HomeMy WebLinkAbout710511.tiff IN THE DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WELD
AND STATE OF COLORADO
CIVIL ACTION NO. /l'f c, =
r:
THE COLORADO STATE BOARD )
OF SOCIAL SERVICES,
r co
Plaintiff-Appelant. )
)
V. ) PERMANENT INJUNCTION
GLENN K. BILLINGS , HARRY S. ) •
ASHLEY, AND MARSHALL ANDERSON, )
individually and as members of )
the Weld County BOARD OF COUNTY )
COMMISSIONERS and as the WELD )
COUNTY BOARD OF PUBLIC WELFARE, )
)
Defendants--Appellees. )
Pursuant to the opinion of the Colorado Supreme Court
in this matter , and based upon the reasoning set forth therein,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendants Gienn K. Rillim�s ,
Marshall Anderson, and Harry S. Ashley individually n ^ ? as
members of the Weld County Board of County Commissioners and
as the Weld County Board of Public Welfare , are hereby permanently
enjoined to provide that Weld County furnish its 20% percent
statutory share of the costs of welfare services for the year
1971 , including, but not limited to, Weld County' s 20% statutory
share of the cost of the benefits awarded under the aid to
dependent children statutes and the costs incident thereto.
Done in Open Court this 16th day of August , A. D. 1971
BY THE COURT:
add
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c,cc: District icL�
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710511
NO. 25267
THE COLOIA})O rTAT' BOARD )
OF : OCIAL CY JIC :S, )
)
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
)
v. )
)
GLENN K. 9iLLI '?: , Pte:?.Y S )
ASHL':Y, a1d :.. LL l 1DERCON , )
individually and as members of )
the U i `, Ui )
;e..d C��:n.,y �C. .D v: Cry..;„iY
CO.L\SIS°Io': `:;F and os the W"LD )
COiL T Y =^.VTW OF PUBLIC WFLF 2E, )
)
Defendants-Appellees. )
Appeal from the District Court
of the County of Weld
Honorable Earl A. Wolvington, Judge
Petition for rehearing having been denied,
IT IS E—RFBY ORDFRFD that the mandate to be
is ued. under the opinion announced by the Colora.io
Supreme Court on August 12, 1971, issue forthwith and
that, in order that the trial judge shall give the matter
immediate attention, copies of this order, of said
opinion and of the mandate shall be delivered to the
•
trial judge and to the clerk of the trial court by personal
C*c'tenger.
StiPMI"
sta.of Cdl ca`� "z + '
Gd�yws, +° Done by the Court en bane August 16, 1971.
A,�616 'ai I ;•
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TUPSW
t21—NAR fl'
Clerkcfthe5`3r's+"a�court _/s/ Edward E. Pringle
;"
Ch1.ei Justice
Writ, Lt, . ' ...." h
r .
'Certified a true copy.
Clerk of the Colorado Supreme Court
v
NO. 25267
THE COLOl;I)D Shal ; BOARD
)
OF LOCIAL SFRVIC;:S, )
)
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
)
v )
)
GLENN K. LILLI 'r+ HA2 Y S.
ASliLFY, and i`_\RCiALL ANDFRS )
individually and as menbers of )
the Weld County BOARD OF COI,TY )
CO:riIsrICi_.. s and as the W"LD )
COUNTY ZO.V. D OF PUBLIC WELFA -:, )
)
Defendants-Appellees. )
Appeal from the District Court
of the County of Weld
Honorable F^r1 A. Wolvinrton, Judge
Petition" for reheeri^g having been denied,
IT. IS hTarBY orra D that the mandate to be
is: ued under the opinion announced by the Colorado
Supreme Court on August 12, 1971, issue forthwith and
that, in' order that the trial judge shall give the matter
immediate attention, copies of this order, of said
opinion and of the mandate shall be delivered to the
trial judge and to the clerk of the trial court by personal
C�3) I31isg `giner
g .
cs,a Of N.'''.ara
Can' ella fl
O " d" Done by the Court en bane August 16, 1971.
tt ��71
WA '.
'WSW
R1CHpz.ed% D•emeog'rt
Cig {�}reS�W Is/ Edward E. Pringle
' �.
C,plilt � � `;- Chief Justice
b ..( .r kL
SLaS }____.
'Certified a true copy.
Clef,: of the Colorado Supreme Court
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STATE OF COLORADO, ss.
IN THE SUPREME COURT THEREOF.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF COLORADO,
To the District Court of Weld and State of
Colorado, Greeting:
WHEREAS, lately in the District Court of Weld
The ColoradotaSta e sBoardaofrtSocial therein
ding between
Plaintiff and Glenn K. $illings,_._Harry. _s_,__Ashley
and Marshall Anderson, etc et al. , Defendant..
the judgment of said District Court in said cause rendered was against the said
plaintiff
AND WHEREAS, the said cause was brought into our SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF COLORADO, bc- iiKA—PvffOfto said District Court.
appeal zrom
AND WHEREAS, at the ASril Term of our Supreme Court, in the year of our
Lord one thousand nine hundred and seventy—one, the said cause came on to be heard be-
fore our said SUPREME COURT on the __12th day of August , A. D. 19..7,1
(the same being one of the Juridical days of said term) and the following proceedings were
had and entered of record in said cause, to-wit:
THE COLORADO STATE BOARD OF
SOCIAL SERVICES,
Plaintiff-Appellee
/I)ldAfi11//4,(MNi/,/ ( Appeal from
No. 25267 VS. ,E/W4f4 the District Court
GLENN K. BILLINGS, HARRY S. ASHT,Fy,
AND MARSHALL ANDERSON, individually of Weld County
and as members of the WELD COUNTY BOARD
OF COUNfiY"CO.•LISSSTO'�IFPS- and as THE Z•TELD No. 21492
COUi11'Y..EOrAR1�...0."r:..k?U$I,IC. ��I+':'� ,��
Defendants-appellees
This cause having been brought to this Court as an appeal from
the District Court of Weld County, and having been heretofore argued
by counsel and submitted to the consideration and judgment of the court,
. and it now appearing to the court that there is manifest error in the
proceedings and judgment of said District Court,
It is therefore ordered and adjudged that the judgment of said
District Court be, and the same is hereby, reversed, and remanded to
said District Court with directions that an injunction issue to the end
that Weld County furnish its 20% statutory share of the costs of welfare
services for the year 1971.
Now, Therefore, this cause is remanded to you, the said District Court,
in and for the said Weld.__County and State aforesaid, that
such further proceedings may be had in said cause as shall conform to the judgment of this
Court, entered as aforesaid, as also with the opinion filed therein.
WITNESS the HONORABLE EDWARD E. PRINGLE Chief Justice
of our Supreme Court and the Seal thereof, affixed at my office in the City of Dense ,
this iirem day of August , A. 11 19
RICHARD D. TURELLI
Clerk Supreme Court.
By % r(,-,
0 Deputy.
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NO. 25267
THE COLORADO STATE BOARD OF
SOCIAJs SERVICES , % )
)
Plaintiff-Appellant )
)
v. )
GLENN K. BILLINGS , HARRY S . ) AUG 1 2 1•971
ASHLEY, and MARSHALL ANDERSON, )
individually and as members of )
the Weld County BOARD OF COUNTY )
COMMISSIONERS and as the WELD )
COUNTY BOARD OF PUBLIC WELFARE, )
•
)
Defendants-Appellees )
Appeal from the District Court
of the County of Weld
Honorable Earl A. Wolvington, Judge
EN BANC JUDGMENT REVERSED AND
-'CAUSE REMANDED WITH
DIRECTIONS, TIME FOR
FILING OF PETITION FOR
REHEARING SHORTENED
•
Duke W. Dunbar, Attorney General,
John P . Moore, Deputy Attorney General,
Douglas D. Doane, Special Assistant Attorney General,
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
Samuel S . Telep,
Thomas A. Connell,
Schneider, Shoemaker, Wham & Cooke,
Ronald Lee Cooke,
Elwyn F. Schaefer,
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees
•
MR, JUSTICE GROVES delivered the opinion of the Court.
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The appellant, called the state board, brought
an action in the district court to compel Weld County, --
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through its board of county commissioners, to defray 20%
of the welfare costs in the county. The district judge
refused to enter a temporary restraining order and then
upon stipulation of counsel placed his decision in a
final, appealable form. Appeal was taken to our court
of appeals and almost immediately thereafter the matter
was certified to this court under the provisions of 1969
Perm. Supp . , C.R.S. 1963, 37-21-9 . We reverse and hold •
that a mandatory injunction should issue.
Several different types of welfare benefits are
involved, being aid to (1) indigent tuberculars, C.R.S .
1963, 119-2-1 et se�C . , as amended; (2) needy disabled,
C.R.S . 1963, 119-6-1 et seq. , as amended; (3) the blind,
C.R.S . 1963, 16-2-1 et 2.2 2. , as amended; and (4) dependent
children, 1967 Perm. Supp . , C.R.S . 1963, 119-9-1 et seq. ,
as amended.
In each type of aid the state has obligated
itself to reimburse the counties for 80% of the costs of
the aid and administration expenses , subject to certain
requirements which the counties must meet. There is a
difference in wording of comparable provisions in the
statutes relating to aid to dependent children, on the one
hand, and in the statutes relating to the other three types
of benefits, on the other hand. Principally by thecpse
of the word "shall" instead of "may" in portions of the
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provisions concerning the other three types, the mandatory
character of the legislation requiring counties to pay
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20% is beyond question. On oral argument, counsel for
the appellees conceded that the county is liable for 20%
of the cost of the program for indigent tuberculars , needy
disabled, and the blind. Therefore, our attention will be
directed to the statutory provisions relating to aid to de-
pendent children.
The state board is the agency which administers
public welfare programs on behalf of the state. The board
of county commissioners in each county is the county board
of public welfare, whose duties are to appoint the county
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director of public welfare and fix his salary in accordance
with a salary schedule prescribed by the state department
of public welfare. C.R.S . 1963, 119-1-10 and 11. So far
as we are advised, these and approval of the hiring of the
county department staff are the only duties placed upon
the county board, acting as such.
1967 Perm. Supp . , C.R.S. 1963, 119-9-12 provides
as follows in regard to aid to dependent children:
"The board of county commissioners in
each county shall appropriate annually
such sum as in its discretion and judg-
ment may be needed to 'carry out the pro-
visions of this article, including
expenses of administration based upon
a budget prepared by the county wel-
fare department, after taking into
account state and federal funds . The
board is to include in the tax levy
for such county, the sum appropriated
for that purpose. Should the sum so
appropriated be expended or exhausted,
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during the year, and for the purpose
for which it was appropriated, additional
sums may be appropriated by the board of
n county commissioners. " •
The budget for' 1971 prepared by the county welfare depart-
ment estimated that the county's 207 share would amount to
$1, 114, 378, which would require a levy of 5.51 mills . The
board of county commissioners in contrast made a levy for
welfare for the year 1971 in the amount of 3.0 mills, to
produce an estimated $602,790 . When mid-year 1971 approached,
it appeared that the funds that Weld County had appropriated
for this purpose would be substantially exhausted by the
end of July 1971. The state board on July 1, 1971, entered
an order directing the county commissioners of Weld County
to make sufficient county funds available for the remainder
of 1971 in order that the county's 20% share would be paid.
The county couuuissioners have not complied with the order
and have indicated that, in the absence of a judicial man-
date, they will not do so.
While other questions are presented here, upon
some of which we will later have comment, the fundamental
question .-- and the one we first approach — is, irrespective
of its lack of welfare money produced by its ad valorem
tax, does a county have to defray 20% of the benefits
awarded under the aid to dependent children statutes and
of the costs incident thereto. We answer the question in
the affirmative and hold that our statutes create such a
mandate.
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Colo. Const. art. V, § 1 provides that, "The
legislative power of the state shall be vested in the
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general assembly. . . . " A county and its board of county
commissioners have only such powers and authority as are
granted by the general assembly, and they must carry out
the will of the state as expressed by the general assembly.
Board of County Commissioners v. Love, _ Colo. _, 470 P.2d
861 (1970) .
A substantial portion of public welfare money
administered by the counties comes from federal grants
paid to the state, and by the state in turn paid to the
counties . Our public welfare statutes and the amendments
thereof have been adopted in the light of federal require-
ments that the public welfare benefits must be allocated
and expended in accordance with the state 's plan by all
the political subdivisions of the state handling the admin-
istration of the matter, i.e. , in Colorado, the counties .
42 U.S .C. § 602; and 45 C.F.R. § 205.120, as found in 36
Fed. Reg. 3862 (1971) .
We find exhibited in the Colorado statutes a
legislative intent that each county must bear 20 of the
welfare costs expended by it, and that one county cannot
bear a lesser .percentage than another. The state depart-
ment of public welfare must require as a condition for a
county to receive grants-in-aid that the county shall bear
the proportion of total expense of furnishing aid asc
fixed by law. C.R.S . 1963, 119-1-5. The board of county
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commissioners are authorized to make appropriations to
defray the cost of "necessary welfare services within the -
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county. " 1969 Perm. Supp. , C.R.S . 1963, 119-1-15 . The
county welfare budget is to contain, among other things,
"the estimated amount required to be raised by county taxa-
tion in order to meet the county's share of the cost of
public welfare. " C.R.S. 1963, 119-3-5. The state depart-
ment of social services is required to take such action
as may be necessary or desirable for carrying out the
provisions of the welfare laws and all "rules and regula-
tions made by the state board shall be binding on the
counties and shall be complied with by the respective
county departments . . . ." 1969 Perm. Supp . , C.R.S . 1963,
119-9-2(1) (c) . 1969 Perm. Supp . , C.R.S . 1963, 119-9-5
provides:
"The amount of assistance or aid to
families with dependent children which
shall be granted shall be on the basis
of budgetary need as determined by the
county department, with due regard to
any other resources and in accordance
with rules and regulations made by the
state board, which may include the use
of tables , standards , and other criteria
. with respect to such determination of
budgetary need. "
1969 Perm. Supp. , C.R.S . 1963, 119-9-8 provides as follows:
"Upon the completion of the verification
and record, the county department shall
decide whether the child is eligible for
assistance or aid under the provisions of
this article, and shall determine the
amount of• such assistance and the date
upon which such assistance shall begin. q
It shall make an award which shall be
binding upon the county,• which award
shall continue until modified or vacated.
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Upon its order, assistance shall be paid
to or in behalf of the applicant from
funds appropriated to it for such purpose. "
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1967 Perm. Supp . , C.R.S . 1963, 119-9-12 provides:
"The board of county commissioners in
each county shall appropriate annually
such sum as in its discretion and judgment
• may be needed to carry out the provisions
of this article, including expenses of
administration based upon a budget prepared
by the county welfare department, after
taking into account state and federal funds .
The board is to include in the tax levy for
.. such county, the sum appropriated for that
purpose . Should the sum so appropriated be
expended or exhausted, during the year, and
for the purpose for which it was appropriated, '
additional sums may be appropriated by the
board of county commissioners . "
The standards governing the granting of aid and
governing the amount to be paid to persons are established
by the state board, except as are provided by statute.
The county board of public welfare and the county department
of public welfare must follow these standards . The conclu-
sion follows that the county commissioners do not have
discretion to decide who is going to receive benefits and
how much each person will receive, nor to rescind the
benefits awarded to a person. Its province is to appoint
the county director, fix his salary, approve appointments
and raise the money to pay the bill.
The statutes provide that the state will reimburse
the counties for 80% of the amounts spent for welfare.
1969 Perm. Supp . , C.R.S . 1963, 119-9-13. In other words,
the counties bear the remaining 20%. While the statute
in places uses the term "may, " it is quite apparent to us
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that the general assembly has used it in a mandatory
sense and has ordered each board of county couuuissioners
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to pay 20% of the benefits awarded and incidental costs .
Carleno Sales v. Ramsay Co . , 129 Colo . 393, 270 P.2d 755
(1954) .
The record discloses that the county commissioners '
association recently asked the general assembly to enact
legislation under which counties would not be liable for
welfare costs in excess of the amounts raised by the mill
levies made for that purpose. In contrast, the First
Regular Session of the Forty-eighth General Assembly enacted
Senate Bill No . 149, which was approved on May 6, 1971.
This is a re-enactment and amendment of C.R.S . 1963, 119-1-15.
It provides in part as follows :
"(1) The board of county commissioners
in each county of this state shall annu-
ally appropriate as provided by law such
funds as shall be needed to carry out the
public assistance and social services
activities of the county department, includ-
ing the costs of administration, based
upon the county welfare budget prepared
by the county department pursuant to sec-
tion 119-3-5, after taking into account
state reimbursements provided for in this
• section, and shall include in the tax levy
for such county the sums appropriated for
this purpose . In the case of a district
welfare department each county forming a
part of said district -shall appropriate
the funds necessary to defray the welfare
activities of such individual county.
"(2) (a) If the county departments are
administered in accordance with the policies
and rules of the department for the admin-
istration of county departments , eighty
percent of the administrative costs of the
county departments shall be advanced or
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reimbursed to the county by the state
treasurer from funds appropriated or
A made available for such purpose. . . . "
This bill has 'an effective date of July 1, 1971. Under
our determination of this matter, it is unnecessary to
express a view as to whether this enactment is controlling
here. It may be that the legislative intent was for it
to come into operation at the time counties fix their mill
levies in the fall of 1971. In any event, it would appear,
although we do not decide, that under this enactment the
questions argued here become academic with the year 1972,
as it seems that the general assembly sets forth in un-
equivocal terms the same mandates which we have determined
that it previously enacted.
The appellees urge strongly that C .R.S . 1963,
119-3-6 provides for a levy limit in Weld County of 3 mills
for welfare purposes . They further argue that there is
no duty upon the county to petition the property tax ad-
ministrator for a rate in excess of these limits under
C .R.S . 1963, 119-3-6 (4) as amended by Colo . Sess . Laws
1970, ch. 90, § 5 . The state board urges that the property
tax administrator and his predecessor, the state tax
commission, has without exception granted all requests
for excess levies . A ruling on this question is unneces-
sary as it is our holding that in some manner the counties
must produce their 207, whether it be from contingency
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funds, an excess levy, registered warrants (C.R.S .
1963, 88-1-16) , sales tax or otherwise. '
• It is urged by the appellees that, by reason of
the wording of C.R.S . 1963, 119-1-5, the state board
cannot require Weld County to bear its proportion of
total expenses . The statute reads:
"(1) (a) In administering any funds appro-
priated or made available to the state de-
partment for welfare purposes , the state
department shall have the power:
(b) To require as a condition for
receiving grants-in-aid, that the county
shall bear the proportion of the total •
expense of furnishing aid, as is fixed by
law relating to such assistance.
(c) To terminate any grants-in-aid
to any county if the laws providing such
grant-in-aid and the minimum standards
prescribed by the state department there-
under are not complied with. "
The contention is that under this wording Weld County must
bear its share "as a condition for receiving grants-in-
aid, " and the only remedy of the state board is to terminate
the grants-in-aid. A decision on our part really is not
necessary under the disposition we are making, but we do
wish to point out the fallacy of this argument. Conceivably,
• there might be something to the argument if in advance of
1970 Weld County notified the state board that it was not
going to bear its share of welfare costs . Then it might be
said that the sole remedy on the part of the state board
would be to terminate grants-in-aid. However, here •
we have an entirely different situation in which Weld
County accepted reimbursement from the state with re-
spect to all welfare costs for a period of at least six
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months and during that time did not indicate to the state
board that it would not bear its full 20% during the last
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half of the year. Thus , the grants-in-aid having been
furnished, Weld County availed itself of and met the con-
dition, and as a result the state board has a right to
require performance by the county.
The board of commissioners of Weld County has
presented its position that welfare funds are being wasted;
that the state should bear the burden of costs in excess
of the monies realized for a 3-mill levy; that many re-
cipients of public welfare should not be receiving it;
and that there ought to be more authority in the county
commissioners with respect to the administration of the
program. In argument to the trial court the county attorney
made a statement to the effect that the action of Weld
County was an attempt to get rid of "fakers , cheaters and
connivers . " However sympathetic we may be with these
views , the correction of such evils is in no manner before
us in this proceeding. If, there are violations of existing
laws, of course, appropriate action should be taken; but
this issue is not here . As to many of the matters which
cause concern to the board of county commissioners , the
remedy which the board seeks must come from the legislative
branch of the government, and not from us .
It is contended on behalf of the appellees that
the only duty with respect to aid to dependent chilcdren
was for the board, in fixing the welfare budget and levy,
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to exercise its discretion. This argument is predicated
upon the provisions of 1967 Perm. Supp . , •C .R.S . 1963, 119-9-12,
already quoted'. Emphasis is placed upon the wording, "such
sum as in its discretion and judgment may be needed to carry
out the provisions of this article, " and the inclusion of
the word "may" in the last sentence relating to appropria-
tions for deficiency. We repeat that disposition has been
made of this argument by our determination that the general
assembly intended to and has placed a mandate upon the county
to furnish 20% of public welfare costs .
The appellees moved that this appeal be dismissed
because no motion for new trial was filed. C .R.C.P. 59 (h)
dispenses with the necessity for such a motion after a hear-
ing involving no controverted issues of fact. We can find
nothing in the decision of the trial court and nothing in-
volved in our resolution in this matter predicated upon
any controverted issues of fact. As is obvious, we are
dealing here almost solely with statutory interpretation.
Therefore, we deny the motion to dismiss .
The judgment of the trial court is reversed and >
I the cause remanded with directions that an injunction issue
to the end that Weld County furnish its 20% statutory share
of the costs of welfare services for the year 1971 .
t It "is ordered that the time for filing of a
petition for rehearing be shortened, and that any such
petition must be filed by 10: 00 o 'clock a.m. on Monday, /
August 16, 1971 .
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