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ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011 WELD COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
AUG 0 7, 1985 I nc_ at �n
Docket: 50-267
j' AUG 61985
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Public Service Company of Colorado
ATTN: 0. R. Lee, Vice President
Electric Production
P. 0. Box 840
Denver, Colorado 80201-0840
Dear Mr. Lee:
We are continuing our review of the fire protection features at the Fort St.
Vrain Nuclear Generating Station (FSV). Our review of Report No. 5 of the
Fire Protection Evaluation, "A Comparison and Evaluation of FSV Building 10 to
BTP 9.5-1, Appendix A," submitted by letter dated May 31, 1985, indicates that
the fire hazards analysis is incomplete. In order for us to complete our
review, we request that you provide an assessment of the consequences of the
loss of shutdown-related systems due to a fire in Building 10. We further
request that this evaluation be provided within 30 days of the date of this
letter so that your review can proceed in a timely manner.
If you have any questions on this subject, please contact the NRC Project
Manager, P. Wagner at (817)860-8127.
Since this request relates solely to FSV, fewer that ten respondents are
affected; therefore, OMB clearance is not required under P.L. 96-511.
Sincerely
D. R. Hunter, Chief
Reactor Safety Branch
cc:
See next page
851189
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cc:
Mr. D. W. Warembourg, Manager
Nuclear Engineering Division
Public Service Company of Colorado
P. O. Box 840
Denver, Colorado 80201
Mr. David Alberstein, 14/159A
GA Technologies, Inc.
P. 0. Box 85608
San Diego, California 92138
Kelley, Stansfield & O'Donnell
Public Service Company Building
550 15th Street, Room 900
Denver, Colorado 80202
Chairman, Board of County Comm.
of Weld County, Colorado
Greeley, Colorado 80631
Regional Representative
Radiation Programs
Environmental Protection Agency
1860 Lincoln Street
Denver, Colorado 80203
Mr. H. L. Brey, Manager
Nuclear Licensing/Fuels Div.
Public Service Company of Colorado
P. 0. Box 840
Denver, Colorado 80201
J. W. Gahm, Manager, Nuclear
Production Division
Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Station
16805 WCR 19i;
Platteville, Colorado 80651
L. Singleton, Manager, Quality
Assurance Division
(same address)
Colorado Radiation Control Program Director
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AUG 61985
U SSINS No. 6835
GREELEY. COLO. IN 85-64
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555
July 26, 1985
IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 85-64: BBC BROWN BOVERI LOW-VOLTAGE K-LINE CIRCUIT
BREAKERS, WITH DEFICIENT OVERCURRENT TRIP
DEVICES MODELS OD-4 AND 5
Addressees:
All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license (OL) or a
construction permit (CP) .
Purpose:
This information notice is to alert licensees that BBC Brown Boveri low-voltage
K-line circuit breakers with overcurrent trip device models OD-4 and OD-5 may
have been manufactured with an incorrect short time delay band lever (link) .
It is expected that licensees will review the information for applicability
to their facilities and consider actions, if appropriate, to preclude the
use of the defective overcurrent trip devices. However, suggestions contained
in this information notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no
specific action or written response is required.
Description of Circumstances:
On May 13, 1985, BBC Brown Boveri Inc. (BBC) made a 10 CFR Part 21 report to
the NRC concerning a deficiency in the Models OD-4 and OD-5 overcurrent trip
devices installed on K-line circuit breakers. The affected breakers were
manufactured by BBC from October 1983 to March 1985 and may have incorrect
short time delay band levers (links) installed in electromechanical overcurrent
trip device models OD-4 and OD-5. The incorrect link could limit the travel of
the short time armature and cause the short time element to be inoperative in
the maximum (MAX) band.
Discussion:
The May 13, 1985, 10 CFR Part 21 report from BBC recommended that all K-line
circuit breakers with the OD-4 and OD-5 overcurrent trip devices and any
spare OD-4 and OD-5 overcurrent trip devices that were manufactured between
October 1983 and March 1985, be inspected for an incorrect short time delay
8507240242
IN 85-64
July 26, 1985
Page 2 of 2
band link. Licensees known by BBC to have purchased K-line breakers or
spare OD-4 or OD-5 overcurrent trip devices were notified of the possible
defect and instructions provided for their inspection. Enclosed is a list
of utilities and related facilities that were notified by BBC. However, BBC
advised the NRC that there is a possibility that other utilities could be
using K-line circuit breakers with the suspect OD-4 and OD-5 overcurrent trip
devices. Therefore, all licensees are being notified of this possible defect.
For facilities not on the list and using BBC K-line circuit breakers with OD-4
and OD-5 overcurrent trip devices that were purchased between October 1983 and
March 1985, it is suggested that BBC Brown Boveri Switchgear Products Group
be contacted for information on performing the inspections and corrective
action.
No specific action or written response is required by this notice. If you have
any questions regarding this notice, please contact the Regional Administrator
of the appropriate NRC regional office or this office.
46 (
du LA ct/T -'t'
ward L. Jorda (, Director
Division of Emdrgency Prepare ess
and Engineering Response
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Technical Contact: L. B. Parker, IE
(301) 492-7190
Enclosures:
1. Utilities/Facilities Notified by BBC Brown Boveri
2. List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices
Attachment 1
IN 85-64
July 26, 1985
Page 1 of 1
Utilities/Facilities Notified by BBC Brown Boveri
1. Public Service of New Hampshire/Seabrook
2. Philadelphia Electric/Peach Bottom
3. Niagara Mohawk/Nine Mile Point 2
4. Duquesne Light/Beaver Valley
5. Cleveland Electric Illuminating/Perry
6. Gulf States Utilities/River Bend
7. Carolina Power and Light/Brunswick
8. Virginia Electric Power/Surry
9. Florida Power and Light/St. Lucie
10. Arkansas Power & Light/Arkansas Nuclear One
11. Georgia Power/Vogtle
12. Commonwealth Edison/no plant identified
13. Long Island Lighting/no plant identified
14. Kansas City Power & Light/no plant identified
15. Florida Power Corporation/no plant identified
Attachment 2
IN 85-64
July 26, 1985
LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
IE INFORMATION NOTICES
Information Date of
Notice No.. Subject Issue Issued to
85-63 Potential for Common-Mode 7/25/85 All power reactor
Failure of Standby Gas Treat- facilities holding
ment System on Loss of Off- an OL or CP
Site Power
85-62 Backup Telephone Numbers to 7/23/85 All power reactor
the NRC Operations Center facilities holding
an OL and certain
fuel facilities
85-61 Misadministrations to Patients 7/22/85 All power reactor
Undergoing Thyroid Scans facilities holding
an OL and certain
fuel facilities
85-60 Defective Negative Pressure 7/17/85 All power reactor
Air-Purifying, Fuel Facepiece facilities holding
Respirators an OL or CP
85-59 Valve Stem Corrosion Failures 7/17/85 All power
or
facilities holding
an OL or CP
85-58 Failure Of A General Electric 7/17/85 Afacilities llpower
reactor
red
Type AK-2-25 Reactor Trip9
Breaker by B&W and CE holding
an OL or CP
85-57 Lost Iridium-192 Source 7/16/85 Afacilities llor rc
r
Resulting In The Death Ofholding
Eight Persons In Morocco an OL or CP; fuel
facilities; and
material licensees
85-56 Inadequate Environment 7/15/85 All power reactor
Control For Components And facilities holding
Systems In Extended Storage an OL or CP
Or Layup
85-55 Revised Emergency Exercise 7/15/85 All
power
o holding
reactor
Frequency Rule facilities
an OL or CP
OL = Operating License
CP = Construction Permit
SSINS No. : 6835
IN 85-63
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555
July, 25, 1985
IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 85-63: POTENTIAL FOR COMMON-MODE FAILURE OF STANDBY
GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM ON LOSS OF OFF-SITE
POWER
Addressees:
All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license (OL) or a
construction permit (CP) .
Purpose:
This information notice is being provided as a notification of a potentially
significant problem pertaining to the standby gas treatment system (SBGT) .
This problem could result in the loss of all SBGT trains following a loss of
all off-site power. This supplements information provided in IE Information
Notices 83-25 and 84-81 on other SBGT problems. It is expected that recipients
will review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider
actions, if appropriate, to preclude a similar problem from occurring at their
facilities. However, suggestions contained in this information notice do not
constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response
is required.
Description of Circumstances:
On May 14, 1985, Carolina Power and Light (CP&L) reported a logic design error
in the SBGT at Brunswick 1 and 2 which would result in the inoperability (i .e. ,
failure to automatically start) of both trains of the system following a loss
of off-site power. Design of Brunswick's SBGT requires automatic initiation
when any of the following signals are received: high radiation in the reactor
building ventilation exhaust, high pressure in the drywell , or low reactor
water level . The system is designed to operate from either on-site or off-site
power sources. However, because of a design error, the instrument that senses
the SBGT heater temperature deenergizes a relay on loss of off-site power,
seals in the signal , and prevents automatic initiation of SBGT until manually
reset.
At Brunswick, indications and reset are available in the control room. CP&L is
considering a modification to the circuit to install a time-delay relay to
allow time for the system to switch to on-site power. This effectively pro-
vides automatic reset for situations where a cause for lockout does not exist.
8507230389
IN 85-63
July 25, 1985
Page 2 of 2
Discussion:
The signals that trip SBGT are unique to each plant; however, automatic lock-
outs are generally associated with the electric heaters. The events described
in IE Information Notices 83-25 and 84-81 provide examples where heater trips
have locked out systems and rendered them inoperable. Based on a review of
several licensee event reports, it appears that this design feature is fairly
common.
For designs such as Brunswick, with indication and reset in the control room,
the operators might be able to diagnose and correct a problem. If indication
and reset are not available in the control room, significant difficulties might
be encountered if an accident requiring filtration were accompanied by a loss
of off-site power. In either event, however, the requirement for automatic
start generally necessitates the ability to start automatically even after a
loss of off-site power.
No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.
If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the Regional
Administrator of the appropriate regional office or this office.
Edward L. Jordan, Director
Division of Emergency Preparedness
and Engineering Response
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Technical Contact: Mary S. Wegner, IE
(301)492-4511
Attachment:
List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices
Attachment
IN 85-63
July 25, 1985
LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
IE INFORMATION NOTICES
Information Date of
Notice No. Subject Issue Issued to
85-62 Backup Telephone Numbers to 7/23/85 All power reactor
the NRC Operations Center facilities holding
an OL and certain
fuel facilities
85-61 Misadministrations to Patients 7/22/85 All power reactor
Undergoing Thyroid Scans facilities holding
an OL and certain
fuel facilities
85-60 Defective Negative Pressure 7/17/85 All power reactor
Air-Purifying, Fuel Facepiece facilities holding
Respirators an OL or CP
85-59 Valve Stem Corrosion Failures 7/17/85 All power reactor
facilities holding
an OL or CP
85-58 Failure Of A General Electric 7/17/85 All power reactor
Type AK-2-25 Reactor Trip facilities designed
Breaker by B&W and CE holding
an OL or CP
85-57 Lost Iridium-192 Source 7/16/85 All power reactor
Resulting In The Death Of facilities holding
Eight Persons In Morocco an OL or CP; fuel
facilities; and
material licensees
85-56 Inadequate Environment 7/15/85 All power reactor
Control For Components And facilities holding
Systems In Extended Storage an OL or CP
Or Layup
85-55 Revised Emergency Exercise 7/15/85 All power reactor
Frequency Rule facilities holding
an OL or CP
85-54 Teletheraphy Unit Malfunction 7/15/85 All NRC licensees
authorized to use
teletheraphy units
OL = Operating License
CP = Construction Permit
to PEow4
e oq` UNITED STATES
W NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION q�c�lil°'F'
w ; WASHINGTON,D.C.20555 GD@1TV t
WELD � ""'
p�1
" July 19, 1985
Docket No. 50-267 ( AEG 6 'Ps5
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Mr. Richard F. Walker
President and Chief Executive Officer
Public Service Company of Colorado
P. 0. Box 840
Denver, Colorado 80201
Dear Mr. Walker:
The enclosed Information Notice concerning the performance of NRC-licensed
individuals while on duty at nuclear power plants is being sent to your
organization by the Director of NRC's Office of Inspection and Enforcement.
I am writing to you to ensure that you have the opportunity to personally
address this important matter relative to your responsibilities for safe
nuclear operations.
Manipulating the controls of a nuclear power plant is a serious business
requiring close attention to duties and a strictly business-like atmosphere
in control rooms. Considering your senior responsibilities, I believe you
should lead the way in assuring the high standards of personal demeanor
essential for safe nuclear operations. If the NRC continues to note problems
in this area, I can assure you there will be further regulatory and enforcement
action.
Sincerely,
4:- 1 ‘ fi-,
W lli . Dircks
Executive Director for Operations
Enclosure:
Information Notice
cc w/enclosure:
Mr. Zack Pate
President
Institute Of Nuclear Power Operations
1100 Circle 75 Parkway
Suite 1500
Atlanta, Georgia 30339
Service Lists
SSINS No. : 6835
IN 85-53
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
July 12, 1985
IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 85-53: PERFORMANCE OF NRC-LICENSED INDIVIDUALS
WHILE ON DUTY
Addressees:
All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license (OL) or a
construction permit (CP).
Purpose:
In February 1981, the attached IE Circular 81-02 was issued. This Circular,
which was prompted by an NRC inspector's observation of two licensed reactor
operators who appeared to be asleep while on duty in the control room, provided
guidance on conditions and practices which the NRC believes to be necessary
for the maintenance of a professional atmosphere in the control room and through-
out the facility. The purpose of this information notice is to reaffirm the
general principles of control room operations which were provided over four
years ago. While some of the regulatory references cited in the Circular may
have been modified or updated since that time, the basic standards of control
room professionalism remain valid as critical elements for continued safe
reactor operations.
Description of Circumstances:
Continuing observation of control room operation by NRC inspectors indicates
that, in general , the high standards of control room professionalism described
in IE Circular 81-02 are being met at most facilities. Nevertheless, recent
NRC observations at some operating facilities indicate the need for further
management attention to one of the areas described in the Circular:
"Potentially distracting activities in the control room and other
watch stations must be prohibited (for example: radios, TV,
alcohol use or drug abuse, games, horseplay,,hobbies , and
reading that is not directly job related)."
In some facility control rooms, NRC inspectors have observed that the playing
of music and operator occupation with reading material that is not job related
continues to be condoned by management. Many utilities have established and
are enforcing a policy which prohibits such activities by on-shift personnel .
Such activities can potentially distract the on-shift personnel from the
performance of their duties and from the monitoring of plant operations and
IN 85-53
July 12, 1985
Page 2 of 2
status. It is expected that recipients will review the information in this
notice and the attached Circular for applicability to their facilities and
consider action, if appropriate, to ensure the highest standards of control
room operations.
No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.
If there are any questions regarding this matter, please contact the Regional
Administrator of the appropriate NRC regional office or this office.
s M. Tay , Director
face of In pection and Enforcement
Technical Contact: J. G. Partlow, IE
301-492-4614
Attachments:
1. IE Circular 81-02
2. List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices
Attachment 1
IN 85-53
July 12, 1985 SSINS No. : 6830
Page 1 of 4 Accession No. :
8008220282
IEC 81-02
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555
February 9, 1981
IE Circular No. 81-02: PERFORMANCE OF NRC-LICENSED INDIVIDUALS WHILE ON
DUTY
Description of Circumstances:
Recently, an NRC inspector observed two licensed reactor operators who
appeared to be asleep while on duty in the control room. A subsequent NRC
investigation into the matter concluded that the operators were not fully
attentive to their licensed duties of monitoring reactor conditions, which
is a serious matter of safety significance. Furthermore, the investigation
concluded that management controls were inadequate to assure the alertness
of licensed operators while on duty. Enforcement action was taken after
it was determined that attentive operators were not present at the controls
as required by 10 CFR 50. 54(k).
Discussion:
NRC believes that a relationship exists between the professional attitude of
a nuclear plant' s operating and management personnel and the degree to which
the health and safety of the public is protected. NRC believes that
professional attitude is reflected in high standards of performance including
pride in the facility as demonstrated by the nuclear power plant staff.
Factors making up this professional attitude include knowledge of all aspects
of plant status by licensed control room operators , maintaining an orderly and
clean working environment, aggressiveness of the operating staff to prevent
operational problems, and correcting observed deficiencies. NRC believes that
clarification of its position on this subject is necessary because several
recent events involving licensed operators indicate a lack of a professional
attitude at some nuclear power plants.
The following conditions and practices are among those the NRC believes to
be necessary for the maintenance of a professional atmosphere in the
control room and throughout the facility.
1. All on-duty NRC-licensed operators and operating supervisors must be
aware of and responsible for the plant status at all times. This
includes supervisors being responsible for the performance of all
personnel assigned to their shift who could affect plant safety,
regardless of specialty affiliation. Knowledge of the plant' s
status must be assured during shift changes by a formal watch
turnover and relief.
Attacment:
Recently issued IE circulars
Attachment 1 IEC 81-02
IN 85-53 February 9, 1981
July 12, 1985 Page 2 of 3
Page 2 of 4
2. All on-duty NRC-licensed operators must be alert, remain within their
immediate areas of responsibility until properly relieved, and be
particularly attentive to the instrumentation and controls located
within these areas at all times.
3. Potentially distracting activities in the control room and other watch
stations must be prohibited (for example: radios, TV, alcohol use or
drug abuse, games, horseplay, hobbies, and reading that is not directly
job related).
4. Control room access must be limited to those persons on official
business only and loitering in this area must be prohibited.
5. All necessary plant-related technical/administrative control room
business must be conducted at a location and in such a manner that
neither licensed control room operator attentiveness nor the professional
atmosphere will be compromised. This includes activities associated with
the use of special eating and training facilities for on-shift personnel .
Additional Information:
NRC inspectors will be particularly mindful of those conditions and practices
described above during future inspections of licensed nuclear facilities.
For more specific information, you are referred to the following NRC documents:
1. 10 CFR 50, "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities,"
Paragraph 50. 54
2. 10 CFR 55, "Operators' Licenses," Paragraph 55. 31 and 55.40
3. Regulatory Guide 1. 114, "Guidance on Being Operator at the Controls
of a Nuclear Power Plant"
4. IE Information Notice 79-20, Revision 1, "NRC Enforcement Policy -
NRC-Licensed Individuals"
5. Letter from D. G. Eisenhut, NRC, to All Licensees and Applicants,
dated July 31, 1980, Subject: Interim Criteria for Shift Staffing
The following excerpts are taken from some of these documents and are
provided for your information:
1. Only licensed operators are permitted to manipulate the controls
that directly affect the reactivity or power level of a reactor
[10 CFR 50. 54(i)].
2. Licensed operators are required to be present at the controls at all
times during the operation of the facility [10 CFR 50.54(k)].
3. Operation of mechanisms and apparatus other than controls that may
indirectly affect the power level or reactivity of a reactor shall
only be accomplished with the knowledge and consent of an operator
licensed in accordance with Part 55 [10 CFR 50. 54(j)].
Attachment 1 IEC 81-02
IN 85-53 February 9, 1981
July 12, 1985 Page 3 of 3
Page 3 of 4
4. The NRCGlicensed individual shall observe all applicable rules,
regulations and orders of the Commission, whether or not stated
in the license [10 CFR 55.31(d)].
5. The operating test, to the extent applicable to the facility,
requires the applicant to demonstrate an understanding of:
The necessity for a careful approach to the responsibility
associated with the safe operation of the facility
[10 CFR 55.23(1)].
6. In order for the operator at the controls of a nuclear power plant
to be able to carry out these and other responsibilities in a timely
fashion, he must give his attention to the condition of the plant
at all times. He must be alert to ensure that the plant is operating
safely and must be capable of taking action to prevent any progress
toward a condition that might be unsafe (Regulatory Guide 1.114.8).
NRC policy regarding responsibility for safe operation of NRC-licensed
facilities as stated in IE Information Notice 79-20, Revision 1, continues
to be as follows:
1. "The facility licensee is responsible for assuring that the facility
is operated safely and within the requirements of the license,
technical specifications, rules, regulations, and Orders of the NRC,
and for the actions of their on-duty employees while on site. "
2. "NRC-licensed individuals are responsible for taking timely and proper
actions that will not create or cause a hazard to ' safe operation of
the facility' (i. e. , actions or activities, including failure to take
action, related to the facility that could have an adverse effect on
the health and safety of the public, plant workers, or the individuals). "
Recommended Action for Licensee' s Consideration:
Each power reactor licensee should review and revise, as necessary, their
administrative controls regarding operator performance to ensure the guidance
contained or referenced herein is incorporated. These administrative controls
should prescribe performance requirements for licensed personnel and specify
types of activities that are prohibited while licensed personnel are on duty.
These administrative controls should be considered for applicability to other
plant personnel whose actions , while on duty, may affect plant safety or the
orderly conduct of facility operation. Licensees should assure dissemination
of these administrative requirements to affected personnel .* It is also
requested that licensees have their licensed personnel review this Circular
and IE Information Notice 79-20, Revision 1, as well as Regulatory Guide 1.114.
No written response to this Circular is required. If you require additional
information regarding this matter, contact the Director of the appropriate
NRC Regional Office.
r
*A copy of this Circular was mailed directly to each licensed reactor operator
and senior reactor operator.
Attachment 1 Attachment
IN 85-53 IEC 81-02
July 12, 1935 February 9, 1981
Page 4 of 4
RECENTLY ISSUED
IE CIRCULARS
Circular Date of
No. Subject Issue Issued to
81-01 Design Problems Involving 1/23/81 All power reactor
Indicating Pushbutton facilities with
Switches Manufactured by an OL or CP
Honeywell Incorporated
80-25 Case Histories of 12/5/80 All radiography
Radiography Events licensees
80-24 AECL Teletherapy Unit 12/2/80 All teletherapy
Malfunction licensees
80-23 Potential Defects in Beloit 10/31/80 All power reactor.
Power Systems Emergency facilities with
Generators OL or a CP
80-22 Confirmation of Employee 10/2/80 All holders of a
Qualifications power reactor OL or CP
architect-engineering
companies and nuclear
steam system suppliers
80-21 Regulation of Refueling 9/10/80 All holders of a
Crews power reactor OL or CP
80-20 Changes in Safe-Slab Tank 8/21/80 All Part 50 and Part
Dimensions 70 fuel facility
licensees
80-19 Noncompliance with 8/26/80 All medical licensees
License Requirements for
Medical Licensees
80-18 10 CFR 50. 59 Safety 8/22/80 All power reactor
Evaluations for Changes to facilities with an
Radioactive Waste Treatment OL or CP
Systems
80-17 Fuel Pin Damage Due to Water 7/23/80 All holders of PWR
Jet from Baffle Plate Corner OLs and PWR CPs
OL = Operating Licenses
CP = Construction Permit
•
Attachment 2
IN 85-53
July 12, 1985
LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
IE INFORMATION NOTICES
Information Date of
Notice No. Subject Issue Issued to
85-52 Errors In Dose Assessment 7/10/85 All power reactor
Computer Codes And Reporting facilities holding
Requirements Under 10 CFR an OL or CP
Part 21
85-51 Inadvertent Loss Or Improper 7/10/85 All power reactor
Actuation Of Safety-Related facilities holding
Equipment an OL or CP
85-50 Complete Loss Of Main And 7/8/85 All power reactor
Auxiliary Feedwater At A PWR facilities holding
Designed By Babcock & Wilcox an OL or CP
85-49 Relay Calibration Problem 7/1/85 All power reactor
facilities holding
an OL or CP
85-48 Respirator Users Notice: 6/19/85 All power reactor
Defective Self-Contained facilities holding
Breathing Apparatus Air an OL or CP, research,
Cylinders and test reactor,
fuel cycle and
Priority 1 material
licensees
85-47 Potential Effect Of Line- 6/18/85 All power reactor
Induced Vibration On Certain facilities holding
Target Rock Solenoid-Operated an OL or CP
Valves
85-46 Clarification Of Several 6/10/85 All power reactor
Aspects Of Removable Radio- facilities holding
active Surface Contamination an OL
Limits For Transport Packages
85-45 Potential Seismic Interaction 6/6/85 All power reactor
Involving The Movable In-Core facilities holding
Flux Mapping System Used In an OL or CP
Westinghouse Designed Plants
OL = Operating License
CP = Construction Permit
Hello