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HomeMy WebLinkAbout851189.tiff n - `f "(co, a UNITED STATES O (AL:// NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION n L: I 11400116::( 140 0II6� IREGION IV J 611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE, SUITE 1000 ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011 WELD COUNTY COMMISSIONERS AUG 0 7, 1985 I nc_ at �n Docket: 50-267 j' AUG 61985 _ Public Service Company of Colorado ATTN: 0. R. Lee, Vice President Electric Production P. 0. Box 840 Denver, Colorado 80201-0840 Dear Mr. Lee: We are continuing our review of the fire protection features at the Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Generating Station (FSV). Our review of Report No. 5 of the Fire Protection Evaluation, "A Comparison and Evaluation of FSV Building 10 to BTP 9.5-1, Appendix A," submitted by letter dated May 31, 1985, indicates that the fire hazards analysis is incomplete. In order for us to complete our review, we request that you provide an assessment of the consequences of the loss of shutdown-related systems due to a fire in Building 10. We further request that this evaluation be provided within 30 days of the date of this letter so that your review can proceed in a timely manner. If you have any questions on this subject, please contact the NRC Project Manager, P. Wagner at (817)860-8127. Since this request relates solely to FSV, fewer that ten respondents are affected; therefore, OMB clearance is not required under P.L. 96-511. Sincerely D. R. Hunter, Chief Reactor Safety Branch cc: See next page 851189 l � 7rinTC, 7/Lt5- -2- cc: Mr. D. W. Warembourg, Manager Nuclear Engineering Division Public Service Company of Colorado P. O. Box 840 Denver, Colorado 80201 Mr. David Alberstein, 14/159A GA Technologies, Inc. P. 0. Box 85608 San Diego, California 92138 Kelley, Stansfield & O'Donnell Public Service Company Building 550 15th Street, Room 900 Denver, Colorado 80202 Chairman, Board of County Comm. of Weld County, Colorado Greeley, Colorado 80631 Regional Representative Radiation Programs Environmental Protection Agency 1860 Lincoln Street Denver, Colorado 80203 Mr. H. L. Brey, Manager Nuclear Licensing/Fuels Div. Public Service Company of Colorado P. 0. Box 840 Denver, Colorado 80201 J. W. Gahm, Manager, Nuclear Production Division Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Station 16805 WCR 19i; Platteville, Colorado 80651 L. Singleton, Manager, Quality Assurance Division (same address) Colorado Radiation Control Program Director . z I(� _.. i 3 Lie t.,\, i ; n / r .` H i AUG 61985 U SSINS No. 6835 GREELEY. COLO. IN 85-64 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 July 26, 1985 IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 85-64: BBC BROWN BOVERI LOW-VOLTAGE K-LINE CIRCUIT BREAKERS, WITH DEFICIENT OVERCURRENT TRIP DEVICES MODELS OD-4 AND 5 Addressees: All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license (OL) or a construction permit (CP) . Purpose: This information notice is to alert licensees that BBC Brown Boveri low-voltage K-line circuit breakers with overcurrent trip device models OD-4 and OD-5 may have been manufactured with an incorrect short time delay band lever (link) . It is expected that licensees will review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, if appropriate, to preclude the use of the defective overcurrent trip devices. However, suggestions contained in this information notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required. Description of Circumstances: On May 13, 1985, BBC Brown Boveri Inc. (BBC) made a 10 CFR Part 21 report to the NRC concerning a deficiency in the Models OD-4 and OD-5 overcurrent trip devices installed on K-line circuit breakers. The affected breakers were manufactured by BBC from October 1983 to March 1985 and may have incorrect short time delay band levers (links) installed in electromechanical overcurrent trip device models OD-4 and OD-5. The incorrect link could limit the travel of the short time armature and cause the short time element to be inoperative in the maximum (MAX) band. Discussion: The May 13, 1985, 10 CFR Part 21 report from BBC recommended that all K-line circuit breakers with the OD-4 and OD-5 overcurrent trip devices and any spare OD-4 and OD-5 overcurrent trip devices that were manufactured between October 1983 and March 1985, be inspected for an incorrect short time delay 8507240242 IN 85-64 July 26, 1985 Page 2 of 2 band link. Licensees known by BBC to have purchased K-line breakers or spare OD-4 or OD-5 overcurrent trip devices were notified of the possible defect and instructions provided for their inspection. Enclosed is a list of utilities and related facilities that were notified by BBC. However, BBC advised the NRC that there is a possibility that other utilities could be using K-line circuit breakers with the suspect OD-4 and OD-5 overcurrent trip devices. Therefore, all licensees are being notified of this possible defect. For facilities not on the list and using BBC K-line circuit breakers with OD-4 and OD-5 overcurrent trip devices that were purchased between October 1983 and March 1985, it is suggested that BBC Brown Boveri Switchgear Products Group be contacted for information on performing the inspections and corrective action. No specific action or written response is required by this notice. If you have any questions regarding this notice, please contact the Regional Administrator of the appropriate NRC regional office or this office. 46 ( du LA ct/T -'t' ward L. Jorda (, Director Division of Emdrgency Prepare ess and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement Technical Contact: L. B. Parker, IE (301) 492-7190 Enclosures: 1. Utilities/Facilities Notified by BBC Brown Boveri 2. List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices Attachment 1 IN 85-64 July 26, 1985 Page 1 of 1 Utilities/Facilities Notified by BBC Brown Boveri 1. Public Service of New Hampshire/Seabrook 2. Philadelphia Electric/Peach Bottom 3. Niagara Mohawk/Nine Mile Point 2 4. Duquesne Light/Beaver Valley 5. Cleveland Electric Illuminating/Perry 6. Gulf States Utilities/River Bend 7. Carolina Power and Light/Brunswick 8. Virginia Electric Power/Surry 9. Florida Power and Light/St. Lucie 10. Arkansas Power & Light/Arkansas Nuclear One 11. Georgia Power/Vogtle 12. Commonwealth Edison/no plant identified 13. Long Island Lighting/no plant identified 14. Kansas City Power & Light/no plant identified 15. Florida Power Corporation/no plant identified Attachment 2 IN 85-64 July 26, 1985 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED IE INFORMATION NOTICES Information Date of Notice No.. Subject Issue Issued to 85-63 Potential for Common-Mode 7/25/85 All power reactor Failure of Standby Gas Treat- facilities holding ment System on Loss of Off- an OL or CP Site Power 85-62 Backup Telephone Numbers to 7/23/85 All power reactor the NRC Operations Center facilities holding an OL and certain fuel facilities 85-61 Misadministrations to Patients 7/22/85 All power reactor Undergoing Thyroid Scans facilities holding an OL and certain fuel facilities 85-60 Defective Negative Pressure 7/17/85 All power reactor Air-Purifying, Fuel Facepiece facilities holding Respirators an OL or CP 85-59 Valve Stem Corrosion Failures 7/17/85 All power or facilities holding an OL or CP 85-58 Failure Of A General Electric 7/17/85 Afacilities llpower reactor red Type AK-2-25 Reactor Trip9 Breaker by B&W and CE holding an OL or CP 85-57 Lost Iridium-192 Source 7/16/85 Afacilities llor rc r Resulting In The Death Ofholding Eight Persons In Morocco an OL or CP; fuel facilities; and material licensees 85-56 Inadequate Environment 7/15/85 All power reactor Control For Components And facilities holding Systems In Extended Storage an OL or CP Or Layup 85-55 Revised Emergency Exercise 7/15/85 All power o holding reactor Frequency Rule facilities an OL or CP OL = Operating License CP = Construction Permit SSINS No. : 6835 IN 85-63 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 July, 25, 1985 IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 85-63: POTENTIAL FOR COMMON-MODE FAILURE OF STANDBY GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM ON LOSS OF OFF-SITE POWER Addressees: All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license (OL) or a construction permit (CP) . Purpose: This information notice is being provided as a notification of a potentially significant problem pertaining to the standby gas treatment system (SBGT) . This problem could result in the loss of all SBGT trains following a loss of all off-site power. This supplements information provided in IE Information Notices 83-25 and 84-81 on other SBGT problems. It is expected that recipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, if appropriate, to preclude a similar problem from occurring at their facilities. However, suggestions contained in this information notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required. Description of Circumstances: On May 14, 1985, Carolina Power and Light (CP&L) reported a logic design error in the SBGT at Brunswick 1 and 2 which would result in the inoperability (i .e. , failure to automatically start) of both trains of the system following a loss of off-site power. Design of Brunswick's SBGT requires automatic initiation when any of the following signals are received: high radiation in the reactor building ventilation exhaust, high pressure in the drywell , or low reactor water level . The system is designed to operate from either on-site or off-site power sources. However, because of a design error, the instrument that senses the SBGT heater temperature deenergizes a relay on loss of off-site power, seals in the signal , and prevents automatic initiation of SBGT until manually reset. At Brunswick, indications and reset are available in the control room. CP&L is considering a modification to the circuit to install a time-delay relay to allow time for the system to switch to on-site power. This effectively pro- vides automatic reset for situations where a cause for lockout does not exist. 8507230389 IN 85-63 July 25, 1985 Page 2 of 2 Discussion: The signals that trip SBGT are unique to each plant; however, automatic lock- outs are generally associated with the electric heaters. The events described in IE Information Notices 83-25 and 84-81 provide examples where heater trips have locked out systems and rendered them inoperable. Based on a review of several licensee event reports, it appears that this design feature is fairly common. For designs such as Brunswick, with indication and reset in the control room, the operators might be able to diagnose and correct a problem. If indication and reset are not available in the control room, significant difficulties might be encountered if an accident requiring filtration were accompanied by a loss of off-site power. In either event, however, the requirement for automatic start generally necessitates the ability to start automatically even after a loss of off-site power. No specific action or written response is required by this information notice. If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional office or this office. Edward L. Jordan, Director Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement Technical Contact: Mary S. Wegner, IE (301)492-4511 Attachment: List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices Attachment IN 85-63 July 25, 1985 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED IE INFORMATION NOTICES Information Date of Notice No. Subject Issue Issued to 85-62 Backup Telephone Numbers to 7/23/85 All power reactor the NRC Operations Center facilities holding an OL and certain fuel facilities 85-61 Misadministrations to Patients 7/22/85 All power reactor Undergoing Thyroid Scans facilities holding an OL and certain fuel facilities 85-60 Defective Negative Pressure 7/17/85 All power reactor Air-Purifying, Fuel Facepiece facilities holding Respirators an OL or CP 85-59 Valve Stem Corrosion Failures 7/17/85 All power reactor facilities holding an OL or CP 85-58 Failure Of A General Electric 7/17/85 All power reactor Type AK-2-25 Reactor Trip facilities designed Breaker by B&W and CE holding an OL or CP 85-57 Lost Iridium-192 Source 7/16/85 All power reactor Resulting In The Death Of facilities holding Eight Persons In Morocco an OL or CP; fuel facilities; and material licensees 85-56 Inadequate Environment 7/15/85 All power reactor Control For Components And facilities holding Systems In Extended Storage an OL or CP Or Layup 85-55 Revised Emergency Exercise 7/15/85 All power reactor Frequency Rule facilities holding an OL or CP 85-54 Teletheraphy Unit Malfunction 7/15/85 All NRC licensees authorized to use teletheraphy units OL = Operating License CP = Construction Permit to PEow4 e oq` UNITED STATES W NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION q�c�lil°'F' w ; WASHINGTON,D.C.20555 GD@1TV t WELD � ""' p�1 " July 19, 1985 Docket No. 50-267 ( AEG 6 'Ps5 ,1� Mr. Richard F. Walker President and Chief Executive Officer Public Service Company of Colorado P. 0. Box 840 Denver, Colorado 80201 Dear Mr. Walker: The enclosed Information Notice concerning the performance of NRC-licensed individuals while on duty at nuclear power plants is being sent to your organization by the Director of NRC's Office of Inspection and Enforcement. I am writing to you to ensure that you have the opportunity to personally address this important matter relative to your responsibilities for safe nuclear operations. Manipulating the controls of a nuclear power plant is a serious business requiring close attention to duties and a strictly business-like atmosphere in control rooms. Considering your senior responsibilities, I believe you should lead the way in assuring the high standards of personal demeanor essential for safe nuclear operations. If the NRC continues to note problems in this area, I can assure you there will be further regulatory and enforcement action. Sincerely, 4:- 1 ‘ fi-, W lli . Dircks Executive Director for Operations Enclosure: Information Notice cc w/enclosure: Mr. Zack Pate President Institute Of Nuclear Power Operations 1100 Circle 75 Parkway Suite 1500 Atlanta, Georgia 30339 Service Lists SSINS No. : 6835 IN 85-53 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 July 12, 1985 IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 85-53: PERFORMANCE OF NRC-LICENSED INDIVIDUALS WHILE ON DUTY Addressees: All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license (OL) or a construction permit (CP). Purpose: In February 1981, the attached IE Circular 81-02 was issued. This Circular, which was prompted by an NRC inspector's observation of two licensed reactor operators who appeared to be asleep while on duty in the control room, provided guidance on conditions and practices which the NRC believes to be necessary for the maintenance of a professional atmosphere in the control room and through- out the facility. The purpose of this information notice is to reaffirm the general principles of control room operations which were provided over four years ago. While some of the regulatory references cited in the Circular may have been modified or updated since that time, the basic standards of control room professionalism remain valid as critical elements for continued safe reactor operations. Description of Circumstances: Continuing observation of control room operation by NRC inspectors indicates that, in general , the high standards of control room professionalism described in IE Circular 81-02 are being met at most facilities. Nevertheless, recent NRC observations at some operating facilities indicate the need for further management attention to one of the areas described in the Circular: "Potentially distracting activities in the control room and other watch stations must be prohibited (for example: radios, TV, alcohol use or drug abuse, games, horseplay,,hobbies , and reading that is not directly job related)." In some facility control rooms, NRC inspectors have observed that the playing of music and operator occupation with reading material that is not job related continues to be condoned by management. Many utilities have established and are enforcing a policy which prohibits such activities by on-shift personnel . Such activities can potentially distract the on-shift personnel from the performance of their duties and from the monitoring of plant operations and IN 85-53 July 12, 1985 Page 2 of 2 status. It is expected that recipients will review the information in this notice and the attached Circular for applicability to their facilities and consider action, if appropriate, to ensure the highest standards of control room operations. No specific action or written response is required by this information notice. If there are any questions regarding this matter, please contact the Regional Administrator of the appropriate NRC regional office or this office. s M. Tay , Director face of In pection and Enforcement Technical Contact: J. G. Partlow, IE 301-492-4614 Attachments: 1. IE Circular 81-02 2. List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices Attachment 1 IN 85-53 July 12, 1985 SSINS No. : 6830 Page 1 of 4 Accession No. : 8008220282 IEC 81-02 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 February 9, 1981 IE Circular No. 81-02: PERFORMANCE OF NRC-LICENSED INDIVIDUALS WHILE ON DUTY Description of Circumstances: Recently, an NRC inspector observed two licensed reactor operators who appeared to be asleep while on duty in the control room. A subsequent NRC investigation into the matter concluded that the operators were not fully attentive to their licensed duties of monitoring reactor conditions, which is a serious matter of safety significance. Furthermore, the investigation concluded that management controls were inadequate to assure the alertness of licensed operators while on duty. Enforcement action was taken after it was determined that attentive operators were not present at the controls as required by 10 CFR 50. 54(k). Discussion: NRC believes that a relationship exists between the professional attitude of a nuclear plant' s operating and management personnel and the degree to which the health and safety of the public is protected. NRC believes that professional attitude is reflected in high standards of performance including pride in the facility as demonstrated by the nuclear power plant staff. Factors making up this professional attitude include knowledge of all aspects of plant status by licensed control room operators , maintaining an orderly and clean working environment, aggressiveness of the operating staff to prevent operational problems, and correcting observed deficiencies. NRC believes that clarification of its position on this subject is necessary because several recent events involving licensed operators indicate a lack of a professional attitude at some nuclear power plants. The following conditions and practices are among those the NRC believes to be necessary for the maintenance of a professional atmosphere in the control room and throughout the facility. 1. All on-duty NRC-licensed operators and operating supervisors must be aware of and responsible for the plant status at all times. This includes supervisors being responsible for the performance of all personnel assigned to their shift who could affect plant safety, regardless of specialty affiliation. Knowledge of the plant' s status must be assured during shift changes by a formal watch turnover and relief. Attacment: Recently issued IE circulars Attachment 1 IEC 81-02 IN 85-53 February 9, 1981 July 12, 1985 Page 2 of 3 Page 2 of 4 2. All on-duty NRC-licensed operators must be alert, remain within their immediate areas of responsibility until properly relieved, and be particularly attentive to the instrumentation and controls located within these areas at all times. 3. Potentially distracting activities in the control room and other watch stations must be prohibited (for example: radios, TV, alcohol use or drug abuse, games, horseplay, hobbies, and reading that is not directly job related). 4. Control room access must be limited to those persons on official business only and loitering in this area must be prohibited. 5. All necessary plant-related technical/administrative control room business must be conducted at a location and in such a manner that neither licensed control room operator attentiveness nor the professional atmosphere will be compromised. This includes activities associated with the use of special eating and training facilities for on-shift personnel . Additional Information: NRC inspectors will be particularly mindful of those conditions and practices described above during future inspections of licensed nuclear facilities. For more specific information, you are referred to the following NRC documents: 1. 10 CFR 50, "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities," Paragraph 50. 54 2. 10 CFR 55, "Operators' Licenses," Paragraph 55. 31 and 55.40 3. Regulatory Guide 1. 114, "Guidance on Being Operator at the Controls of a Nuclear Power Plant" 4. IE Information Notice 79-20, Revision 1, "NRC Enforcement Policy - NRC-Licensed Individuals" 5. Letter from D. G. Eisenhut, NRC, to All Licensees and Applicants, dated July 31, 1980, Subject: Interim Criteria for Shift Staffing The following excerpts are taken from some of these documents and are provided for your information: 1. Only licensed operators are permitted to manipulate the controls that directly affect the reactivity or power level of a reactor [10 CFR 50. 54(i)]. 2. Licensed operators are required to be present at the controls at all times during the operation of the facility [10 CFR 50.54(k)]. 3. Operation of mechanisms and apparatus other than controls that may indirectly affect the power level or reactivity of a reactor shall only be accomplished with the knowledge and consent of an operator licensed in accordance with Part 55 [10 CFR 50. 54(j)]. Attachment 1 IEC 81-02 IN 85-53 February 9, 1981 July 12, 1985 Page 3 of 3 Page 3 of 4 4. The NRCGlicensed individual shall observe all applicable rules, regulations and orders of the Commission, whether or not stated in the license [10 CFR 55.31(d)]. 5. The operating test, to the extent applicable to the facility, requires the applicant to demonstrate an understanding of: The necessity for a careful approach to the responsibility associated with the safe operation of the facility [10 CFR 55.23(1)]. 6. In order for the operator at the controls of a nuclear power plant to be able to carry out these and other responsibilities in a timely fashion, he must give his attention to the condition of the plant at all times. He must be alert to ensure that the plant is operating safely and must be capable of taking action to prevent any progress toward a condition that might be unsafe (Regulatory Guide 1.114.8). NRC policy regarding responsibility for safe operation of NRC-licensed facilities as stated in IE Information Notice 79-20, Revision 1, continues to be as follows: 1. "The facility licensee is responsible for assuring that the facility is operated safely and within the requirements of the license, technical specifications, rules, regulations, and Orders of the NRC, and for the actions of their on-duty employees while on site. " 2. "NRC-licensed individuals are responsible for taking timely and proper actions that will not create or cause a hazard to ' safe operation of the facility' (i. e. , actions or activities, including failure to take action, related to the facility that could have an adverse effect on the health and safety of the public, plant workers, or the individuals). " Recommended Action for Licensee' s Consideration: Each power reactor licensee should review and revise, as necessary, their administrative controls regarding operator performance to ensure the guidance contained or referenced herein is incorporated. These administrative controls should prescribe performance requirements for licensed personnel and specify types of activities that are prohibited while licensed personnel are on duty. These administrative controls should be considered for applicability to other plant personnel whose actions , while on duty, may affect plant safety or the orderly conduct of facility operation. Licensees should assure dissemination of these administrative requirements to affected personnel .* It is also requested that licensees have their licensed personnel review this Circular and IE Information Notice 79-20, Revision 1, as well as Regulatory Guide 1.114. No written response to this Circular is required. If you require additional information regarding this matter, contact the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office. r *A copy of this Circular was mailed directly to each licensed reactor operator and senior reactor operator. Attachment 1 Attachment IN 85-53 IEC 81-02 July 12, 1935 February 9, 1981 Page 4 of 4 RECENTLY ISSUED IE CIRCULARS Circular Date of No. Subject Issue Issued to 81-01 Design Problems Involving 1/23/81 All power reactor Indicating Pushbutton facilities with Switches Manufactured by an OL or CP Honeywell Incorporated 80-25 Case Histories of 12/5/80 All radiography Radiography Events licensees 80-24 AECL Teletherapy Unit 12/2/80 All teletherapy Malfunction licensees 80-23 Potential Defects in Beloit 10/31/80 All power reactor. Power Systems Emergency facilities with Generators OL or a CP 80-22 Confirmation of Employee 10/2/80 All holders of a Qualifications power reactor OL or CP architect-engineering companies and nuclear steam system suppliers 80-21 Regulation of Refueling 9/10/80 All holders of a Crews power reactor OL or CP 80-20 Changes in Safe-Slab Tank 8/21/80 All Part 50 and Part Dimensions 70 fuel facility licensees 80-19 Noncompliance with 8/26/80 All medical licensees License Requirements for Medical Licensees 80-18 10 CFR 50. 59 Safety 8/22/80 All power reactor Evaluations for Changes to facilities with an Radioactive Waste Treatment OL or CP Systems 80-17 Fuel Pin Damage Due to Water 7/23/80 All holders of PWR Jet from Baffle Plate Corner OLs and PWR CPs OL = Operating Licenses CP = Construction Permit • Attachment 2 IN 85-53 July 12, 1985 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED IE INFORMATION NOTICES Information Date of Notice No. Subject Issue Issued to 85-52 Errors In Dose Assessment 7/10/85 All power reactor Computer Codes And Reporting facilities holding Requirements Under 10 CFR an OL or CP Part 21 85-51 Inadvertent Loss Or Improper 7/10/85 All power reactor Actuation Of Safety-Related facilities holding Equipment an OL or CP 85-50 Complete Loss Of Main And 7/8/85 All power reactor Auxiliary Feedwater At A PWR facilities holding Designed By Babcock & Wilcox an OL or CP 85-49 Relay Calibration Problem 7/1/85 All power reactor facilities holding an OL or CP 85-48 Respirator Users Notice: 6/19/85 All power reactor Defective Self-Contained facilities holding Breathing Apparatus Air an OL or CP, research, Cylinders and test reactor, fuel cycle and Priority 1 material licensees 85-47 Potential Effect Of Line- 6/18/85 All power reactor Induced Vibration On Certain facilities holding Target Rock Solenoid-Operated an OL or CP Valves 85-46 Clarification Of Several 6/10/85 All power reactor Aspects Of Removable Radio- facilities holding active Surface Contamination an OL Limits For Transport Packages 85-45 Potential Seismic Interaction 6/6/85 All power reactor Involving The Movable In-Core facilities holding Flux Mapping System Used In an OL or CP Westinghouse Designed Plants OL = Operating License CP = Construction Permit Hello