The URL can be used to link to this page

Browse Search

Home My WebLink About982332.tiff STATE OF COLORADO CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION • 9ep4rt5Qahgfl latoryAgencies i JACK LANG y MARQUEZ. Director `' `lb>` i,'iPl.tarcia ,�E�F��r4 C n. -Ex6tubive D ttor AZ ''r" 19911 NOV 16 AH !0: 26 — •�76 CLERK Roy Romer co ernor CERTIFICATE CIO lialth 'ab Charge No. E98GY100 This is to certify that on this/g—day of November, 1998, a true and exact copy of the Closing Action of the above-referenced charge was deposited in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the parties listed below. Information and necessary forms for filing an appeal are enclosed with this mailing. Rick G. Margheim P.O. Box 787 Platteville, CO 80651 Chalres B. Dickson, Attorney Dickson & Dickson P.C. 821 9th St. Suite, 101 Greeley, CO 80631 The Board of County Commissioners Weld County 915 10th St. Greeley, CO 80631 Weld County Ambulance 1121 M St. Greeley, CO 80631 Cindy Giaugne Asst. Weld County Attorney P.O. Box 1948 Greeley, CO 80622 Greeley Office • EEOC V I4M � Elizabet ayes, Case Contfol Coordinator COM/appeal 1560 Broadway, Suite 1050 • Denver, Colorado 80202-5143 yoag (303)894-2997 It tJ,@J+�� Fax # (303) 894-7830 ■ TTY # (303) 894-7832 ■ 1-800-262-4845 (Colorado only) V � Am Pr 982332 CC .' C , STATE OF COLORADO CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION Department of Regulatory Agencies 0C•c JACK LANG y MARQUEZ,Director Joseph A.Garcia , ��o\ Executive Director I pl � s, �� r �r � �t89fi r Charge No. E98GY 100 Roy Romer Governor Rick G. Margheim P.O. Box 787 Platteville, CO 80651 Charging Party vs. The Board of County Commissioners of the County of Weld 915 10th St. Greeley, CO 80631 AND Weld County Ambulance 1121 M St. Greeley, CO 80631 Respondent DETERMINATION Under the authority vested in me by C.R.S. 24-34-306(2) I conclude from our investigation that there is not probable cause to credit Charging Party's allegation. The case is dismissed effective the date of this notice. My decision is based on the following facts and conclusions, but not limited thereto: Respondent is an employer within the meaning of C.R.S. 24-34-401(3), as re-enacted, and the timeliness and all other jurisdictional requirements pursuant to Title 24, Article 34, Parts 3 and 4 have been met. Charging Party alleges that on or about January 5, 1998, effective January 7, 1998,the Respondent discharged him from the position of paramedic because of his disability(neurological deficit of unknown origin which also involves headaches and knee replacement). The Respondent states that the Charging Party has an impairment which prevents him from performing the essential elements of the paramedic position. The Charging Party was hired in May 1981 as an emergency medical technician. In 1983, after the Charging Party had completed paramedic training, he became a working paramedic. In October 1996, the Charging Party first noticed problems with his memory and vision. On August 25, 1997, the Charging Party's doctor notified the Respondent that the Charging Party was not capable of performing the essential functions of the paramedic 1560 Broadway, Suite 1050 • Denver, Colorado 80202-5143 (303)894-2997 Fax # (303)894-7830 ■ TTY# (303) 894-7832 ■ 1-800-262-4845 (Colorado only) 95a5_3(9-- Notice of Determination Charge No. E98GY100 Page Two position. This doctor indicated that the Charging Party was diagnosed as having a "neurological condition—etiology unknown." When the Charging Party filed his charge of discrimination on March 25, 1998, he admitted that he was "not physically able to perform the essential job functions of paramedic." The Charging Party was put on medical leave on July 3, 1997. He remained on this leave status until January 7, 1998, when the Respondent terminated his employment. Before the Charging Party was discharged, he wrote a proposal for the Respondent to create a new position of fleet coordinator and requested that the Respondent transfer him to this position. The Charging Party suggested that he could perform the following duties as a fleet coordinator: • Coordinate maintenance of ambulance vehicles. • Monitor ambulance usage. • Handle "specs" on new ambulances and sale of old ones. • Order, stock and distribute maintenance supplies. The Charging Party asserts that when he had worked as a paramedic, 20%-60% of his time had been spent on mechanical maintenance. The Respondent states that on December 29, 1997, the Charging Party requested that the fleet coordinator position be created for him as a new, half-time position. The Respondent admits that between approximately 1990 and December 1995, the Charging Party did some extra maintenance work and received additional compensation for it. At the end of 1995, the Respondent decided to assign some of these duties to other ambulance employees. After the Charging Party submitted his proposal, the Respondent's director of finance and personnel department reviewed it and determined that there was not enough work involved in maintaining the fleet to justify creating a half-time position. The Charging Party also requested that the Respondent consider transferring him to a position in the road and bridge department or in the maintenance division of the building and grounds department. He states that he met with Michelle Raimer (personnel services employee) on November 25, 1997 to discuss his options. The Charging Party believes that positions were available in both areas. However, the Charging Party contends Ms. Raimer denied that any jobs were available in either area. Also, the Charging Party maintains that Ms. Raimer told him that the personnel director(Pat Persichino) did not want the Charging Party to work with the building and grounds department. Mr. Persichino had said that maintenance workers in this department do overhead work, and he did not want the Charging Party to work on a ladder. However, the Charging Party believes that the Respondent could have provided some reasonable accommodation to allow him to work in this position with his knee replacement. 9yra33c Notice of Determination Charge No. E98GY100 Page Three In August 1997, the Charging Party had a left knee replacement. On May 11, 1998, the Charging Party stated that he believed his left knee was functioning at about 80%. The Respondent maintains that there were no vacant positions in road and bridge and on the maintenance crew from November 25, 1997 through January 15, 1998. The Respondent has had openings in other areas and contends that the Charging Party was encouraged to apply for any vacant position. However, the Charging Party did not apply for any vacancy. The Respondent indicates that Ms. Raimer told the Charging Party the following regarding climbing ladders: "...if there were ajob available, he could obtain a Transfer Request Form and interview for the job, and he would have to meet the physical requirements for the job such as climbine a ladder and overhead reaching." The Charging Party alleges that the Respondent has transferred four other employees to different positions and/or created new positions for them. These four employees are Steve Hartwick, Sue Gray, Cindy Engle and Jerry Hettinger. The Respondent states that Gray and Engle claimed to have suffered emotional harm after witnessing terrible accidents. Both employees received worker's compensation settlements and did not return to work. The Respondent maintains that neither Gray nor Engle was offered or applied for any other position. Mr. Hartwick was a paramedic who had an on-the-job back injury. He worked in a temporary light duty position for a few weeks and was returned to full paramedic duties, where he continued through the remainder of his employment. Mr. Hettinger was injured on the job and was physically unable to continue in his position. At this same time the assessor's office was creating a new position. Mr. Hettinger applied and was interviewed for this new position. The assessor's office offered this position to Mr. Hettinger., but he declined the job offer. Between March 1996 and March 1998, the only other employee in addition to the Charging Party who was separated for "health" reasons was Mr. Hettinger. Weld County Ambulance Service employs 53 people. The Respondent is not aware of any employees with disabilities. When the Respondent provided its response, the Charging Party's position had not yet been filled. During the expedited resolution conference on this case, the Charging Party maintained that he could have continued as a paramedic if the Respondent had given him computer training and allowed him to work only with another paramedic on a call. The Charging Party believed that if he knew how to operate a computer, he could use a laptop computer to help recall current procedure when he was assisting victims. The Charging Party did not believe that it would be difficult for the Respondent to assign him to work only with another paramedic. 9803339, Notice of Determination Charge No. E98GY100 Page Four The Respondent asserts that the Charging Party never asked for this accommodation before he was terminated. Respondent further states that even if the Charging Party had requested this accommodation, the Respondent would not have been able to agree to it. The Charging Party's doctor said that the Charging Party could not perform as a paramedic. Furthermore, as a paramedic, the Charging Party would still have to be able to make decisions on his own because more than one person in an accident scene might be hurt. To access information in a computer, the Charging Party would need to remember how to request it. The Respondent is unsure if the Charging Party could properly handle that function in an emergency. Finally, the Charging Party could not work as a paramedic unless a physician advisor would approve using him. When the Charging Party filed his charge, he stated that the Respondent could have accommodated him by creating a new, half-time position of fleet coordinator. However, an employer is not required to create a new position to accommodate a disabled worker. McDonald v. State of Kansas Dept. of Corrections, 880 F. Supp. 1416, 1423 (D. Kan. 1995). The Charging Party alleges that the Respondent created positions for four other employees. However, only one of these employees was offered a position, but the position was not created for this employee. The Charging Party wanted to be transferred to a road and bridge or a maintenance position. However, neither area had any vacancies. The Charging Party did not apply for any open position before he was terminated. Subsequent to filing his charge, the Charging Party indicated that the Respondent could have provided a reasonable accommodation to allow him to continue as a paramedic. However, the Charging Party's doctor had not changed his diagnosis that the Charging Party could not work as a paramedic. Furthermore, the Charging Party did not request that the Respondent accommodate him as a paramedic while he was still employed so that the parties could engage in an interactive process. Bul.temeyer v. Ft. Wayne Community Schools, DLR 11/26/96 (7`h Cir. 1996). The Respondent has provided legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions regarding the Charging Party. The Charging Party has been unable to show that these reasons were pretextual. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Therefore, this case is dismissed with a Finding of No Probable Cause. Based on the evidence contained above, I determine that the Respondent has not violated C.R.S. 24-34-402, as re-enacted. In accordance with Rule 10.6(A)(1) of the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure, the Charging Party may appeal the dismissal of the charge to the Commission as set forth in the enclosed form. If the Charging Party wishes to file a civil action in a district court in this state, which action is based on the alleged discriminatory or unfair practice that was the subject of the charge filed with the Commission he/she must do so gy-a33,2 Notice of Determination Charge No. E98GY100 Page Five a. Within ninety days of the mailing of this notice if no appeal is filed with the Colorado Civil Rights Commission or b. Within ninety days of the mailing of the final notice of the Commission dismissing the appeal. If Charging Party does not file an action within the time limits specified above, such action will be barred and no State District Court shall have jurisdiction to hear such action [CRS 24-34-306(I)]. On Behalf of the Colorado Civil Rights Division At /Wier Jack ng y Marquez, D. for Date Enclosure: cc: Rick G. Margheim Charles B. Dickson, Attorney Board of Weld County Commissioners Weld County Ambulance Cindy Giaugne, Asst. Weld County Attorney EEOC Greeley Regional Office • 9sa332 Hello