The URL can be used to link to this page

Browse Search

Home My WebLink About851177.tiff SS INS No. : 6835 mitt IN 85-17, Supplement 1 UNITED STATES 1NELD COUM}9 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION p OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 OCT l6 as October 1, 1985 _ it it4-4.4.I.EY. COLA_ IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 85-17, SUPPLEMENT 1: SOLENOID VAL VES STICKING CI OF ASCO Addressees: All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license (OL) or a construction permit (CP). Purpose: This notice is to inform recipients of the results of followup investigations regarding the reasons for sticking of Automatic Switch Company (ASCO) solenoid valves used to shut main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) under accident conditions. Recipients are expected to review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, if appropriate, to preclude similar problems occurring at their facilities. However, suggestions contained in this information notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required. Description of Circumstances: Information Notice No. 85-17, "Possible Sticking of ASCO Solenoid Valves," described the problem that occurred with ASCO Model HTX 832320V solenoid valves at Grand Gulf Unit 1. General Electric (GE) and ASCO conducted tests to determine the cause and any further corrective actions. The following is a summary of the GE and ASCO tests and analyses: Two of the three solenoid valves which failed at the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station also sporadically failed to transfer during testing at elevated temperatures. These two valves were the only valves that failed during these tests. However, these failures were not predictable. Subsequently, five valves from Grand Gulf service were disassembled and inspected. This inspection identified a microscopic foreign substance on the lower core/plug nut interfaces on all five valves. Further evaluations of this microscopic substance were inconclusive because of the small foreign substance sample size. After cleaning and reassembly of these valves, tests were conducted on four of these five valves at elevated temperatures. These four valves functioned normally. ASCO felt certain that the valve failures resulted from high-temperature sticking of the lower core-to-plug nut faces resulting from a foreign substance or combination of substances collected at this interface. 851177 nFno9Fn'zF4 1..,� r rr.�cla�lk5 IN 85-17, Supplement 1 October 1, 1985 Page 2 of 2 A detailed dimensional analysis and comparison among the valves returned from Grand Gulf indicated that all parts were within allowable limits and differences were not enough to cause a failure to shift. Therefore, this examination tended to relieve concerns related to a generic design defect. GE has attempted to locate additional foreign substance from other valves of the same type in use at Grand Gulf to determine how the foreign substance got in the valve, or where it originated. GE was able to scrape some small amounts of foreign substance from the lower core-to-plug nut interface. However, there was not enough residue to make a definitive identification of the nature of the foreign substance. GE has recommended that the licensee replace the potentially contaminated MSIV solenoid valves and institute a periodic examination and cleaning of the MSIV solenoid valves. Grand Gulf has replaced the eight MSIV HTX832320V dual solenoid valves with fully environmentally qualified ASCO Model NP 8323A20E dual solenoid valves. The environmentally qualified valve Model NP 8323A20E was included in a control sample placed in the test ovens with the solenoid valves that stuck at Grand Gulf. The environmentally qualified model did not stick under the test conditions that cause sticking in the other solenoid valves. No specific action or written response is required by this information notice. If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional office or this office. Jar/ Srector Divisi of Emergency Preparedness and gineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement Technical Contact: Eric Weiss, IE (301) 492-9005 Attachment: List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices Attachment 1 IN 85-17, Supplement 1 October 1, 1985 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED IE INFORMATION NOTICES Information Date of Notice No. Subject Issue Issued to 85-79 Inadequate Communications 9/30/85 All power reactor Between Maintenance, facilities holding Operations, And Security an OL or CP; research Personnel and nonpower reactor facilities; fuel fabrication and processing facilities 85-78 Event Notification 9/23/85 All power reactor facilities holding an OL or CP 85-77 Possible Loss Of Emergency 9/20/85 All power reactor Notification System Due To facilities holding Loss Of AC Power an OL or CP 85-76 Recent Water Hammer Events 9/19/85 All power reactor facilities holding an OL or CP 85-75 Improperly Installed Instru- 8/30/85 All power reactor mentation, Inadequate Quality facilities holding Control And Inadequate Post- an OL or CP modification Testing 85-74 Station Battery Problems 8/29/85 All power reactor facilities holding an OL or CP 84-70 Reliance On Water Level 8/26/85 All power reactor Sup. 1 Instrumentation With A facilities holding Common Reference Leg an OL or CP 85-73 Emergency Diesel Generator 8/23/85 All power reactor Control Circuit Logic Design facilities holding Error an OL or CP 85-72 Uncontrolled Leakage Of 8/22/85 All power reactor Reactor Coolant Outside facilities holding Containment an OL or CP OL = Operating License CP = Construction Permit SSINS No. : 6835 IN 85-79 UNITED STATES Q w�� NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION L OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT OCT 8 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 sas September 30, 1985 � tLt IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 85-79: INADEQUATE COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN MAINTENANCE, OPERATIONS, AND SECURITY PERSONNEL Addressees: All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license (OL) or construction permit (CP), research and nonpower reactor facilities, and fuel fabrication and processing facilities using or processing formula quantities of special nuclear material . Purpose: This information notice is provided to alert addressees of the need to ensure that actions of a temporary or permanent nature taken by operations, maintenance, or other personnel that may affect the integrity of the physical barriers used to control access to protected, material access, and vital areas, or other por- tions of the overall security program, are coordinated with the organization ' directly responsible for security before being implemented. It is expected that the recipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions , if necessary, to preclude a similar problem occurring at their facilities. Suggestions contained in this information notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required. Description of Circumstances: During plant walkdowns and/or inspections, NRC and licensee personnel have identified instances where actions by plant organizational elements other than security have resulted in the degradation of protected and vital area barriers and other security/safeguards measures without proper compensation. Some examples are: o removal of portions of protected and vital area barriers, including fences, hatches, or other portals that allow unauthorized access to the protected area or vital areas o removal of equipment that had formed part of the barrier, such as piping or valves that would allow passage of small objects into or out of a material access area or vital area o creation of holes in protected and vital area barriers to facilitate construction 8509260122 IOpll9.c IN 85-79 September 30, 1985 Page 2 of 3 o leaving vital area door alarms in access mode after work is completed o removal of essential telephone lines from an independent power source o building or placing equipment, structures, or vehicles within the isolation zone of the protected area or within exterior "clear" zones of sensitive facilities, such as storage vaults The incidents that lead to the issuance of this information notice have resulted in the degradation of protected and vital area barriers and access controls necessary for protection of vital equipment and, in one case, the loss of the means to communicate with local law enforcement officials or emergency response personnel . In many cases, the loss of this protection has been accompanied by the failure of the licensee to notify the NRC in accordance with the applicable provisions of 10 CFR 73. 71, depending on the degree to which the security system has been degraded. Discussion: A review of each incident has indicated that the modification or repairs that degraded the protected and vital area barriers and communications systems were made without an adequate, or in some cases any, notification of the facility' s security organization by the organization planning or performing the modifica- tions or repairs. The likelihood of degradation may be substantially lessened at sites where the organization responsible for security is part of the planning or scheduling phase of any facility modifications or repairs. In such facilities, the barriers and equipment necessary to provide security to the facility are identified and the proper compensatory measures planned and scheduled to allow for the efficient implementation of the planned modifications or repairs. An integrated planning system allows for all facility organizations to have input to the planning and scheduling phase of maintenance and facility modifications, especially when the actions taken can negatively impact on the effectiveness of other essential programs. The reporting requirements of 10 CFR 73. 71 may apply to security incidents of the type described above, depending on the degree to which the security system has been degraded. IN 85-79 September 30, 1985 Page 3 of 3 No specific action or written response is required by this information notice. If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the Regional Administrator of the approprate NRC regional office or this office. dward . io d, Director Divisi n •f Emergency Preparedness and gineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement Technical Contact: R. Rosano, IE (301) 492-4006 Attachment: List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices Attachment 1 IN 85-79 September 30, 1985 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED IE INFORMATION NOTICES Information Date of Notice No. Subject Issue Issued to 85-78 Event Notification 9/23/85 All power reactor facilities holding an OL or CP 85-77 Possible Loss Of Emergency 9/20/85 All power reactor Notification System Due To facilities holding Loss Of AC Power an OL or CP 85-76 Recent Water Hammer Events 9/19/85 All power reactor facilities holding an OL or CP 85-75 Improperly Installed Instru- 8/30/85 All power reactor mentation, Inadequate Quality facilities holding Control And Inadequate Post- an OL or CP modification Testing 85-74 Station Battery Problems 8/29/85 All power reactor facilities holding an OL or CP 84-70 Reliance On Water Level 8/26/85 All power reactor Sup. 1 Instrumentation With A facilities holding Common Reference Leg an OL or CP 85-73 Emergency Diesel Generator 8/23/85 All power reactor Control Circuit Logic Design facilities holding Error an OL or CP 85-72 Uncontrolled Leakage Of 8/22/85 All power reactor Reactor Coolant Outside facilities holding Containment an OL or CP 85-71 Containment Integrated Leak 8/22/85 All power reactor Rate Tests facilities holding an OL or CP 85-70 Teletherapy Unit Full 8/15/85 All material Calibration And Qualified licensees Expert Requirements (10 CFR 35. 23 And 10 CFR 35. 24) OL = Operating License CP = Construction Permit Hello