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Home My WebLink About951898.tiffaakibli6- MAY -16-95 TUE 10:24 WELD COUNTY TITLE DNTN FAX NO, 3033563248 P.01 Weld County Title Company 1221 8th Ave. GnNy, CO 80631 • (303) 'iaf-103P % ( 1) 3563248 May 16, 1995 Ken Lind Lind, Lawrence and Ottenhoff 1011 11th Avenue Greeley, CO 80631 VIA Facsimile Dear Mr. Lind: This letter shall confirm that Weld County Title Company has searched its title records and finds no irrigation ditch deed, easement or right-of-way in favor of Fiechtner over the west side of the NW 1/4 of Section 19, Township 3 North, Range 67 West of the 6th P.M., Weld County, Colorado. Please advise if you need additional information. Sincerely, Janeen K. McGinn Executive Vice President Downtown • 1221 alh Ave G„May. (Y1 EMI • Nn\ wawa 4. PIM% •ca. •,.• 951898 Drew Scheltinga County Engineer DEPARTMENT OF ENGINEERING PHONE (303) 356-4000, EXT. 4750 P.O. Box 758 GREELEY, COLORADO 80632 COLORADO April 30, 1992 Mrs. Barbara Liechtner 15152 WCR 13 Longmont, CO 80504 Dear Mrs. Liechtner: In response to your complaint, we have done a traffic study on Road 13 between Weld County Roads 32 and 34. Our traffic counts indicate 3 percent .of the traffic is exceeding 55 mph between the hill crest and your house. North of that location 55 percent of the traffic is speeding. Although these results seem inconsistent, they are not unusual. We do not question that you have seen excessive speeding. However, lowering the speed limit does not have an effect on those who are reckless. Only consistent law enforcement can control excessive speeding. Also, we have examined the site distances at the hill crest and compared them to the no passing -zones delineated by solid yellow lines. The striping is consistent with the present 55 mph speed limit. Because of these facts, I cannot recommend reducing the speed limit. Enclosed is a copy of the Colorado Department of Highway's pamphlet entitled "Establishing Realistic Speed Limits." It does a good job of explaining how we look at speed reductions. If excessive speeding continues to be a problem, I recommend you contact the Weld County Sheriff's Office. erely; DS/gb:liecht cc: Commissioner Webster Marc Street, Maintenance Support Superintendent WCR 13 951898 June 8, 1995 Weld County Department of Planning Services 1400 N. 17th Ave. Greeley, CO 80631 RE: Case Number USA -1082 Sekich Equipment Co. Docket No: 95-43 This letter is in protest to Sekich Equipment Company's request to relocate Beet Dump Site within 500 ft of Grandview Estates, Town of Mead. I am opposed to this request for the following reasons: . Safety . Increased Traffic . Hours of Operation (at times 24 hours a day) . Noise Level . Devaluation of residential property . Overall reduction in quality of life for residences and surrounding neighbors of Grandview Estates; Town of Mead We were told by Mr. Fred Sekich when purchasing property in Grandview Estates that 1994 would be the last year for the Beet Dump. There was no mention of plans to move the Beet Dump from one side of Grandview Estates to the other. Please take our concerns into consideration when reviewing the above application. We will be out of the state and unable to.attend June 21st meeting. Respectfully submitted, Wtndell J. Fountain 109 Grandview Dr. Longmont, CO 80504 WELD COUNTY PLANNING JUN 1 2 1995 ECEIVE 951893 LIND, LAWRENCE & OTTENHOFF ATTORNEYS AT LAW THE LAW BUILDING 1011 ELEVENTH AVENUE P.O. BOX 326 GREELEY, COLORADO 80632 GEORGE H. OTTENHOFF KENNETH F. LIND KIM R. LAWRENCE JEFFREY R. BURNS James A. P.O. Box Greeley, Gustafson, Esq. 1726 CO 80632 May 19, 1995 Re: Fiechtner Lateral and Sekich Dear Mr. Gustafson: TELEPHONE (970)353-2323 (970) 356-9160 TELECOPIER (970) 356-1111 WELD COUNTY PUNNING MAY 2 2 1995 D In an attempt to diffuse any misunderstanding or legal issues as related to the Fiechtner Lateral located upon the western boundary of the Sekich property in the Northwest Quarter of Section 19, Township 3 North, Range 67 West of the 6th P.M., I have pursued further factual and legal research on the matter. I would like to completely resolve the issues as they have created some misunderstandings between our clients and, as they are neighbors, I would like to resolve those misunderstandings. I must admit that I am mystified by you and/or your client's assertion that they "own the ditch" or, they "own the ditch property" and my clients cannot cross the ditch or make any uses without the Fiechtners' permission. Based upon my title and legal research I can state to you that there is absolutely no question that my clients own the Northwest Quarter, and the Fiechtners do have rights in and to a non-exclusive easement within which is located the Fiechtner Lateral. This easement was acquired by use, acquiescence or prescription as there is no type of recorded document granting an easement or right-of-way or title to your clients. How the easement was acquired is irrelevant, as we recognize said easement and we also recognize your client's right to the use of the ditch easement including rights of access for use, repair and maintenance. I can assure you that my clients have no intention of interfering with those easement rights and your clients will have their historical rights for use, repair, maintenance and access. On the other hand, I would expect that your clients recognize that my clients have the right to use the easement so long as my client's use does not unreasonably interfere with your client's 951898 James A. Gustafson, Esq. May 19, 1995 Page 2 rights in the easement. I believe that Colorado law is very clear on these points and I cannot imagine a dispute as to those tenants of law. As related to the law concerning easements, there is no doubt that my clients recognize the ditch easement and if my clients damage or unreasonably interfere with the easement, they are responsible. Be assured that my clients will be responsible for removing any waste in the ditch caused by them or by users of the USR property. As to your claims of "ownership", I did cause Weld County Title to research public records and they did confirm that there are no recorded instruments of any type in favor of your clients concerning the lateral. I then reviewed your letter dated May 2, 1995 at Page 2 starting with the second line and the language "deeds to Fiechtners' property evidencing ownership of ditches and water rights appurtenant to said property". Additionally, my notes reflect that you made the statement at the Planning Commission hearing that the patents which you provided are also evidence of the Fiechtners' ownership in ditches and reservoirs. Those statements caused me to thoroughly review the three patents and I conclude that you have misinterpreted the language of the patents. Specifically, the three patents are all standard homestead patents which describe your client's property in Section 18. After the description of the lands, the "granting" paragraph is included which states: ""Now Know Ye, that there is, therefore, granted by the United States unto the said (name) the tract of land above described: To Have and to Hold the said tract of Land, with the appurtenances thereof, unto the said (name) and to her heirs and assigns forever;". This is commonly referred to as the granting clause or paragraph and does convey title to the section 18 lands to your client's predecessors in title. However, the granting clause is then followed with language commonly referred to as the habendum clause which states as follows: "subject to any vested and accrued water rights for mining, agricultural, manufacturing or other purposes, and rights to ditches and reservoirs used in connection with such water rights, as may be recognized and acknowledged by the local customs, laws and decisions of Courts, The words "subject to" are critical in the habendum clause as you have, apparently, misinterpreted the language "rights to ditches and reservoirs used in connection with such water rights," as part of the grant of the lands. That is not a correct interpretation as the language concerning the ditches and 951898 James A. Gustafson, Esq. May 19, 1995 Page 3 reservoirs is contained within the "subject to" language and is part of the habendum clause. This means that it is your client's property in Section 18 that is "subject to" ditches and reservoirs (among other things) that are located upon their property. This is not a grant to your clients of ditches and reservoirs on other lands. There is no question concerning this interpretation and for general reference I would refer you to 23 Am Jur 2d, Section 293. This Am Jur reference cites cases and language that the words "subject to" are words of qualification or words of limitation which directly affect your client's property. The general Am Jur thesis is supported by Colorado case law and I would refer you to 43 Colo. 306, Miller v. DeGraffenried (1908). In this case the Colorado Supreme Court recognized that including the words "subject to" are not an addition to the granting part but are actually a limitation or qualification upon the estate granted. A more recent case, Bernice Webb v. Donna Gold, 154 Colo. 464 (1964) revisited the "subject to" language. In this case the facts showed that the deed in question first described the property in the granting clause, and following the granting clause, language was added "subject to . . . lateral ditch". The Colorado Supreme Court, as well as the Trial Court ruled very simply that the words "subject to" speak for themselves and that the property conveyed was subject to a right-of-way whoever may own the right-of-way and the grantees were aware that their property was subject to that right-of-way. Thus, the patent in favor of your clients in Section 18 conveys the Section 18 property to them but their ownership of the Section 18 property is subject to any ditches or reservoirs that were upon the property. Obviously, if• no ditches or reservoirs were upon their property, they are not subject to that limitation. In no terms, however, does that language mean that your clients are deeded property located on other sections and specifically, they were not granted property in Section 19. It is my expectation that clarification and understanding of ownership of the property in Section 19 by my clients and our recognition of your client's interest in the prescriptive ditch easement clarifies and ends misunderstandings as to who owns what. I believe that clarification assists all parties in determining rights and responsibilities as to ownership, use and maintenance. 951898 James A. Gustafson, Esq. May 19, 1995 Page 4 I would suggest that you review the annotations and cases cited in this letter and then review the language that was substituted for Paragraph 4 of the conditions at the Planning Commission hearing. If you do not believe that the substituted language adequately protects your client's interest in the easement, please contact me and I will be more than willing to discuss any other language that your propose. I look forward to discussing this matter with you. Very truly yours, LIND, Keneth F. Lind T KFL/cg pc: Lee Morrison, Esq. Shani L. Eastin, Department of Planning Services FF 951898 306 MILLER V. DE GRAFFENRIED. i43 Colo. There is not a word of testimony in support of this allegation, and the only evidence of a fraud is that the defendant states that slae thought she was bor- rowing $120.00 instead of $175.00, and she thought. the time the note was to run was for two months in- stead of one year. She says that she did not go to the plaintiff and did not have the conversation with him which he testified to, but, in corroboration of the tes- timony of plaintiff is the fact that the defendant at that time- ordered the abstract of title to -her property made and that Mrs. Bush had agreed to pay for it. That admission upon her part is, however, coupled with the assertion that she desired the abstract for her own use. She had evidently had the property for some time, and had no abstract, but, by some co- incidence, she ordered the abstract at the very time the plaintiff testifies she had agreed to make the mortgage and furnish the abstract. Promissory notes and mortgages, which are duly executed and acknowledged before a notary public, ought not to be set aside as invalid for frand, except upon the most clear and convincing proof of their fraudulent character, and we cannot find anything in this testimony which warrants the finding and judgment of the trial court. The judgment will, , therefore, be reversed. Reversed. CTITEF. JUSTICE STEELE and Mr. JUSTICE GODDARD -concur. 1 No. 5708.1 MILLER V. DE GRAFFENRIED. Con veyances—Covenants—W arranty—Breach. A deed described the land conveyed, as "subject, however, to onecertaintrust deed incumbrance for the same, etc., which said incumbrance has been assumed by" a third person, and con- tained a general covenant of warranty against all incumbranees -except for taxes for a designated year, which the grantee agreed 951 a Al t.o tha apt red the mo guff wh DE ph tin pn lal flu of so co CV SU ha to in gf tr SE to 1T. Il/Is that IIU1 light N in - 1 the 1111I1 les 111 ill city ur it. tilled t for pert> le eo tile('. e the tduly uhlir, xeept their thing sad will, fell. IlnAltn enrich Id con - agreed • 4 S I ... III(II; I•rl(NIA 1.1.. i1 , ill HI, lilt 'lilt it COVrn:ull 16:11 Ili!'tl,u,l 1„ I .,, nlltl P��, lilk' , II I 'II t I) uI wtlluril>. Lnl a 1, d old) ,e k+I .11 ouu)c'i �',I ml.l,II a:I� au eyufly ..I edclu)d i01/ II. I u' pinIi.I I dvv i /Lvd s III., I IL/. HI'Lilclllelll Ihdl Ih: ilu ulll61i,li.r h,ld In'L II Llsuu.,,t I I n'IsOll wuLL Illl iI,IJ.U. Ilk III, lull III the !Ill 'HULluur.. :I/.d did lee [II. u.iieee III,e 51W h IIIIId I,crsuu \1,(11111 L•) Ille iueullILrulIUC ,1 h. -u due. I' CIE o h'rrur ItOw Il.slrrrl Comr l u1 0111111 ('uunty. lionl 11,'ll/u N lee r or 17 ,111111/r. Aetioll I,r -Au;l ill b;. Millerr against James It. UullraIleum d. 1,'roal a ,jullrinollt of dismissal, plaintiff IJ.i11 5 VI (11% .1 jjirme it. 1'llr,rr.11 11.( sue, fur pluiuliff Ili error. ('n.lt1.1-s I. I'IRI:, for d1411Illuul ill urrur. Air_ .II,11,-1-: (loon vIto delivered the opinion of the coin I 011 the 19th of October, 1�91i, plaiutifl' in error purchased futon defendant in error a rerlanl tract id hand at the agreed price of $1110. The (iced described the land conyecl as follows: "The west one Iltllf of Lot I and all of I.ut '_', in Section 1, Towllsllip 15 south, Itauge `Ili west of the 6th luriucipal meridian, containing sixty acres, mote or less. Subject, how- ver, to one rennin bust deed iuomuln'.ulre for the :Anil of $1110 and interest, lvhicll sail iueumhrlulee has been iwsulued h', uue (1. A. Uranl."; and con- tained a general covenant u1' vvarrallty against all iucuaihranees, extent taxes for ISt)li, which the grantee agreed to '191ereal'ter suit was brought to foreclose the trust deed uleotiuned. The defendant was duly served with notice of the suit, and failed and refused to defend the same. Snit was prosecuted to Baal judgment, and jactgment rendered in the stun of $610 ci )iH98 308 Miih.ER v: DE GRAFFENRIED. [43 CO1O. and costs, and a decree of foreclosure entered. The' property was sold under -the -decree for the amonnl of the judgment and costs, and plaintiff was com- pelled to, and did, pay that sum toredeemthe prem- ises and clear the title thereto. Upon the foregoing facts the plaintiff predicates his right to recover the amount so expended, and as- signs error upon the ruling of the .trial court in sus- taining a demurrer to the complaint, upon the ground that it did not state a cause of -action, and in holding that the clause, "subject, however, to one certain trust deed incumhrance for the sum of $400 and in- terest, which said incmnbrance has been assumed by one G. A. Grant," was a limitation upon the estate granted, and that the deed conveyed only an equity of redemption to which alone the covenants in the deed applied, his contention being that the words last quoted are merely words of description, and not words of limitation of the estate conveyed. We do not think that this contention of counsel can be upheld. "Subject always to a manifest intention to the contrary, general covenants will be construed as limited to the premises andestatepurported and in- tended to be conveyed; they are intended to protect, and cannot be construed to enlarge, the estate granted." -11 eye. p. 1059, and cases cited. And under this rule of construction it has been frequently held that a statement in a deed, after a specific description of the granted premises, that they are subject to a mortgage, -qualifies the estate granted, and a subsequent covenant of warranty ap- plies to the estate as thus qualified, which is an equity of redemption. In vol. 8, Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d ed.), the rule is stated as follows: r Apr., conve to be of the whicl qualil nants egnit; purpi 1 P'reei den, - ton S 69 1W I it is i distir jests, porti prem The not a ing 1 grant warr: appli held wise force 1 for t talne was i enanl S u :11,r 1/41 1 r V 111 I. I) 309 the dependent ruvi mints in ❑ decd of con crcance 'nay be absolute in Iurla, vel thev are to he riiistrurd with releieuce to the subject platter ul the decd. filch office being Illrlt't lu delclh,l that \\ }deli I1as bun gfam ed, ` ' 1'. 60, ,Mid. c). "Su where a runcoyahlre ul 1111,11 is oyl,resslc qualified as living ,sultje-I to a met t ll;e, the cove emits in the decd, thifiudi absolute,apply only to the equity of redemption, which is all that such a deed purports to con vcq."---Ibid, l,. ill, solid. dd. .1 'Hong the cases announcing this rule see: !'rrruture r, ira Nit. 508, ;it l; flinty r. 1101 den, 1'!I Ill. I:;U, H N. V. 517; 1Jrtill It 1'..ti'uullt Bu'- lnit Su rings Biulli, I-Iti \lass. 3UU; II�dlhrr r. Briggs, ll :AI iuu. 98. lu !Iron it r. )')Alit Insloll Sri( iugs Bonk, sttpra, it is said: I;ut \\ bile covenants may he, and often are, distinct from each other, and umde for different ob- jects, all are necessarily connected with the grunting portion of the deed and with the description of (lie premises there given, and lutist be allltiied to that. The words, `subject to a mortgage " " are not added to the description of the land in the grant- ing part to identify it, but to quality the estate granted, and to that description as thus qualified the warranty applies. It receives its full loiee when applied to the subject of the grant, and that must lie held to have been an equity of redemption; other- wise the qualilv'Mg worths are (rented as without force." In !Drury n. !loldclt, supra, Sheldon, d., speaking for the corn t, said: "IL is said the deed from Ilaggett to Drury eon- laiued full covenants of vvarrulty, to which there was no exception; that thereby I)rury's grantor cov- enanted that he would warrant and defend the lots 951893 310 ROniSON V. GUMAnn. ['I3 Colo. conveyed against the holders of all incnmhrances. The covenants extended only to what was conveyed, and that was, not the lots absolutely, but the lots sub- ject to the ineumbrance. The real covenant was that, otherwise than as subject to the incnmbrances named, the lots were free from all incumhrances, and that the grantor would warrant and defend the titles." It clearly appears in the granting portion of .the deed that the estate intended to be conveyed and that was conveyed was the title to the premises described, subject to the lien of the inrvntbrance; in other words, the equity of the grantor therein; and the statement that such ineumbrance had been assumed by 0. A. Grant was at most an added identification of the incmnbrance, and the defendant did not by his covenant of warranty guarantee that Grant would pay said indebtedness upon maturity, and in the circumstances no breach of the covenant is shown. It follows that the court below correctly held that the complaint did not state a. cause of action. The judgment dismissing the action will, there- fore, be affirmed. Affirmed. CIIIEF JUSTICE STEELE. and Mr. JUSTICE BAILEY concur. No. 5678.1 ROBISON V. GUMAEE ET AL. 1. Real Property —Judgment —Lien —Issue of Execution. In Colorado, save in the federal court, a judgment does not of itself constitute a lien upon realty of a judgment debtor even in the county where itis rendered, nor does the issue of execu- tion create such a lien. —P. 312. 2. Creditors' Suit —Conditions Precedent. A mere general judgment creditor cannot maintain a cred- itor's suit to reach real property appearing in the name of the judgment debtor's wife subject to a resulting trust in his favor, S 4 r 95189$ A w in if in w hi di m of t, n: P a 0 p c 464 WEBB v. GOLD [ 154 Colo. No. 20,501. BERNICE LEE WEBB, ET AL., V. DONNA ARLENE GOLD, ET AL. (591 P. (Sell 6971 Decided April 20, 1964. Rehearing denied May 11, 1964. Action by grantees to establish breach of warranty. Judgment for defendants. Affirmed. 1. Dnos—Warranty—Title—Right-of Way —Limitations. In action to establish breach of covenant of warranty where it appeared from the record that title was conveyedsubject to right of way for canal and ditch, and that quit claim deed was of record conveying such right of way to canal and ditch owner, court properly refused to rule on applicability of statute of limits• tions to the covenants of warranty, it appearing that the grantees were aware at time of delivery owned e gr antors that rand ps rty was subject to such right of -way, not knowingly not received by grantees. 2. VENDOR AND PURCHASER —Matters of Record Prior to Sate—Coa- veyance—Subjrct to Right of Way. Where quit claim deed eon. veying right of way was of record prior to sale to grants*, who prevailed upon grantors to convey disputed area not sot. ject to warranty, such conveyance had only effect of TM claiming to grantees whatever right or title grantors then had to portion of property covered by right of way. Error to the District Court of Arapahoe County, Hon. Robert B. Lee, Judge. Mr. RICHARD L. GREENER, for plaintiffs in error. Mr. SAMUEL H. STERLING, Mr. HARRY M. STERLING, for defendants in error. In Department. 951898 April, '64 Opinion by THIS dispu breach of wa warranty del Arlene Gold, (herein calle hoe County, Webb (hereil of which thi: title suit by of the ditch which action parties. The cross -claim al The record lying along t of Denver. P gide by a ri, Creek Latera Denver. Als predecessors puted part o merely confit Shorn of c the warranty evidence, she clause two SE of which wa wit: "except Creek LaterE at the sale c the following to -wit: "sub Canal Sand came immed after an exc "subject to" ttehb. In action etc It appeared to right of way was of re.ord :It owner, c.,tlrt itutu of lhoita- aring that the I that property y grantor; and to Sale -Cou- claiui deed con- ic to grantees, I area tot sub - effect of quit whirs then had County, rror. iTERLING, for April..64 I WEBB V. GOLD 465 Upluiuu by MR. JUSTICE SUTTON. ['Isla dispute involves an -amended cross -claim for breach of warranty and concerns the construction of a warranty deed dated March 5, 1954, wherein Donna Arlene Cold, H. Michael Jultak and Selma L. Jultak (herein called grantors) deeded certain land in Arapa- hoe County, Colorado, to Frankell and Bernice Lee Webb (herein referred to as grantees). The action out of which this controversy arose was a successful quiet title suit by the Denver Water Board concerning part of the ditch right-of-way hereinafter mentioned and to which action these grantors and grantees were made parties. The trial court held for grantors dismissing the cross -claim and grantees bring error. The record discloses that grantors owned certain land lying along the south side of East Colfax Avenue east of Denver. Part of their tract was traversed on the east side by a right-of-way of the High Line Canal Sand Creek Lateral Ditch owned -by the City and County of Deaver. Also, it appears that one of the grantors' predecessors in title in 1952 had quit claimed the dis- puted part of the ditch right-of-way to Denver which merely confirmed Denver's earlier possessory right. Shorn of extraneous facts the dispute arose because the warranty deed to grantors, which was admitted in evidence, shows that it first contained in the granting clause two separate metes and bounds descriptions each of which was originally followed by this language, to - wit: "excepting therefrom the High Line Canal Sand Creek Lateral Ditch right-of-way." The evidence is that at the sale closing the above wording was lined out and the following language added after the warranty clause, to -wit: "subject to .the right-of-way of the High Line Canal Sand Creek Lateral Ditch;". This latter phrase came immediately after the usual printed wording and after an exception relating to 1954 general taxes and a "subject to" trust deed and note phrase. 951898 466 WEBB V. GOLD i. 154 Coin. It also appears that in 1954 the ditch was blocked at Colfax Avenue and there was some thought at the time that the right-of-way would be abandoned by the Water Board. At the trial of the case grantors unsuccessfully at- tempted to introduce parol evidence to show the reason for the alteration of the deed in the above particulars and in view of the result obtained it was immaterial there and here as to this. issue. The court at the conclusion of the trial said: "The Court is going to dismiss the action, dismiss the cross -claim. The statute of limitations as to the cove- nants of seisin of course has run. The statute of limi- tations as to the covenants of warranty I am not going to decide. * * * "The property was taken (i.e. deeded) subject to the right-of-way of the Highline Canal. The Court cannot construe the document in any other manner than that in which it appears. The parol evidence rule would forbid the Court from receiving any evidence explain- ing what the 'subject to the right-of-way of the High - line Canal Sand Creek Lateral Ditch' was intended to mean. It is clear to the Court what it means: That the property is conveyed subject to that right-of-way, who- ever may own the right-of-way." (Part in parenthesis added.) "Now, it appears to the Court that the grantees were aware at the time of the delivery of the deed * * * that the property described in the deed itself was subject to the right-of-way of the Highline Canal." [il In our view of the record the trial court in ruling on the disputed area considered the term right-of-way in effect to be the same as title which title it found to be in the Denver Water Board. Thus, the court, for example, properly refused to rule as to the applicability of the statute of limitations to the covenants of warranty for land not owned by grantors and knowingly not received by grantees. 951898 April, '64 [2] The record prim prevailed ui subject to 1 claiming to grantors tin it appears t puted area. The judgr MR. JUST] GIOVANNI ISTRATOR Proceedin; of deceased. Administrate I. ESTATES- -Error. ance of resident heir, wit each wa erroneot CouRTs—I diction. adminisl to enter the enti Unit_ hi :,t ti,,_ I,y the li'.,te .tceussl Oil ,ow ULe I , A_A,:h )ce hartit ul;ir, ;a:; inuuat o,.,l aid: uu, tiisiui:,; the La to the ,:ore duiluto of I 1111 Hut. ;.;Ding sit lijcct to Lhc court cvuuot niter than that ice rule w<alld idcnee explain iy of the High - vas intended to Leans: 'I'Irat the it of way, who . iii parenthesis grantees were deed " :- that was subject to 1 court iu ruling Ln1 right of -wad title it found to , the court, for the applicability tuts of warm tly knowingly not. GENTILE U. GENTILE 467 z I The quit claim deed to the Water Board was of record prior to the sale to these grantees and when they prevailed upon grantors to convey the disputed area not subject to the warranty it had only the effect of quit elailuing to grantees whatever right or title, if any, grantors then had to that property. Prom this record it appears they had no record right or title to the dis- puted area. 'I'ILe judgment is affirmed. yllt. JUSTICE DAY and MR. JUSTICE PRINGLE concur. No. 20,480. GIOVANNI GENTILE, E'1' AL., V. PETER GENTILE, I4llMIN- iS'rftATOR OF THE ESTATIYJ E OF VITO GENTILE, DECEASED. (39 Decided April 20, 1964. te Proceedings involving distribution strbawarding n ofesaejsof e assets of deceased. From a judgment _Administrator heir, other heirs bring error. Reversed. ESTATES—Administrator—Parol Contract —Specific Performance —Error. Judgment of probate court granting specific perform- ance of a parol contract allegedly entered into between non- resident brothersandsister heirs of deceasedandadministrator heir, withreferenceto distribution to be made of share to which each was entitled in event of their survival of deceased, was erroneous. 2. COURTS —Probate Court —Estate —Distribution of Assets —Juris- diction. County court in which estate of deceased was being administered had no jurisdiction upon petition of administrator to enter a judgment under which,administrator paid to himself the entire net proceeds remaining in the estate; had no juris- 951898 nth lair 11 1111 1111 11 1I, 111K lIu. tli.ltt 111 Jet 1, NI 210 01000111i 0 11 11 u .11 11].11 &tills 111111 111 at( i) 2'29, 7111 I SN'!t 919. 27 fit. USU. 51 8k. 575. i 251 .511'2(1 1A1' 51, Wn n, I s Holt von s Va 5911. /U "I §293 IInIt .nt ,1111. unless .I tt,Utl.11y 1,u}; ,d 111 deed,. gnnlg shit' 1111 111 1111 taut ,vinl u.11Ui,t1 111.'118,•• a, Jl reyuucd Ile, linen 111111 1- ,A11101111111llo 121111 hells „I WI' 1.11, 1L1ne cnllllell II1 ,odes! la, the gI11nu't's t' stile 1.;.1,111 Lt us, 1,,t d 111 .1 dte11 Move, iUg laud It, 11 L.u11 11eI ,: tilt' vv1nd, Id 1111111.1th tit and nil lrurth Ilt 't 1,+y Je ink' 111 ILe 1,.0 ucd 1111 xul. 1111 lgl-l' :1 IILII. \\ lit a 11,111 111 1.10'11.11, ill(' I1'Rll "181111.-' iutludcl ery'It Ian( and is 11, be giAeU that weaning in 1.111 al,urun' of 1111 xl"' 1 hr 111111 W it L1 ttut,u Old uun1 11stricUctl), hotteAcr, iren ssheic ,11th ullaUinl s 11au:uutd Ly the c1,weXl, read ,11111 0'w lulls tilt unul;uur, al .111 pulpel to be ronside' Lit . 75 ,1 die It rut 'im11r" is [wilier 1Lu idated in decisions it lauug 11, I I,1,usiu„I L. le t l 1U." '.ub)ecl It," in n deed tunvtV Jug an iwcical Ju real plopcuy alc I,,.dint atioll 1,1 dii' 1shJc granted." itreu though the ssoltls " suljctI .1 1.1.11 ill lie hhldar "stilnct 1t) ,1 spec died cut 11111131'1011 e,'' hear lilt ..o1,..a, tut . ,lung than onl) the cyuil) of It-deluptiuu belonging ill 1111 grdutur 1..1„ , it'ttl,18 slit h vvskin limy, Under We1111. unnStallres of the pal Hi uhu .11�1taguotis.'° l0 lutcrial❑ tic IUlcunuu 111 811(11 ambigwnu tax, all 111, Ii, .u:.l,lutcs art i,,keu tutu cunsideraau nt, Mull the primal nitallong of tilt „ subject III %sill be dep:utett hum, it uetessary, iU older to 71 „1 S1&10(311, 219 NC I2I, 19 54.2(1 71 ;I.. L.a.1 , lituticnuu. 117 Ark 21, 173 VN NIL',:,,i0, 1 %',''Idyll. 19 tutu, 107 1',,l., ,i,1. F), clause ill a decd 01 1 0.1.1 1.. 1111 glank a tlaugllltt 1111 lilt ,..� 11 1.0lt 1atu1.J 111.118 ill 1111 l,d1 la lang as ,11111,11 Ine, lhtu .11 tut dt.e1. 1„ 1111 11.a111n1 11tU, 111 Intl both. I1 11.1 I I¢ 1 11(1(11111 1,i 1111 Ludt 111.1) 111,11 1,t 1,1111;. and 11 1111 Ilaiviial 11111 111.118 11111(1 1...111 1 ,111 her, 01111 al 11O1 111.1111 111 1111. Ili 11,1 11111, ,.I Ill r buds 111 111O1111 Ielali'tt ILt uuu ll.uut,d 111118 111 Ler L11Jy" Iuyam 111114014 11111 ILt 111111 1..01181 111111 111 11(1 61.11 111( Ili, 111.11CM lit ,1111(1.1111S, 111111, all 1L1ut 110111 1111 1curlwldvr 111 111( tllild 01 1111111tH% .d 1111 lilt' 1cu.1n1 111O '011 \ C1.1 Ltl. 1111,1..11 •ILw.1u, 209 Va 511, 165 541d 380. b w uL(11111 a gill 111 "issue" tut bides itltgwnlalts, w. Ill Ann 111 2,1 Itvs' vAir, § 136. 75. Adaws s I..ns, 58 US 417 I5 I. Pd 149.1. 76. 811:11n Iut"I, AA'u.rs § 1216 11:1 u1�. 77. I bat 11.' v 51.1gIuli.t Yet ukluu l'1., 375 III 19, 37 N1:2_(1 760. lLt uauuy ill a t uuveylute as a 11,11Iwa). 1.(1.11 is 1111 suet Rd by the Fall 111.11 die wit- , II) is 11111%111(1 "su111eet el' a unnag.tgt-, Ina 1111 %slalaim, is to la taken iU a 'touted seise as applitallc to We slate graultd ,s qu.lhlittl 19 thy. nluilgage. Nit stet v Pope. 311 Mass 500, 12 N42,1 261. 78. Millet s Ile Graileuried, 43 Colo 306, 95 I' 91 I At I. 1111. we.It ling ill 'Laos el 111111' i1, a As 111 the Le Li GIy ill transltrces ill a nun ga X111 s r 110 :1111 Iw 2d. Wins § 1209.goi idio lake Ott pluperly subictl I1. a Mutt - 13 I,Ll , ,ullunul (Okla) 365 112(1 369, 89 gage, sec 55 Ant f 1,r Id, Meal .111.8 §§ 1046 0'I Al N':d Ill Annutalious: 59 AI,1t2t 1222 Practice Aids.. —Used puns uiun-:AssuUlpt0i1 ill via hub, autos- 7 Am Jog 1111111. Foists 211, 11. rlt1N111 % Junes, Illb NJ hi -153, 155 A Dross §§ 57:226, 67.227. 511 1. I1, 1,11111111 ado xtt J111(1ltU ale LIUkid,' 79. lio,culhal r 111111 155 Mal 410, N? A 598, 1• 2 , laic, app 159 INd 3112, 1511 A 850; Meugal Box 1,1 a IL'''. 191.1. I1. "issue," sec aw Iw d, 111 Tenn 596, 87 SW 415, 411111111 r. §!IN Cu. r pluurc. 271 § 293 DEEDS 23 .gym Jur 2d effectuate what seems best to accord with the intention of the parties." Of course, the rights of an earlier grantee to which a later grant is expressed to be subject are neither abridged nor enlarged by the later grant." § 294. "And"; "or." As used in deeds, the word "and" ordinarily implies the conjunctive, while "or" ordinarily implies the -alternative,* or is used as a disjunctive to .indicate substitution.* There is a presumption that when the word "or" is used in the habendum of a deed, the grantor intended it to express its ordinary meaning -as a disjunctive, and that he did not intend to use the -word "and."" Where the obvious intention so requires, the word "and" will .be read "or," and "or" will be read "and,"* but such construction is never resorted to for the purpose of supplying an intention not otherwise appearing." § 295. Other particular words and phrases. In deed construction, the term "assign" or "assignee" denotes in Jaw one to whom -an assignment has been made, and comprehends all chose who take either immediately or remotely from or under the assignor, whether by conveyance, devise, descent, or act of law." In the construction of deeds, the expression "nearest blood kin," where used to designate those who take in remainder, has been construed to mean the grantee's father and mother to the exclusion of brothers and sisters.-* In the absence of qualifying words the term "surviving children" in a trust deed to provide for the grantor's surviving children means all who survive the grantor or other designated person.* However, since a deed is construed according to the circumstances as they existed at the date of the execution thereof," some who would otherwise fall within this class may be excluded by a recital as to those whom the grantor intends shall benefit under the deed.'' In the construction of deeds, the term "encumbrance," as used in reference to a covenant to convey land "free from all encumbrances," has been defined as any right to, or interest in, the land subsisting in another to the diminution of its value, although such encumbrance is consistent with the passage of the fee by a deed." Thus, an easement in or over the land may be an encum- 80. Capitol Nat. Bank v Holmes, 43 Cob 154. 87. Hoffeld v United States. 186 US 273, 46 L 95 P 314; Moore v Griffin. 72 Kan 164, 33 P Ed 1160. 22 S Ct 927. 395. 81. Simmons v Northern P. R. Co., 38 Wash Generally, as to meaning of "assignee." see 6 Amur 2d. AssteNssENrs 384, P 321, reminitur mod on other ¢ f. 153 s 88 Wash 389, 155 P 1039 (contract as. Smith v Egan. 258 Mo 569, 167 SW 971. by But see Graves v Hver (Mo App) 626 SW2d conveyance subject to such contract). remove gravel held not restored OR revived 661, holding that the above case should be narrowly confined to its facts, on the authority 82. Jackson ex dent. Reeves v Topping, 1 of St. Lows Union Trust Co. v Kaltenbach. 353 Wend (NY) 388. Mo 1114. 186 SW2d 578. 83. Davis v Vermillion, 173 Kan 508, 249 P2d 625. 750, 33 S Ct 494. 84. Davis v Vermilion, 173 Kan 508. 249 P2d 625. 85. Jackson ex dem. Reeves v Topping I -Wend (NY) 388. -86. Davis v Vermillion. 173Kan508. 249 P2d 625. 272 89. Frosch v Walter, 228 US 109, 57 L Ed 90. As to when membership in class of per- sons taking under a deed is to be ascertained, see ¢ 275. 91. Frosch v Walter, 228 US 109, 57 L Ed 750, 33 S Ct 494. .92. 20 .Am fur 2d, COVENANTS. CONDITIONS, AND RESTRICTIONS 3 31. 951898 May 14, 1995 Shani L. Eastin, Current Planner Department of Planning Services Weld County Administrative Offices 1400 N 17th Ave. Greeley, CO 80631 Town of Mead P.O. Box 626 Mead, Colorado 80542 (303) 535-4477 WED COUNTY PLANNING Rti MAY 1 8 1995 i l! 'I I� n RE: Sekich Equipment Company - Special Use Permit - Beet Receiving Station. Dear Shani: April 19, I responded to your referral for the above Special Use Permit on behalf of the Town. At that time ',indicated that because the proposal conformed with the Town's Comprehensive Plan, the Town had no official objection to the request. Enclosed is correspondence regarding this proposal that we have received from residents of the Town's Grandview Estates on Friday. I believe that their objections speak for themselves and ask that you consider their concerns in the Board's deliberations. I apologize for any inconvenience this may have caused. Sincerely, st Rider City tanager 21mm WP 951893 May 6, 1995 Weld County Planning Commission Members: I am writing in regards to the Sekich Equipment Companys' request for a special use permit for an agricultural and suger beet receiving station. The proposed site is at the south-east corner of Weld County Road 13 and 32. My family and I live in the new Grand View Estates development just north of Highway 66 and W.C.R. #13. This development is currently only occupied by approximately twenty families, not even one-third of the number that will reside in this area when the development is complete. W.C.-R #13 is the only access road to enter this development. If the suger beet receiving station is located as it is presently proposed, it will also use W.C.R. #13 exclusively. The number of semi- trailers and trucks that both deliver beets and pick them up for processing is tremendous. These trucks deliver all day long and sometimes run 24 hours a day/night. I am concerned not only about the traffic problems but also about the noise from the trucks that run continuously in the middle of the night. If this^allowed WCR #13 will constantly be covered with mud and dirt from heavy truck usage. Most of us moved to the country for the quiet and peacefulness of country livingnotto listen to trucks keeping us awake at night. Another concern is what this beet dump will do to the property values of our homes. The current homes in this development are $200,000 - $300,000 plus. The dust,noise and traffic problems created by this newly proposed site can only devalue this area. Alternate sites that do not border housing developments seem better suited for this station. Thank you for your consideration in this matter. < er& Susan Liddell -Caudillo WELD COUNTY PLANNIN ToMAY 1 5 1995 E©E-BM1 951898 May 9, 1995 Shani L. Eastin Department of Planning Services Weld County Administrative Offices 1400 N. 17th Ave. Greeley, Colorado -80631 Subject: Sekich Equipment Company Sugar Beet Receiving Station Dear Ms. Eastin: This letter shall serve as an objection to the proposed Special Use Permit for the sugar beet receiving station located at Weld County Rd. 13 and Weld County Rd. 32. The reasons for this objection are 1) Very high truck traffic 24 hours a day, 2) dust conditions, 3) mud conditions on the highways, 4) decline in home sale traffic in Grandview Estates Subdivision, 5) potential decline in property values, and 6) small children at the entrance to subdivision waiting for school bus, thus creating a safety hazard. In addition to these concerns, the abuse the large trucks will have on the pavement on WCR 13. The pavement will only deteriorate quicker with this abuse. Thank -you for your attention and consideration of this objection. Hopefully, Sekich Equipment Company can find an alternate site that is not so close to a quality residential neighborhood. Sincerely, Douglas D. Koenig Lot 7, Grandview Estates WELD COUNTY PLANNING MAY 1 1 1995 I[ft ECEI E J� d 951898 rci Sslitetis)2 c7 �J- 41fira' yntes4) 4-1-0 4are.e.ati-Pt 6-7-4,.(7;d;Aite-t e zd,Acai4e__ 3p9Dto. , ot)Lac4t—O4,gitit-- 951899 St. Vrain Valley Schk,ol District RE -1J 395 South Pratt Parkway • Longmont • CO • 80501-6499 303-776-6200/449-7343 • FAX 303-682-7343 May 1, 1995 Ms. Shani L. Eastin, Planner Weld County Department of Planning Services Weld County Administrative Offices 1400 North 17th Avenue Greeley, Colorado 80631 Dear Ms. Eastin: I am writing to express the St. Vrain Valley School District's concern about locating a beet dump at WCR 13 and WCR 32. It is our understanding that the intent is to combine two beet dumps and relocate to this site. Our concern specifically is the amount of truck traffic generated during the beet harvest season. The information we have been given would indicate that up to 600 truck loads could be expected each day. This assumes the consolidation of two beet dumps into one. We have both elementary and secondary school buses operating in this area. Obviously, with this tremendous increase in truck traffic, the potential for a serious truck —school bus accident will increase as well. With the housing areas being developed in the same area as the proposed beet dump site, it is likely that school bus traffic may increase as well. We would suggest to you that perhaps a location could be found that is less popu- lated and that beet truck traffic would have a lesser impact on residents and students. Sincerely, J.D. Allen Director of Custodial, Transportation, and Warehouse Services cc: Mr. Robert Moderhak, SVVSD Asst. Supt. Auxiliary Services Mrs. Barbara Fiechtner 15152 WCR 13 Longmont, CO 80504 "Excellence - Our Only Option" WELD L.\-11 MAY 41995 ECfI■tE of 951598 James A. Gustafson Attorney and Counselor of Law 1010 9th Avenue, P.O. Box 1726 Greeley. Colorado 80632 3033564200 or 303-356.8201 May 2, 1995 Weld County Department of Planning Services 1400 North 17th Avenue Greeley, Colorado 80631 Attention: Shani L. Eastin Re: USR-1082 (Sekich) Dear Ms. Eastin: n DCOUNTY`wN1NG MAY E C 21995 FIVE I have been requested by Arvid L. and Barbara L. Fiechtner, Harvey Dean and Rose Ellen ,Fiechtner and Raymond Fiechtner (hereinafter referred to as Fiechtners), who reside and/or have an ownership interest in the property immediately to the north of the proposed sugar beet receiving station, to write you this letter. Before I set forth Fiechtners' concerns about the location of the sugar beet receiving station (hereinafter beet dump) being located on Lot B of RE -1590, located in the NW 1/4 of Sec. 19, Twp. 3 N., Rng. 67 W. of the 6th P.M., Weld County, Colorado, I believe you should be advised about the following problems with application USR-1082. 1. Paragraph 3. of the Use By Special Review questionnaire stated that, "Prior to a moratorium for annexation into the Town of Mead, this property and use had been reviewed by the Town of Mead Planning Commission and said Planning Commission recommended approval of this facility." This statement is not correct because the Town of Mead Trustees reviewed the annexation request of Sekich and made the recommendation that the annexation be denied. However, before a vote was conducted by the Trustees Sekich withdrew the annexation petition. On page 5 of the Minutes of the Town of Mead Board of Trustees Special Meeting held on January 23, 1995, at 7:00 p.m. it sets forth that the Town of Mead Attorney Rick Samson suggested that the application of Sekich be amended to reflect that the beet dump show a commercial zoning classification instead of agricultural. Further, on page 5 of the Town of Mead Minutes it shows the general consensus of the board was to deny the request for annexation. The Minutes are attached hereto and made a part hereof for your review. 2. Sekich needs to provide you with the documentation he has to support that the beet dump currently located one-half mile to the south of USR-182 had an excellent safety record. Fiechtners do not understand why the Colorado Transportation Department was not listed on the referral list as being sent a copy of the Use By Special Review application because it would be the best source to provide information concerning the current access and safety information of the beet dump now in existence. 3. The site sketch provided by Sekich shows an existing access easement immediately north of Lot A off of Weld County Road 13 between State Highway 66 and Weld County Road 32. This is neither an express or implied access easement that Sekich has to Lot B. In fact, Sekich only recently has attempted to utilize this access to get into and out of Lot B. Fiechtners and their predecessors in interest have always owned the ditch easement along the west side of Lot B and to the east of Weld County Road 13 to run their Highland ditch water rights to irrigate their property located in Sec. 18, Twp. 3 N., Rng. 67 W. of the 6th 951898 P.M., Weld County, Colorado. Attached hereto and made a part hereof by this reference are deeds to Fiechtners' property evidencing ownership of ditches and water rights appurtenant to said property and the Rules and Regulations of the Highland Ditch Company evidencing its' 1871 priority. It is Fiechtners' understanding that Weld County appropriated land to each side of the center line of Weld County Road 13 for a right-of-way in 1889. Therefore, it is Fiechtners' position that their easement interest in the irrigation ditch immediately east of Weld County Road 13 and west of Lot B should not be interfered with unless Sekich can guarantee them that the following will occur: (a) Either a concrete or a steel bridge needs to be installed wherever Sekich is requesting access over Fiechtners' irrigation ditch. (b) Sekich needs to install an appropriate ditch cleaner and he will be solely responsible for maintaining Fiechtners' irrigation ditch as it runs through Lot B. (c) Sekich needs to clean out Fiechtners' irrigation ditch along the area he is requesting access crossings and he needs to clean out Fiechtners' ditch along Lot B on a daily basis between April 15th through August 31st. (d) Sekich needs to agree that as long as he is crossing the Fiechtners' irrigation ditch to get to and from Lot B that he will be fully liable for any injuries or damages that occur because of Fiechtners' irrigation ditch or the crossings installed therein. (e) As soon as this use by special review for Western Sugar terminates that the access easements across Fiechtners' irrigation ditch shall also terminate and the ditch shall be restored to its' original condition and all structures installed in the ditch shall be removed at the expense of Sekich. (-f) Any deceleration lane or turning lane required because of this use by special review shall not be constructed in such a manner that interferes with Fiechtners' ditch easement. (gWelCountRoad 3,is going to)bef tili zed asyaccess2tolthedbeetldumprit sh uldmmeiatey noth of thepbeppav d byroosed beetSekich to curtail dust in the area. 4. Fiechtners are also concerned about the volume of traffic that will occur on weld County Road 13 and possibly on Weld County Road 32. Fiechtners do not believe the estimation of increased traffic made by Sekich is accurate. Fiechtners have been advised that if the beet dump is closed at Buda and the existing beet dump off of Highway 66 and Weld County Road 13 is relocated to Lot B that there will be approximately 500 to 600 truckloads delivered to the beet dump on a daily basis by approximately 67 beet growers. Thus, the statement Sekich makes in paragraph no. 4. of the questionnaire of this new beet dump merely being a minor relocation needs to be reexamined because this area will be utilized to accommodate two former beet dump locations. In addition, the relocation of the Buda site to this proposed site will increase the mileage traveled by the beet growers from the Buda site to the new proposed beet dump to the factory by nine miles. Fiechtners also believe that the amount of beets Sekich is estimating to be delivered to the new beet dump is very low and they believe itwillbe in excess of 200,000 tons thatwillbe piled at the new beet dump. Further, maximum weight of the beet trucks loaded with beets between September and the latter part of October will be a higher weight than estimated by Sekich. 5. The estimated number of trucks traveling to and from the beet dump will also be in excess of ten trucks per hour. The health, safety and welfare of the neighborhood will be affected quite a bit by this increased traffic along Weld County Road 13. Therefore, the use of Weld County Road 13 does change because some of the traffic to the existing beet dump was on Highway 66. Now all of the traffic will be on Weld County Road 13. The information provided in Sekich's 951898 application under the portion entitled Use By Special Review questionnaire, paragraph 15., should be scrutinized quite closely because Fiechtners believe the information is not an accurate estimation of the volume of traffic or the number or weight of the trucks being utilized on Weld County Road 13. 6. The removal operations will also take place twenty-four hours each day between September and January each year. Every time a piece of heavy equipment backs up, safety rules and regulations require that heavy equipment to make a warning noise of this backing action. The noise and the dust will greatly impact people in the immediate vicinity of the beet dump. Therefore, Fiechtners are requesting that landscaping barriers and/or sound barriers be installed on site to curtail the noise and dust that will be created by this activity. 7. Attached hereto and made a part hereof is a traffic study for Highway 66 near the existing beet dump. This traffic -study should be considered by Weld County officials in making a determination on whether or not Lot B is an appropriate location for the new beet dump. Weld County officials should bear in mind that the speed limit along Weld County Road 13 in the immediate vicinity of the access easements requested by Sekich and Great Western is anywhere from 45 m.p.h. to 55 m.p.h. The new traffic associated with this beet dump should require both deceleration lane and a turning lane if Weld County government follows the State Highway Access Code amended by the Colorado Highway Commission on or about August 15, 1985. You need to -keep in mind that the Weld County Road 13 in the area of Lot B has but twelve foot lanes, two foot shoulders and no base under the existing pavement other than the original soil. The size of the trucks utilizing the site will also cause problems to the other drivers in the area because they will often be swinging into the other lane when turning into or out of the beet dump area. 8. Weld County should also review the type of soil features for Lot B. It appears that the soil features may have a problem with the ability to support the weight of the loads Sekich is requesting travel over the property in question. If this fact is true then Fiechtners request Sekich to take appropriate action to see that the area in question for the beet dump is properly prepared to handle the weight of the loads that will be traveling over it. 9. Weld County Road 13 does have school buses that travel along it and Fiechtners have been advised by some of the bus drivers that this increased traffic associatedwiththe beet dump will cause the bus drivers problems. 10. Fiechtners request that whatever use occurs on Lot B meet the appropriate Weld County and Colorado standards for access easements, for health standards, and for traffic and drainage requirements. Specifically, Fiechtners are concerned that Weld County requires Sekich to install appropriate flood control retention ponds on site to prevent erosion to their ditch and fields to the north of the proposed beet dump site. 11. It is Fiechtners' understanding that if the access easement Sekich is requesting in his use by special review is only temporary in nature that the standards require thatwhateveraccess Sekich obtains does not block the existing drainage features. Fiechtners and their predecessors in interest have had an irrigation ditch that runs to the west of Lot B and to the east of Weld County Road 13 since the Highland ditch water was decreed. Therefore, Fiechtners request that Weld County officials take whatever steps are necessary to insure that their irrigation water is not interfered with by this use by special review. In addition, before any type of use by special review is granted to Sekich, Fiechtners request that appropriate construction drawings be submitted for the requested access easements, that the traffic associated with this use be reviewed, that a deceleration lane and a turning lane be examined to see if they are necessary and feasible and that Sekich and/or Great Western advise Weld County why this proposed location for a beet dump is more appropriate than one of the other two beet dump sites listed below: (1) Frontage Road and Weld County Road 38. 951.098 JAG:mkl (2) Weld County Road 13 and Weld County Road 38. Thank you for taking these concerns into consideration. Sr1Tcekely your, on -4- Ref es A. Gustaf 951898 April 27, 1995 Shani L. Eastin, Current Planner Dept. of Planning Services Weld County Administrative Offices 1400 N. 17th Avenue Greeley, CO 80631 RE: CASE NUMBER USR-1082 Ms. Easton: We are owners of Lot 15 in Grand View Estates. When we were negotiating the purchase of this lot in November of 1984, we inquired about the status of the sugar beet storage and hauling on the property adjacent to this sub -division, through the listing real estate agent Joe Current of Remax of Longmont. Mr. Current then contacted Mr. Sekich to find out if this was a permanent facility. The answer given to us was that it was only temporary and would be shut down after that season, not to return next year. If this is the same type of facility, we are strongly opposed to it. Our objections are: 1. The constant heavy truck traffic on the service roads behind our property is a safety hazard to both children and pets. Also, the noise of these trucks passing by the border of our property negatively affects the value and livability of the home we are planning to build. 2. Grand ViewEstateshas many restrictive covenants which protect both the value and peace and quiet of country living. The noise of conveyers and diesel trucks does not blend well with this environment. If further input from us is desired, please contact Lee Storlie at 428-0207 (days), or 252-0830 (evenings). Sincerely, ighton and Diane Storlie A COUNTY PLANNWNt -APR 2 8 1995 7' ECINVEL 9 951838 Don Boos Construction, Inc. 6405 Hwy. 66 Longmont, Colorado 80504 (303) 535-4327 5L), kokc-O4 O1) ) Lt Jo. . S��Coto 5 &oc�3j 1 C)�LQ p ICJ Q �Q r b C\ UDhu-1/4.-CL St* NQ -c f' n S� c�� w, a�� LJe \ sz t o � . \c) hornivla `aoic, �e \,-\c\_ G-^ J�9 ✓, �- .SIZE WELD COUNTY PLANNING APR 2 7 1995 ECEIV 0 951898 �i� L r,4 . );t Cr. iL C .Ste rteecl-np-1 tt L,' ic-Yz /C A5t.? 2 D/ j 0 o acAcsidd 1 -4 -274a --n/ 951898 ✓Lp/ l`�✓ / / 7 WELD COUNTY PLANNING APR 2 6 1995 111) C( F!WIr 951898 Town of Mead P.O. Box 626 Mead, Colorado 80542 (303) 535-4477 April 19, 1995 Shani L. Eastin, Current Planner Department of Planning Services Weld County Administrative Offices 1400 N 17th Ave. Greeley, CO 80631 RE: Sekich Equipment Company - Special Use Permit - Beet Receiving Station Dear Shani: I have reviewed the requested "Site Specific Development Plan and Special Use Permit" for the Sekich Equipment Company referred to the Town of Mead. The proposed sugar beet receiving station is compatible with our comprehensive plan for this area. A similar proposal was condsidered as part of an annexation request some months ago. The present beet receiving station on the Grandview Estates property off Hwy 66 is being displaced by the residential development in the subdivision. The proposed site appears to be appropriate in terms of access and proximity to beet producers.. Therefore, the Town does not have an objection to a granting of the proposed Special Use Permit. Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the proposed division. If there are any questions, I may be contacted at (303) 532-4054. Sincerely ; Garyfiest Cir it Rider City Manager 2150161 WI WELD COUNTY PLANNING p APR 2 1 1995 1� 4c 95 898 Hello