communicative content, they are presumptively The Ninth Circuit's conclusion that the Sign Code does unconstitutional and may be justified only if the government not single out any idea or viewpoint for discrimination proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling conflates two distinct but related limitations that the state interests. E.g. , R. A .V. v. St. Paul, 505 U . S . 377, 395 , 112 First Amendment places on government *2223 regulation S .Ct. 2538, 120 L . Ed.2d 305 . Speech regulation is content of speech . Government discrimination among viewpoints based if a law applies to particular speech because of the topic is a "more blatant" and "egregious form of content discussed or the idea or message expressed. E.g. , Sorrell v. discrimination," Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. IMS Health, Inc. , 564 U . S . , - , 131 S .Ct. of Va. , 515 U . S . 819, 829, 115 S .Ct. 2510, 132 L .Ed.2d 2653 , 2663-2664, 180 L. Ed.2d 544 . And courts are required 700, but "[t] he First Amendment's hostility to content-based to consider whether a regulation of speech "on its face" draws regulation [also] extends . . . to prohibition of public discussion distinctions based on the message a speaker conveys . Id. , of an entire topic," Consolidated Edison Co. of N. Y. v. Public at , 131 S .Ct., at 2664. Whether laws define regulated Serv. Comm 'n of N. Y. , 447 U . S . 530, 537, 100 S.Ct. 2326, speech by particular subject matter or by its function or 65 L . Ed.2d 319. The Sign Code, a paradigmatic example purpose, they are subject to strict scrutiny . The same is true of content-based discrimination, singles out specific subject for laws that, though facially content neutral, cannot be " matter for differential treatment, even if it does not target `justified without reference to the content of the regulated viewpoints within that subject matter. speech, ' " or were adopted by the government "because of disagreement with the message" conveyed. Ward v. Rock The Ninth Circuit also erred in concluding that the Sign Code Against Racism, 491 U .S . 781 , 791 , 109 S .Ct. 2746, 105 was not content based because it made only speaker-based L .Ed.2d 661 . Pp. 2226 — 2227. and event-based distinctions. The Code's categories are not speaker-based—the restrictions for political, ideological, and (b) The Sign Code is content based on its face. It defines the temporary event signs apply equally no matter who sponsors categories of temporary, political, and ideological signs on them . And even if the sign categories were speaker based, the basis of their messages and then subjects each category that would not automatically render the law content neutral . to different restrictions. The restrictions applied thus depend Rather, "laws favoring some speakers over others demand entirely on the sign's communicative content. Because the strict scrutiny when the legislature's speaker preference Code, on its face, is a content-based regulation of speech, reflects a content preference." Turner Broadcasting System, there is no need to consider the government's justifications Inc. v. FCC, 512 U . S . 622, 658, 114 S .Ct. 2445 , 129 L .Ed.2d or purposes for enacting the Code to determine whether it is 497 . This same analysis applies to event-based distinctions. subject to strict scrutiny . P. 2227. Pp. 2227 — 2231 . (c ) None ofthe Ninth Circuit's theories for its contrary holding (d) The Sign Code's content-based restrictions do not survive is persuasive. Its conclusion that the Town's regulation was strict scrutiny because the Town has not demonstrated that the not based on a disagreement with the message conveyed Code's differentiation between temporary directional signs skips the crucial first step in the content-neutrality analysis: and other types of signs furthers a compelling governmental determining whether the law is content neutral on its face. A interest and is narrowly tailored to that end. See Arizona law that is content based on its face is subject to strict scrutiny Free Enterprise Club 's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, regardless of the government's benign motive, content-neutral 564 U . S. , , 131 S .Ct. 2806, 2817, 180 L . Ed.2d justification, or lack of "animus toward the ideas contained" 664 . Assuming that the Town has a compelling interest in in the regulated speech. Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, preserving its aesthetic appeal and traffic safety, the Code's Inc. , 507 U . S . 410, 429, 113 S.Ct. 1505 , 123 L .Ed.2d 99. distinctions are highly underinclusive. The Town cannot Thus, an innocuous justification cannot transform a facially claim that placing strict limits on temporary directional signs content-based law into one that is content neutral . A court is necessary to beautify the Town when other types of signs WestlawNex t Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz. , 135 S .Ct. 2218 (2015) 192 L. Ed . 2d 236, 83 USLW 4444 , 15 Cal . Daily Op . Serv. 6239. . . create the same problem. See Discovery Network, supra, at 425, 113 S .Ct. 1505 . Nor has it shown that temporary Opinion directional signs pose a greater threat to public safety than Justice THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court. ideological or political signs. Pp. 2231 — 2232. The town of Gilbert, Arizona (or Town), has adopted a (e ) This decision will not prevent governments from enacting comprehensive code governing the manner in which people effective sign laws. The Town has ample content-neutral may display outdoor signs. Gilbert, Ariz., Land Development options available to resolve problems with safety and Code Code or Code),( Sign e), ch . 1 , § 4.402 (2005 ). The aesthetics, including regulating size, building materials, Sign Code identifies various ca tegories categories of signs based on lighting, moving parts, and portability . And the Town may be the type of information o they convey, then subjects each able to forbid postings on public property, so long as it does category to different restrictions. ca tegories ry One of the categories so in an evenhanded, content-neutral manner. See Members is "Temporary Directional Signs Relating to a Qualifying of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 Event," loosely defined ' U .S. 789, 817, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 80 L . Ed.2d 772 . An ordinance as signs directing the public to a meeting of a nonprofit group. § 4.402( P). The Code imposes narrowly tailored to the challenges of protecting the safety more stringent restrictions on these signs ' ofpedestrians, drivers, andpassengers—e.g. , g than it does on signs warning signs conveying other messages. We hold that these provisions are marking hazards on private property or signs directing traffic content-based regulations of speech that cannot survive strict might also survive strict scrutiny . Pp. 2232 — 2233 . scrutiny . 707 F .3d 1057, reversed and remanded. 1 The Town's Sign Code is available online at http:// THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which www. gilbertaz.gov/departments/development-service/ ROBERTS, C.J ., and SCALIA , KENNEDY, ALITO, and planning-development/land-development-code (as visited June 16, 2015, and available in Clerk of Court's SOTOMAYOR, JJ ., joined. AUTO, J., filed a concurring case file). opinion, in which KENNEDY and SOTOMAYOR, JJ ., joined. BREYER, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. KAGAN, J ., filed an opinion concurring in the i judgment, in which GINSBURG and BREYER, JJ ., joined. A Attorneys and Law Firms The Sign Code prohibits the display of outdoor signs David A . Cortman, Lawrenceville, GA, for Petitioners. anywhere within the Town without a permit, but it then exempts 23 categories of signs from that requirement. These *2224 Eric J . Feigin, Washington, DC, for the United States exemptions include everything from bazaar signs to flying as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court, supporting banners. Three categories of exempt signs are particularly neither party . relevant here. Philip W . Savrin, Atlanta, GA, for Respondents. The first is "Ideological g Sign [s] ." This category includes any "sign communicating a message or ideas for noncommercial Kevin H . Theriot, Jeremy D. Tedesco, Alliance Defending purposes that is not a Construction Sign, Directional Sign, Freedom, Scottsdale, AZ, David A . Cortman, Counsel of Record, Rory T. Gray, Alliance Defending Freedom, Temporary Directional Sign Relating to a Qualifying Event, Lawrenceville, GA , for Petitioner. Political Sign, Garage Sale Sign, or a sign owned or required by a governmental agency." Sign Code, Glossary of General Philip W . Savrin, Counsel of Record, Dana K . Maine, Terms (Glossary ), p. 23 (emphasis deleted). Of the three William H . Buechner, Jr., Freeman Mathis & Gary, LLP, categories discussed here, the Code treats ideological signs Atlanta, GA, for Respondents. most favorably, allowing them to be up to 20 square feet in area and to be placed in all "zoning districts" without time limits. § 4.402(J ) . VVestlawNex Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz. , 135 S. Ct. 2218 ( 2015 ) 192 L. Ed . 2d 236 , 83 USLW 4444 , 15 Cal . Daily Op . Serv . 6239. . . The second category is "Political Sign [s] ." This includes any "temporary sign designed to influence the outcome of an election called by a public body ." Glossary 23 . 2 The Code treats these signs less favorably than ideological signs. Petitioners Good News Community Church (Church) and its The Code allows the placement of political signs up to 16 pastor, Clyde Reed, wish to advertise the time and location square feet on residential property and up to 32 square feet of their Sunday church services. The Church is a small, on nonresidential property, undeveloped municipal property, cash-strapped entity that owns no building, so it holds its and "rights-of-way ." *2225 § 4.402( 1 ). 3 3 These signs may services at elementary schools or other locations in or near be displayed up to 60 days before a primary election and up the Town. In order to inform the public about its services, to 15 days following a general election . Ibid. which are held in a variety of different locations, the Church began placing 15 to 20 temporary signs around the Town, 2 frequently in the public right-of-way abutting the street. The A "Temporary Sign" is a "sign not permanently attached signs typically displayed the Church's name, along with the to the ground, a wall or a building, and not designed or time and location of the upcoming service. Church members intended for permanent display ." Glossary 25 . would post the signs early in the day on Saturday and then 3 The Code defines "Right—of—Way" as a "strip of publicly remove them around midday on Sunday . The display of owned land occupied by or planned for a street, utilities, these signs requires little money and manpower, and thus has landscaping, sidewalks, trails, and similar facilities." Id. , proved to be an economical and effective way for the Church at 18. to let the community know where its services are being held The third category is "Temporary Directional Signs Relating each week. to a Qualifying Event." This includes any "Temporary Sign intended to direct pedestrians, motorists, and other passersby This practice caught the attention of the Town's Sign to a `qualifying event. ' " Glossary 25 ( emphasis deleted). A Code compliance manager, who twice cited the Church "qualifying event" is defined as any "assembly, gathering, for violating the Code. The first citation noted that the activity, or meeting sponsored, arranged, or promoted by Church exceeded the time limits for displaying its temporary a religious, charitable, community service, educational, or directional signs. The second citation referred to the same other similar non-profit organization ." Ibid. The Code treats problem, along with the Church's failure to include the date temporary directional signs even less favorably than political of the event on the signs. Town officials even confiscated one of the Church's signs, which Reed had to retrieve from the signs. 4 Temporary directional signs may be no larger than six square feet. § 4.402( P). They may be placed on private municipal offices. property or on a public right-of-way, but no more than four signs may be placed on a single property at any time. Ibid. Reed contacted the Sign Code Compliance Department And, they may be displayed no more than 12 hours before the in an attempt to reach an accommodation . His efforts "qualifying event" and no more than 1 hour afterward. Ibid. proved unsuccessful . The Town's Code compliance manager informed the Church that there *2226 would be "no leniency 4 under the Code" and promised to punish any future violations. The Sign Code has been amended twice during the pendency of this case. When litigation began in 2007, the Shortly thereafter, petitioners filed a complaint in the United Code defined the signs at issue as "Religious Assembly Temporary Direction Signs." App. 75 . The Code entirely States District Court for the District of Arizona, arguing prohibited placement of those signs in the public right-of- that the Sign Code abridged their freedom of speech in way, and it forbade posting them in any location for more violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The than two hours before the religious assembly or more District Court denied the petitioners' motion for a preliminary than one hour afterward. Id. , at 75-76. In 2008, the Town injunction. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit redefined the category as "Temporary Directional Signs affirmed, holding that the Sign Code's provision regulating Related to a Qualifying Event," and it expanded the time temporary directional signs did not regulate speech on the limit to 12 hours before and 1 hour alter the "qualifying basis of content. 587 F .3d 966, 979 (2009). It reasoned event." Ibid. In 2011 , the Town amended the Code to that, even though an enforcement officer would have to authorize placement of temporary directional signs in the read the sign to determine what provisions of the Sign public right-of-way . Id. , at 89. Code applied to it, the " ' kind of cursory examination ' WesttawNext _ Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz. , 135 S .Ct. 2218 (2015) 192 L. Ed . 2d 236, 83 USLW 4444, 15 Cal . Daily Op . Serv . 6239. . . " that would be necessary for an officer to classify it as unconstitutional and may be justified only if the government a temporary directional sign was "not akin to an officer proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling synthesizing the expressive content of the sign ." Id , at 978 . state interests. R.A .V. v. St. Paul, 505 U . S . 377, 395 , 112 S .Ct. It then remanded for the District Court to determine in the 2538, 120 L. Ed.2d 305 ( 1992); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. first instance whether the Sign Code's distinctions among Members of N. Y. State Crime Victims Bd. , 502 U . S. 105 , 115 , temporary directional signs, political signs, and ideological 118, 112 S.Ct. 501 , 116 L . Ed.2d 476 ( 1991 ) . signs nevertheless constituted a content-based regulation of speech. *2227 [31 [4 ] Government regulation of speech is content based if a law applies to particular speech because of the topic On remand, the District Court granted summary judgment discussed or the idea or message expressed. E.g. , Sorrell v. in favor of the Town . The Court of Appeals again IMS Health, Inc. , 564 U .S . , — , 131 S .Ct. affirmed, holding that the Code's sign categories were 2653 , 2663-2664, 180 L. Ed.2d 544 (2011 ); Carey v. Brown, content neutral . The court concluded that "the distinctions 447 U.S . 455 , 462, 100 S.Ct. 2286, 65 L.Ed.2d 263 ( 1980); between Temporary Directional Signs, Ideological Signs, and Mosley, supra, at 95, 92 S.Ct. 2286. This commonsense Political Signs . . . are based on objective factors relevant to meaning of the phrase "content based" requires a court to Gilbert's creation of the specific exemption from the permit consider whether a regulation of speech "on its face" draws requirement and do not otherwise consider the substance of distinctions based on the message a speaker conveys. Sorrell, the sign." 707 F .3d 1057, 1069 (C.A .9 2013 ). Relying on supra, at , 131 S.Ct., at 2664. Some facial distinctions this Court's decision in Hill v. Colorado, 530 U .S. 703 , 120 based on a message are obvious, defining regulated speech S .Ct. 2480, 147 L .Ed.2d 597 (2000), the Court of Appeals by particular subject matter, and others are more subtle, concluded that the Sign Code is content neutral . 707 F .3d, at defining regulated speech by its function or purpose. Both are 1071 - 1072. As the court explained, "Gilbert did not adopt its distinctions drawn based on the message a speaker conveys, regulation of speech because it disagreed with the message and, therefore, are subject to strict scrutiny . conveyed" and its "interests in regulat[ing] temporary signs are unrelated to the content of the sign." Ibid Accordingly, [5l Our precedents have also recognized a separate and the court believed that the Code was "content-neutral as that additional category of laws that, though facially content term [has been] defined by the Supreme Court." Id , at 1071 . neutral , will be considered content-based regulations of In light of that determination, it applied a lower level of speech : laws that cannot be " `justified without reference to scrutiny to the Sign Code and concluded that the law did not the content of the regulated speech, ' " or that were adopted by violate the First Amendment. Id , at 1073- 1076 . the government "because of disagreement with the message [the speech] conveys," Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 We granted certiorari, 573 U . S . , 134 S .Ct. 2900, 189 U . S . 781 , 791 , 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L. Ed.2d 661 ( 1989). Those L .Ed.2d 854 (2014), and now reverse. laws, like those that are content based on their face, must also satisfy strict scrutiny . li B A [61 The Town's Sign Code is content based on its face. [ 1 I [2 [ The First Amendment, applicable to the States It defines "Temporary Directional Signs" on the basis of through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits the enactment whether a sign conveys the message of directing the public to church or some other "qualifying event." Glossary 25 . of laws "abridging the freedom of speech ." U .S . Const., Amdt. 1 . Under that Clause, a government, including a It defines "Political Signs" on the basis of whether a municipal government vested with state authority, "has no sign's message is "designed to influence the outcome of an power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, election " Id , at 24. And it defines "Ideological Signs" on the its subject matter, or its content. " Police Dept. of Chicago basis of whether a sign "communicat [es] a message or ideas" v. Mosley, 408 U . S. 92, 95 , 92 S .Ct. 2286, 33 L . Ed .2d that do not fit within the Code's other categories. Id , at 23 . It 212 ( 1972). Content-based laws those that target speech then subjects each of these categories to different restrictions. based on its communicative content are presumptively WesttawNex,t _ Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz. , 135 S.Ct. 2218 (2015 ) 192 L. Ed . 2d 236, 83 USLW 4444 , 15 Cal . Daily Op . Serv . 6239. . . The restrictions in the Sign Code that apply to any given intent is not the sine qua non of a violation of the First sign thus depend entirely on the communicative content of Amendment, ' " and a party opposing the government "need the sign . If a sign informs its reader of the time and place adduce ` no evidence of an improper censorial motive. ' " a book club will discuss John Locke's Two Treatises of Simon & Schuster, supra, at 117, 112 S .Ct. 501 . Although Government, that sign will be treated differently from a sign "a content-based purpose may be sufficient in certain expressing the view that one should vote for one of Locke's circumstances to show that a regulation is content based, it followers in an upcoming election, and both signs will be is not necessary ." Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, treated differently from a sign expressing an ideological view 512 U . S. 622, 642, 114 S .Ct. 2445 , 129 L . Ed.2d 497 ( 1994) . rooted in Locke's theory of government. More to the point, the In other words, an innocuous justification cannot transform a Church's signs inviting people to attend its worship services facially content-based law into one that is content neutral . are treated differently from signs conveying other types of ideas. On its face, the Sign Code is a content-based regulation [ 121 That is why we have repeatedly considered whether a of speech. We thus have no need to consider the government's law is content neutral on its face before turning to the law's justifications or purposes for enacting the Code to determine justification or purpose. See, e.g. , Sorrell, supra, at — whether it is subject to strict scrutiny . , 131 S .Ct., at 2663-2664 (statute was content based "on its face," and there was also evidence of an impermissible legislative motive); United States v. Eichman, 496 U .S. 310, 315 , 110 S .Ct. 2404, 110 L . Ed.2d 287 ( 1990 ) ("Although the [statute] contains no explicit content-based limitation on the In reaching the contrary conclusion, the Court of Appeals scope of prohibited conduct, it is nevertheless clear that the offered several theories to explain why the Town's Sign Code Government's asserted interest is related to the suppression should be deemed content neutral . None is persuasive. of free expression" ( internal quotation marks omitted)); Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U . S . 789, 804, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 80 L . Ed.2d 772 ( 1984) ("The text of the ordinance is neutral," and "there is 1 not even a hint of bias or censorship in the City's enactment The Court of Appeals first determined that the Sign Code was or enforcement of this ordinance"); Clark v. Community for content neutral because the Town "did not adopt its regulation Creative Non— Violence, 468 U .S . 288, 293 , 104 S.Ct. 3065 , of speech [based on] disagree [ment] with the message 82 L .Ed.2d 221 ( 1984 ) ( requiring that a facially content- conveyed," and its justifications for regulating temporary neutral ban on camping must be "justified without reference directional signs were "unrelated to the content of the sign ." to the content of the regulated speech"); United States v. O 'Brien, 391 U .S . 367, 375 , 377, 88 S .Ct. 1673 , 20 L . Ed.2d 707 F .3d, at 1071 - 1072. *2228 In its brief to this Court, the United States similarly contends that a sign regulation is 672 ( 1968) ( noting that the statute "on its face deals with content neutral—even if it expressly draws distinctions based conduct having no connection with speech," but examining on the sign's communicative content if those distinctions whether the "the governmental interest is unrelated to the can be " `justified without reference to the content of the suppression of free expression"). Because strict scrutiny regulated speech. ' " Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae applies either when a law is content based on its face or when 20, 24 (quoting Ward, supra, at 791 , 109 S.Ct. 2746; emphasis the purpose and justification for the law are content based, deleted). a court must evaluate each question before it concludes that the law is content neutral and thus subject to a lower level of 171 181 191 1 101 [ 11 l But this analysis skips the crucial rutiny . first step in the content-neutrality analysis: determining whether the law is content neutral on its face. A law that The Court of Appeals and the United States misunderstand is content based on its face is subject to strict scrutiny our decision in Ward as suggesting that a government's regardless of the government's benign motive, content-neutral purpose is relevant even when a law is content based justification, or lack of "animus toward the ideas contained" on its face. That is incorrect. Ward had nothing to say in the regulated speech. Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, about facially content-based restrictions because it involved Inc. , 507 U .S. 410, 429, 113 S .Ct. 1505 , 123 L . Ed.2d 99 a facially content-neutral ban on the use, in a city-owned ( 1993 ). We have thus made clear that " ` illicit legislative music venue, of sound amplification systems not provided [ ] g WestlawNext • J ; 1 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz. , 135 S . Ct. 2218 (2015 ) 192 L. Ed . 2d 236 , 83 USLW 4444 , 15 Cal . Daily Op. Serv. 6239. . . by the city . 491 U . S., at 787, and n. 2, 109 S.Ct. 2746 . The Court of Appeals next reasoned that the Sign Code was In that context, we looked to *2229 governmental motive, content neutral because it "does not mention any idea or including whether the government had regulated speech viewpoint, let alone single one out for differential treatment." "because of disagreement" with its message, and whether the 587 F .3d, at 977. It reasoned that, for the purpose of the regulation was " `justified without reference to the content Code provisions, "[i]t makes no difference which candidate of the speech . ' " Id. , at 791 , 109 S .Ct. 2746 . But Ward 's is supported, who sponsors the event, or what ideological framework "applies only if a statute is content neutral ." Hill, perspective is asserted." 707 F .3d, at 1069. 530 U . S., at 766, 120 S .Ct. 2480 ( KENNEDY, J., dissenting). Its rules thus operate "to protect speech," not "to restrict it." The Town seizes on this reasoning, insisting that "content Id. , at 765 , 120 S .Ct. 2480. based" is a term of art that "should be applied flexibly" with the goal of protecting "viewpoints and ideas from government The First Amendment requires no less. Innocent motives do censorship or favoritism ." Brief for Respondents 22. In the not eliminate the danger of censorship presented by a facially Town's view, a sign regulation that "does not censor or favor content-based statute, as future government officials may one particular viewpoints or ideas" cannot be content based. Ibid. day wield such statutes to suppress disfavored speech . That The Sign Code allegedly passes this test because its treatment is why the First Amendment expressly targets the operation of temporary directional signs does not raise any concerns of the laws i. e. , the "abridg[ement] of speech"—rather than that the government is "endorsing or suppressing ` ideas or merely the motives of those who enacted them . U .S. Const., viewpoints, ' " id , at 27, and the provisions for political signs Amdt. 1 . " 'The vice of content-based legislation . . . is not that and ideological signs "are neutral as to particular ideas or it is always used for invidious, thought-control purposes, but viewpoints" within those categories. Id , at 37. that it lends itself to use for those purposes. ' " Hill, supra, at 743 , 120 S.Ct. 2480 ( SCALIA, J ., dissenting). [ 131 This analysis conflates two distinct but related limitations that the First *2230 Amendment places on For instance, in NAACP v. Button, 371 U .S. 415 , 83 S .Ct. 328, government regulation of speech. Government discrimination 9 L . Ed.2d 405 ( 1963 ), the Court encountered a State's attempt among viewpoints or the regulation of speech based on "the to use a statute prohibiting " ` improper solicitation ' " by specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of attorneys to outlaw litigation-related speech of the National the speaker"—is a "more blatant" and "egregious form of Association for the Advancement of Colored People. Id , content discrimination." Rosenberger v. Rector and visitors at 438, 83 S.Ct. 328 . Although Button predated our more of Univ. of Va. , 515 U.S. 819, 829, 115 S.Ct. 2510, 132 recent formulations of strict scrutiny, the Court rightly L .Ed.2d 700 ( 1995 ) . But it is well established that "[t] he First rejected the State's claim that its interest in the "regulation of Amendment's hostility to content-based regulation extends professional conduct" rendered the statute consistent with the not only to restrictions on particular viewpoints, but also First Amendment, observing that "it is no answer . . . to say . . . to prohibition of public discussion of an entire topic." that the purpose of these regulations was merely to insure high Consolidated Edison Co. of N. I v. Public Serv. Comm 'n of N. professional standards and not to curtail free expression." Y. , 447 U . S . 530, 537, 100 S .Ct. 2326, 65 L . Ed.2d 319 ( 1980). Id. , at 438-439, 83 S.Ct. 328. Likewise, one could easily imagine a Sign Code compliance manager who disliked the [ 14 [ Thus, a speech regulation targeted at specific subject Church's substantive teachings deploying the Sign Code to matter is content based even if it does not discriminate among make it more difficult for the Church to inform the public of viewpoints within that subject matter. Ibid For example, a the location of its services. Accordingly, we have repeatedly law banning the use of sound trucks for political speech and "rejected the argument that ` discriminatory . . . treatment is only political speech would be a content-based regulation, suspect under the First Amendment only when the legislature even if it imposed no limits on the political viewpoints that intends to suppress certain ideas. ' " Discovery Network, 507 could be expressed. See Discovery Network, supra, at 428, U . S., at 429, 113 S.Ct. 1505 . We do so again today . 113 S.Ct. 1505 . The Town's Sign Code likewise singles out specific subject matter for differential treatment, even if it does not target viewpoints within that subject matter. 2 Ideological messages are given more favorable treatment than messages concerning a political candidate, which are themselves given more favorable treatment than messages WestlawNex t Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz. , 135 S .Ct. 2218 ( 2015 ) 192 L. Ed . 2d 236 , 83 USLW 4444 , 15 Cal . Daily Op . Serv. 6239. . . announcing an assembly of like-minded individuals. That is come election time, it requires Town officials to determine a paradigmatic example of content-based discrimination . whether a sign is "designed to influence the outcome of an election" (and thus "political") or merely "communicating a message or ideas for noncommercial purposes" (and thus "ideological") . Glossary 24. That obvious content-based 3 inquiry does not evade strict scrutiny review simply because Finally , the Court of Appeals characterized the Sign Code's an event ( i. e. , an election) is involved. distinctions as turning on " `the content-neutral elements of who is speaking through the sign and whether and when an [ 17 [ And, just as with speaker-based laws, the fact that a event is occurring. ' " 707 F .3d, at 1069. That analysis is distinction is event based does not render it content neutral . mistaken on both factual and legal grounds. The Court of Appeals cited no precedent from this Court supporting its novel theory of an exception from the content- To start, the Sign Code's distinctions are not speaker based. neutrality requirement for event-based laws. As we have The restrictions for political, ideological, and temporary event explained, a speech regulation is content based if the law signs apply equally no matter who sponsors them . If a local applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed business, for example, sought to put up signs advertising or the idea or message expressed. Supra, at 2226 — 2227. A the Church's meetings, those signs would be subject to the regulation that targets a sign because it conveys an idea about same limitations as such signs placed by the Church . And if a specific event is no less content based than a regulation Reed had decided to display signs in support of a particular that targets a sign because it conveys some other idea. Here, candidate, he could have made those signs far larger and the Code singles out signs bearing a particular message: the kept them up for far longer than signs inviting people to time and location of a specific event. This type of ordinance attend his church services. If the Code's distinctions were may seem like a perfectly rational way to regulate signs, but a truly speaker based, both types of signs would receive the clear and firm rule governing content neutrality is an essential same treatment. means of protecting the freedom of speech, even if laws that might seem "entirely reasonable" will sometimes be "struck [ 151 [ 161 In any case, the fact that a distinction is speaker down because of their content-based nature." City of Ladue based does not, as the Court of Appeals seemed to believe, v. Gilleo, 512 U . S . 43 , 60, 114 S .Ct. 2038, 129 L. Ed.2d 36 automatically render the distinction content neutral . Because ( 1994) (O'Connor, J ., concurring) . "[s]peech restrictions based on the identity of the speaker are all too often simply a means to control content," Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm 'n, 558 U .S . 310, 340, III 130 S.Ct. 876, 175 L . Ed.2d 753 ( 2010), we have insisted that "laws favoring some speakers over others demand strict [ 18 [ [ 19 [ Because the Town's Sign Code imposes content- scrutiny when the legislature's speaker preference reflects based restrictions on speech, those provisions can stand a content preference," Turner, 512 U .S., at 658, 114 S .Ct. only if they survive strict scrutiny, " ` which requires 2445 . Thus, a law limiting the content of newspapers, but the Government to prove that the restriction furthers a only newspapers, could not evade strict scrutiny simply compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that because it could be characterized as speaker based. Likewise, interest, ' " Arizona Free Enterprise Club 's Freedom Club a content-based law that restricted the political speech of all PAC v. Bennett, 564 U .S . , , 131 S.Ct. 2806, corporations would not become content neutral just because 2817, 180 L. Ed.2d 664 ( 201 1 ) (quoting Citizens United, it singled out corporations as a class of speakers. See Citizens 558 U . S ., at 340, 130 S .Ct. 876). Thus, it is the Town's United, supra, at 340-341 , 130 S .Ct. 876. Characterizing a burden to demonstrate that the Code's differentiation between distinction *2231 as speaker based is only the beginning— temporary directional signs and other types of signs, such as not the end of the inquiry . political signs and ideological signs, furthers - a compelling governmental interest and is narrowly tailored to that end. See Nor do the Sign Code's distinctions hinge on "whether and ibid. when an event is occurring." The Code does not permit citizens to post signs on any topic whatsoever within a The Town cannot do so. It has offered only two governmental set period leading up to an election, for example. Instead, interests in support of the distinctions the Sign Code WestlawNext Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz. , 135 S . Ct. 2218 (2015) 192 L. Ed . 2d 236 , 83 USLW 4444 , 15 Cal . Daily Op. Serv. 6239. . . draws: preserving the Town's aesthetic appeal and traffic its current Code regulates many aspects of signs that have safety . Assuming for the sake of argument that those are nothing to do with a sign's message: size, building materials, compelling governmental interests, the Code's distinctions lighting, moving parts, and portability . See, e.g. , § 4.402( R). fail as hopelessly underinclusive. And on public property, the Town may go a long way toward entirely forbidding the posting of signs, so long as it does so Starting with the preservation of aesthetics, temporary in an evenhanded, content-neutral manner. See Taxpayers for directional signs are "no greater an eyesore," Discovery Vincent, 466 U . S ., at 817, 104 S .Ct. 2118 ( upholding content- Network, 507 U. S ., at 425 , 113 S.Ct. 1505 , than ideological neutral ban against posting signs on public property ). Indeed, or political ones. Yet the Code allows unlimited proliferation some lower courts have long held that similar content-based of larger ideological signs while strictly limiting the sign laws receive strict scrutiny , but there is no evidence number, size, and duration of smaller directional ones. The that towns in those jurisdictions have suffered catastrophic Town cannot claim that placing strict limits on temporary effects. See, e.g. , Solantic, LLC v. Neptune Beach, 410 F .3d directional signs is necessary to beautify the Town while at 1250, 1264- 1269 (C.A . 11 2005 ) (sign categories similar to the same time allowing unlimited numbers of other types of the town of Gilbert's were content based and subject to strict signs that create the same problem . scrutiny ); Matthews v. Needham, 764 F .2d 58, 59-60 (C.A . 1 1985 ) ( law banning political signs but not commercial signs *2232 The Town similarly has not shown that limiting was content based and subject to strict scrutiny ) . temporary directional signs is necessary to eliminate threats to traffic safety, but that limiting other types of signs is not. The We acknowledge that a city might reasonably view the Town has offered no reason to believe that directional signs general regulation of signs as necessary because signs "take pose a greater threat to safety than do ideological or political up space and may obstruct views, distract motorists, displace signs. If anything, a sharply worded ideological sign seems alternative uses for land, and pose other problems that more likely to distract a driver than a sign directing the public legitimately call for regulation." City of Ladue, 512 U . S., at to a nearby church meeting. 48, 114 S.Ct. 2038. At the same time, the presence of certain signs may be essential, both for vehicles and pedestrians, to 1201 In light of this underinclusiveness, the Town has not guide traffic or to identify hazards and ensure safety . A sign met its burden to prove that its Sign Code is narrowly tailored ordinance narrowly tailored to the challenges of protecting to further a compelling government interest. Because a " ` law the safety of pedestrians, drivers, and passengers such as cannot be regarded as protecting an interest of the highest warning signs marking hazards on private property, signs order, and thus as justifying a restriction on truthful speech, directing traffic, or street numbers associated with private when it leaves appreciable damage to that supposedly vital houses well might survive strict scrutiny . The signs at issue interest unprohibited, ' " Republican Party of Minn. v. White, in this case, including political and ideological signs and signs 536 U. S . 765, 780, 122 S.Ct. 2528, 153 L . Ed.2d 694 (2002), for events, are far removed from those purposes. As discussed the Sign Code fails strict scrutiny . above, they are facially content based and are neither justified by traditional safety concerns nor narrowly tailored. * * * IV 1211 Our decision today will not prevent governments from *2233 We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and enacting effective sign laws. The Town asserts that an " remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion . `absolutist' " content-neutrality rule would render "virtually all distinctions in sign laws . . . subject to strict scrutiny," Brief It is so ordered. for Respondents 34-35 , but that is not the case. Not "all distinctions" are subject to strict scrutiny, only content-based ones are. Laws that are content neutral are instead subject to Justice AL ITO, with whom Justice KENNEDY and Justice lesser scrutiny . See Clark, 468 U . S ., at 295 , 104 S .Ct. 3065 . SOTOMAYOR join, concurring. g I join the opinion of the Court but add a few words of further The Town has ample content-neutral options available to explanation . resolve problems with safety and aesthetics. For example, Wes tlawNex t Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz. , 135 S .Ct. 2218 (2015) 192 L . Ed . 2d 236, 83 USLW 4444 , 15 Cal . Daily Op. Serv. 6239. . . As the Court holds, what we have termed "content-based" * Of course, content-neutral restrictions on speech are laws must satisfy strict scrutiny. Content-based laws merit not necessarily consistent with the First Amendment. this protection because they present, albeit sometimes in a Time, place, and manner restrictions "must be narrowly subtler form, the same dangers as laws that regulate speech tailored to serve the government's legitimate, content- based on viewpoint. Limiting speech based on its "topic" or neutral interests." Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 "subject" favors those who do not want to disturb the status U .S . 781 , 798, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L. Ed.2d 661 ( 1989). quo. Such regulations may interfere with democratic self- But they need not meet the high standard imposed on government and the search for truth. See Consolidated Edison viewpoint- and content-based restrictions. Co. of N. Y. v. Public Serv. Comm 'n of N. Y. , 447 U .S . 530, In addition to regulating signs put up by private actors, 537, 100 S.Ct. 2326, 65 L . Ed.2d 319 ( 1980) . government entities may also erect their own signs consistent with the principles that allow governmental speech. See As the Court shows, the regulations at issue in this case are Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U .S . 460, 467-469, 129 replete with content-based distinctions, and as a result they S.Ct. 1125, 172 L .Ed.2d 853 (2009) . They may put up all must satisfy strict scrutiny . This does not mean, however, that manner of signs to promote safety, as well as directional signs municipalities are powerless to enact and enforce reasonable and signs pointing out historic sites and scenic spots. sign regulations. 1 will not attempt to provide anything like a comprehensive list, but here are some rules that would not Properly understood, today's decision will not prevent cities be content based: from regulating signs in a way that fully protects public *2234 safety and serves legitimate esthetic objectives. Rules regulating the size of signs. These rules may distinguish among signs based on any content-neutral criteria, including any relevant criteria listed below. Justice BREYER, concurring in the judgment. I join Justice KAGAN's separate opinion. Like Justice Rules regulating the locations in which signs may be placed. KAGAN I believe that categories alone cannot satisfactorily These rules may distinguish between free-standing signs and resolve the legal problem before us. The First Amendment those attached to buildings. requires greater judicial sensitivity both to the Amendment's expressive objectives and to the public's legitimate need for Rules distinguishing between lighted and unlighted signs. regulation than a simple recitation of categories, such as "content discrimination" and "strict scrutiny," would permit. Rules distinguishing between signs with fixed messages and In my view, the category "content discrimination" is better electronic signs with messages that change. considered in many contexts, including here, as a rule of thumb, rather than as an automatic "strict scrutiny" trigger, Rules that distinguish between the placement of signs on leading to almost certain legal condemnation. private and public property . To use content discrimination to trigger strict scrutiny Rules distinguishing between the placement of signs on sometimes makes perfect sense. There are cases in which the commercial and residential property . Court has found content discrimination an unconstitutional method for suppressing a viewpoint. E.g. , Rosenberger v. Rules distinguishing between on-premises and off-premises Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va. , 515 U . S. 819, 828— signs. 829, 115 S.Ct. 2510, 132 L .Ed.2d 700 ( 1995 ); see also Boos v. Barry, 485 U .S. 312, 318-319, 108 S.Ct. 1157, Rules restricting the total number of signs allowed per mile 99 L .Ed.2d 333 ( 1988 ) (plurality opinion ) (applying strict of roadway . scrutiny where the line between subject matter and viewpoint was not obvious) . And there are cases where the Court has Rules imposing time restrictions on signs advertising a one- found content discrimination to reveal that rules governing time event. Rules of this nature do not discriminate based a traditional public forum are, in fact, not a neutral way of on topic or subject and are akin to rules restricting the times fairly managing the forum in the interest of all speakers. Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U . S . 92, 96, 92 S.Ct. within which oral speech or music is allowed. * 2286, 33 L .Ed.2d 212 ( 1972 ) ( "Once a forum is opened up WestlawNex 1 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz. , 135 S.Ct. 2218 (2015 ) 192 L. Ed . 2d 236 , 83 USLW 4444 , 15 Cal . Daily Op . Serv. 6239. . . to assembly or speaking by some groups, government may allowing a physician to disclose that the patient has HIV to the not prohibit others from assembling or speaking on the basis patient's spouse or sexual partner); of income tax statements, of what they intend to say"). In these types of cases, strict e.g. , 26 U .S .C . § 6039F ( requiring taxpayers to furnish scrutiny is often appropriate, and content discrimination has information about foreign gifts received if the aggregate thus served a useful purpose. amount exceeds $ 10,000); of commercial airplane briefings, e.g. , 14 CFR § 136. 7 (2015 ) ( requiring pilots to ensure that But content discrimination, while helping courts to identify each passenger has been briefed on flight procedures, such unconstitutional suppression of expression, cannot and as seatbelt fastening); of signs at petting zoos, e.g. , N .Y . should not always trigger strict scrutiny . To say that it is Gen. Bus. Law Ann . § 399—ff( 3 ) ( West Cum . Supp. 2015 ) not an automatic "strict scrutiny" trigger is not to argue ( requiring petting zoos to post a sign at every exit " ` strongly against that concept's use. I readily concede, for example, that recommend [ing] that persons wash their hands upon exiting content discrimination, as a conceptual tool, can sometimes the petting zoo area' "); and so on. reveal weaknesses in the government's rationale for a rule that limits speech. If, for example, a city looks to litter Nor can the majority avoid the application of strict scrutiny prevention as the rationale for a prohibition against placing to all sorts of justifiable governmental regulations by relying newsracks dispensing free advertisements on public property, on this Court's many subcategories and exceptions to the why does it exempt other newsracks causing similar litter? rule. The Court has said, for example, that we should apply Cf. Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc. , 507 U .S . 410, less strict standards to "commercial speech ." Central Hudson 113 S .Ct. 1505 , 123 L . Ed.2d 99 ( 1993 ) . I also concede that, Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service Comm 'n of N. Y. , 447 whenever government disfavors one kind of speech, it places U . S. 557, 562-563 , 100 S.Ct. 2343 , 65 L .Ed.2d 341 ( 1980) . that speech at a disadvantage, potentially interfering with But I have great concern that many justifiable instances of the free marketplace of ideas and with an individual's ability "content-based" regulation are noncommercial . And, worse to express thoughts and ideas that can help that individual than that, the Court has applied the heightened "strict determine the kind of society in which he wishes to live, help scrutiny" standard even in cases where the less stringent shape that society, and help define his place within it. "commercial speech" standard was appropriate. See Sorrell v. 111S Health Inc. , 564 U .S . , , 131 S.Ct. 2653 , Nonetheless, in these latter instances to use the presence of 2664, 180 L . Ed.2d 544 (201 1 ) ( BREYER, J ., dissenting). content discrimination automatically to trigger strict scrutiny The Court has also said that "government speech" escapes and thereby call into play a strong presumption against First Amendment strictures. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U . S. constitutionality goes too far. That is because virtually all 173 , 193- 194, 111 S .Ct. 1759, 114 L . Ed.2d 233 ( 1991 ) . But government activities involve speech, many of which involve regulated speech is typically private speech, not government the regulation of speech. Regulatory programs almost always speech. Further, the Court has said that, "[w]hen the basis require content discrimination. And to hold that such content for the content discrimination consists entirely of the very discrimination triggers strict scrutiny is to write a recipe reason the entire class of speech at issue is proscribable, no for judicial management of ordinary government regulatory significant danger of idea or viewpoint discrimination exists." activity . R. A . L' v. St. Paul, 505 U .S . 377, 388, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 L .Ed.2d 305 ( 1992 ). But this exception accounts for only a Consider a few examples of speech regulated by government few of the instances in which content discrimination is readily that inevitably involve *2235 content discrimination, but justifiable. where a strong presumption against constitutionality has no place. Consider governmental regulation of securities, e. g. , I recognize that the Court could escape the problem 15 U.S .C. § 78/ ( requirements for content that must be by watering down the force of the presumption against included in a registration statement); of energy conservation constitutionality that "strict scrutiny" normally carries with it. labeling-practices, e. g. , 42 U . S.C. § 6294 ( requirements for But, in my view, doing so will weaken the First Amendment's content that must be included on labels of certain consumer protection in instances where "strict scrutiny" should apply electronics); of prescription drugs, e.g. , 21 U . S.C. § 353( b) in full force. (4 )( A ) ( requiring a prescription drug label to bear the symbol "Rx only"); of doctor-patient confidentiality, e.g. , 38 U . S .C . § The better approach is to generally treat content 7332 ( requiring confidentiality of certain medical records, but discrimination as a strong reason weighing against the WestlawNeg S odeS 1* Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz. , 135 S.Ct. 2218 (2015 ) 192 L. Ed . 2d 236 , 83 USLW 4444 , 15 Cal . Daily Op . Serv. 6239. . . constitutionality of a rule where a traditional public forum, or require one. See, e.g. , Code of Athens—Clarke County, Ga., where viewpoint discrimination, is threatened, but elsewhere Pt. III , § 7-4-7( 1 ) ( 1993 ). Elsewhere, historic site markers treat it as a rule of thumb, finding it a helpful, but —for example, "George Washington Slept Here"—are also not determinative legal tool, in an appropriate case, to exempt from general regulations. See, e. g. , Dover, Del ., Code determine the strength of a justification. I would use of Ordinances, Pt. II , App. B, Art. 5 , § 4.5( F ) (2012). And content discrimination as a supplement to a more basic similarly, the federal Highway Beautification Act limits signs analysis, which, tracking most of our First Amendment cases, along interstate highways unless, for instance, they direct asks whether the regulation at issue works harm to First travelers to "scenic and historical attractions" or advertise free Amendment interests that is disproportionate in light of coffee. See 23 U .S .C . § § 131 ( b), (c )( 1 ), (c )( 5 ) . *2236 the relevant regulatory objectives. Answering this question requires examining the seriousness of the harm to Given the Court's analysis, many sign ordinances of that speech, the importance of the countervailing objectives, the kind are now in jeopardy . See ante, at 2231 (acknowledging extent to which the law will achieve those objectives, and that "entirely reasonable" sign laws "will sometimes be whether there are other, less restrictive ways of doing so. struck down" under its approach ( internal quotation marks See, e.g. , United States v. Alvarez, 567 U . S . , — omitted)) . Says the majority : When laws "single[ ] out , 132 S .Ct. 2537, 2551 -2553 , 183 L . Ed.2d 574 (2012) specific subject matter," they are "facially content based"; and ( BREYER, J ., concurring in judgment); Nixon v. Shrink when they are facially content based, they are automatically Missouri Government PAC, 528 U . S. 377, 400-403 , 120 S.Ct. subject to strict scrutiny . Ante, at 2230, 2232 — 2233 . And 897, 145 L.Ed.2d 886 (2000) ( BREYER, J ., concurring). although the majority holds out hope that some sign laws Admittedly, this approach does not have the simplicity of with subject-matter exemptions "might survive" that stringent a mechanical use of categories. But it does permit the review, ante, at 2232 — 2233 , the likelihood is that most will government to regulate speech in numerous instances where be struck down . After all, it is the "rare case[ ] in which the voters have authorized the government to regulate and a speech restriction withstands strict scrutiny ." Williams— where courts should hesitate to substitute judicial judgment Yulee v. Florida Bar, 575 U .S . , , 135 S .Ct. 1656, for that of administrators. 1666, L . Ed.2d (2015 ). To clear that high bar, the government must show that a content-based distinction "is Here, regulation of signage along the roadside, for purposes necessary to serve a compelling state interest and is narrowly of safety and beautification is at issue. There is no traditional drawn to achieve that end." Arkansas Writers ' Project, Inc. public forum nor do I find any general effort to censor a *2237 v. Ragland, 481 U .S . 221 , 231 , 107 S.Ct. 1722, particular viewpoint. Consequently, the specific regulation 95 L. Ed.2d 209 ( 1987) . So on the majority's view, courts at issue does not warrant "strict scrutiny ." Nonetheless, would have to determine that a town has a compelling for the reasons that Justice KAGAN sets forth, I believe interest in informing passersby where George Washington that the Town of Gilbert's regulatory rules violate the First slept. And likewise, courts would have to find that a town Amendment. I consequently concur in the Court's judgment has no other way to prevent hidden-driveway mishaps than by only . specially treating hidden-driveway signs. ( Well-placed speed bumps? Lower speed limits? Or how about just a ban on hidden driveways?) The consequence unless courts water Justice KAGAN , with whom Justice GINSBURG and Justice down strict scrutiny to something unrecognizable is that BREYER join, concurring in the judgment. our communities will find themselves in an unenviable bind: Countless cities and towns across America have adopted They will have to either repeal the exemptions that allow for ordinances regulating the posting of signs, while exempting helpful signs on streets and sidewalks, or else lift their sign certain categories of signs based on their subject matter. For restrictions altogether and resign themselves to the resulting example, some municipalities generally prohibit illuminated clutter. * signs in residential neighborhoods, but lift that ban for signs that identify the address of a home or the name of its owner or occupant. See, e.g. , City of Truth or Consequences, N . M ., Even in trying (commendably ) to limit today's decision, Code of Ordinances, ch . 16, Art. XIII , § § 11 - 13-2 .3 , 11 - 13- Justice ALITO's concurrence highlights its far-reaching 2.9( H )( 4) ( 2014). In other municipalities, safety signs such effects. According to Justice ALITO, the majority does as "Blind Pedestrian Crossing" and "Hidden Driveway" can not subject to strict scrutiny regulations of "signs beposted without a permit, even as other permanent signs advertising a one-time event." Ante, at 2233 (ALITO, West lawNext Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz. , 135 S.Ct. 2218 ( 2015 ) 192 L. Ed . 2d 236,83 USLW 4444, 15 Cal . Daily Op . Serv. 6239. . . J ., concurring). But of course it does. On the majority's we have recognized that such subject-matter restrictions, even view, a law with an exception for such signs "singles though viewpoint-neutral on their face, may "suggest[ ] an out specific subject matter for differential treatment" attempt to give one side of a debatable public question an and "defin[es] regulated speech by particular subject advantage in expressing its views to the people." First Nat. matter." Ante, at 2227, 2230 (majority opinion). Indeed, Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765, 785, 98 S .Ct. 1407, the precise reason the majority applies strict scrutiny here 55 L. Ed.2d 707 ( 1978 ); accord, ante, at 2233 (ALITO, J., is that "the Code singles out signs bearing a particular message: the time and location of a specific event." Ante, concurring) ( limiting all speech on one topic "favors those at 2231 . who do not want to disturb the status quo"). Subject-matter regulation, in other words, may have the intent or effect of Although the majority insists that applying strict scrutiny favoring some ideas over others. When that is realistically to all such ordinances is "essential" to protecting First possible when the restriction "raises the specter that the Amendment freedoms, ante, at 2231 , I find it challenging to Government may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints understand why that is so. This Court's decisions articulate from the marketplace we insist that the law pass the most two important and related reasons for subjecting content- demanding constitutional test. R.A. V ,, 505 U .S., at 387, 112 based speech regulations to the most exacting standard of S.Ct. 2538 (quoting Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of review. The first is "to preserve an uninhibited marketplace V. Y. State Crime Victims Bd. , 502 U . S. 105, 116, 112 S .Ct. of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail ." McCullen 501 , 116 L. Ed.2d 476 ( 1991 )). v. Coakley, 573 U .S. , — , 134 S .Ct. 2518, 2529, 189 L . Ed.2d 502 (2014) ( internal quotation marks But when that is not realistically possible, we may do well to omitted). The second is to ensure that the government has relax our guard so that "entirely reasonable" im periled mperiled not regulated speech "based on hostility—or favoritism by strict scrutiny can survive. Ante, at 2231 . This point is b by towards the underlying message expressed." R.A . V v. St no means new. Our concern with content-based regulation Paul, 505 U .S . 377, 386, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 L . Ed.2d 305 arises from the fear that the government will skew the public's ( 1992). Yet the subject-matter exemptions included in many debate of ideas—so when "that risk is inconsequential, . . . sign ordinances do not implicate those concerns. Allowing strict scrutiny is unwarranted." Davenport, 551 U.S., at 188, residents, say, to install a light bulb over "name and address" 127 S .Ct. 2372; see R. A. V , 505 U .S., at 388, 112 S.Ct. 2538 signs but no others does not distort the marketplace of ideas. (approving certain content-based distinctions when there is Nor does that different treatment give rise to an inference of "no significant danger of idea or viewpoint discrimination"). impermissible government motive. P To do its intended work, of course, the category of content- based regulation triggering strict scrutiny must sweep more We apply strict scrutiny to facially content-based regulations broadly than the actual harm; that category exists to create g of speech, in keeping with the rationales just described, when a buffer zone guaranteeing that the government cannot favor there is any "realistic possibility that official suppression of or disfavor certain viewpoints. But that buffer zone need ideas is afoot." Davenport v. Washington Ed. Assn. , 551 U . S . not extend forever. We can administer our content-regulation 177, 189, 127 S .Ct. 2372, 168 L. Ed.2d 71 (2007) (quoting doctrine with a dose of common sense, so as to leave standing R.A . V , 505 U . S., at 390, 112 S .Ct. 2538 ). That is always the laws that in no way implicate its intended function. case when the regulation facially differentiates on the basis of viewpoint. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. And indeed we have done just that: Our cases have been far of Va. , 515 U . S. 819, 829, 115 S.Ct. 2510, 132 L . Ed.2d 700 less rigid than the majority admits in applying strict scrutiny ( 1995 ) . It is also the case (except in non-public or limited Y to facially content-based laws including in cases just like public forums) when a law restricts "discussion of an entire this one. See Davenport, 551 U . S ., at 188, 127 S .Ct. 2372 topic" in public debate. Consolidated Edison Co. of N. Y. ( noting that "we have identified numerous situations in which v. Public Serv. Comm 'n of N. Y. , 447 U .S . 530, 537, 539- [the] risk" attached to content-based laws is "attenuated"). 540, 100 S .Ct. 2326, 65 L .Ed.2d 319 ( 1980) ( invalidating a In Members of City Council of Los v.Angeles Taxpayers limitation on speech about nuclear power). We have stated g for Vincent, 466 U .S . 789, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 80 L .Ed.2d that "[i] f the marketplace of ideas is to remain free and open, 772 ( 1984), the Court declined to apply strict scrutiny Y governments must not be allowed to choose `which issues are to a municipal ordinance that exempted address numbers worth discussing or debating. ' " Id , at 537-538, 100 S .Ct. and markers commemorating "historical, cultural, or artistic 2326 (quoting Police Dept. of *2238 Chicago v. Mosley, event[s]" from a generally applicable limit on sidewalk signs. 408 U . S . 92, 96, 92 S .Ct. 2286, 33 L .Ed .2d 212 ( 1972 ) ). And P WestlawNex t Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz. , 135 S.Ct. 2218 (2015 ) 192 L. Ed . 2d 236 , 83 USLW 4444, 15 Cal . Daily Op . Serv. 6239. . . Id. , at 792, n. 1 , 104 S .Ct. 2118 ( listing exemptions ); see 20 square feet. See § § 4.402( J ), ( P)( 1 ) . The best the Town id. , at 804-810, 104 S.Ct. 2118 ( upholding ordinance under could come up with at oral argument was that directional intermediate scrutiny ) . After all , we explained, the law's signs "need to be smaller because they need to guide travelers enactment and enforcement revealed "not even a hint of bias along a route." Tr. of Oral Arg. 40 . Why exactly a smaller or censorshi ." Id. , at 804, 104 S .Ct. 2118; see also Renton sign better helps travelers get to where they are going is left p v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. , 475 U .S . 41 , 48, 106 S.Ct. 925 , 89 a mystery . The absence of any sensible basis for these and L .Ed.2d 29 1986) (applyingintermediate scrutiny to a zoningother distinctions dooms the Town's ordinance under even the ( law that facially distinguished among movie theaters based intermediate scrutiny that the Court typically applies to "time, on content because it was "designed to prevent crime, protect place, or manner" speech regulations. Accordingly, there is the city's retail trade, [and] maintain property values . . ., not no need to decide in this case whether strict scrutiny applies to suppress the expression of unpopular views"). And another to every sign ordinance in every town across this country decision involving a similar law provides an alternative containing a subject-matter exemption . model . In City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U .S . 43 , 114 S .Ct. 2038, 129 L .Ed.2d 36 ( 1994), the Court assumed arguendo that a I suspect this Court and others will regret the majority's sign ordinance's exceptions for address *2239 signs, safety insistence today on answering that question in the affirmative. signs, and for-sale signs in residential areas did not trigger As the years go by , courts will discover that thousands strict scrutiny . See id. , at 46 47, and n . 6, 114 S .Ct. 2038 of towns have such ordinances, many of them "entirely ( listing exemptions); id. , at 53 , 114 S .Ct. 2038 (noting this reasonable." Ante, at 2231 . And as the challenges to them assumption). We did not need to, and so did not, decide the mount, courts will have to invalidate one after the other. (This level-of-scrutiny question because the law's breadth made it Court may soon find itself a veritable Supreme Board of Sign unconstitutional under any standard. Review. ) And courts will strike down those democratically enacted local laws even though no one certainly not the The majority could easily have taken Ladue 's tack here. majority has ever explained why the vindication of First The Town of Gilbert's defense of its sign ordinance most Amendment values requires that result. Because I see no notably, the law's distinctions between directional signs and reason why such an easy case calls for us to cast a others does not pass strict scrutiny, or intermediate scrutiny, constitutional pall on reasonable regulations quite unlike the or even the laugh test. See ante, at 2231 — 2232 (discussing law before us, I concur only in the judgment. those distinctions). The Town, for example, provides no reason at all for prohibiting more than four directional signs All Citations on a property while placing no limits on the number of other types of signs. See Gilbert, Ariz., Land Development Code, 135 S.Ct. 2218 , 192 L . Ed.2d 236, 83 USLW 4444, 15 Cal . ch. I , § § 4.402(J), ( P)(2) (2014) . Similarly, the Town offers Daily Op. Serv. 6239, 2015 Daily Journal D .A . R. 6831 , 25 no coherent justification for restricting the size of directional Fla. L . Weekly Fed. S 383 signs to 6 square feet while allowing other signs to reach End of Document © 2015 Thomson Reuters No claim to original U . S . Government Works . West tawNex.t Hello