HomeMy WebLinkAbout851186.tiff pR REC
°�E <yr UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
' ( f. 3 REGION IV
. L 4
611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE, SUITE 1000
ARLINGTON,TEXAS 76011
hub 2 2 1985
Docket: 50-267
/WELD COUNTY COsiMT.'"ITS
D � Jrn fir-
Public Service Company of Colorado
ATTN: 0. R. Lee, Vice President AUG 26 6 1985
Electric Production
P. 0. Box 840
Denver, Colorado 80201-0840
Gentlemen:
As a result of the meetings held at the Fort St. Vrain Station on July 22
through 26, 1985, to discuss the Technical Specification Upgrade Program,
lists of items requiring NRC action and PSC action were developed. A
conference call was held on August 14, 1985, to finalize the lists and to
clarify the questions. It was agreed during the conference call that PSC
would respond to actions 27, 28, 30, 31, and 35 by September 15, 1985, and all
other actions by October 15, 1985; NRC responses were discussed and will be
finalized in the near future.
The enclosures to this letter present a list of attendees from the July 22
through 26, 1985 meeting, a list of NRC actions and a list of PSC actions as
Enclosures 1, 2, and 3 respectively.
Since the reporting requirements relate solely to the Fort St. Vrain Station,
OMB clearance is not required under P.L. 96-511.
If you have any questions on this matter, please contact the NRC Project
Manager.
Sincerely,
i
two- .
Dorwin R. Hunter, Chief
Reactor Safety Branch
Enclosures:
As stated
cc:
See next page
851186
I 1 Ain<Joc
Public Service Company -2-
of Colorado
Mr. D. W. Warembourg, Manager
Nuclear Engineering Division
Public Service Company of Colorado
P. 0. Box 840
Denver, Colorado 80201
Mr. David Alberstein, 14/159A
GA Technologies , Inc.
P. 0. Box 85608
San Diego, California 92138
Kelley, Stansfield & O'Donnell
Public Service Company Building
550 15th Street, Room 900
Denver, Colorado 80202
Chairman, Board of County Comm.
of Weld County, Colorado
Greeley, Colorado 80631
Regional Representative
Radiation Programs
Environmental Protection Agency
1860 Lincoln Street
Denver, Colorado 80203
Mr. H. L. Brey, Manager
Nuclear Licensing/Fuels Div.
Public Service Company of Colorado
P. 0. Box 840
Denver, Colorado 80201
J. W. Gahm, Manager, Nuclear
Production Division
Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Station
16805 WCR 19}
Platteville, Colorado 80651
L. Singleton, Manager, Quality
Assurance Division
(same address)
Colorado Radiation Control Program Director
Enclosure 1
ATTENDEES
JULY 22-26, 1985 NRC/PSC MEETING ON
FSV TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION UPGRADE
NAME ORGANIZATION
T. L. King NRC/NRR
S. Chesnutt PSC
J. M. Gramling PSC
M. H. Holmes PSC - Licensing
F. J. Novachek PSC - FSV Nuc. Prod.
R. E. Collins PSC - Licensing
W. Wittich PSC - Licensing
M. Joseph PSC - T.A.
D. Rodger PSC
R. E. Ireland NRC/Rg. IV
P. M. Williams NRC/NRR
G. L. Plumlee NRC/NRR
P. Wagner NRC/Rg. IV
K. Heitner NRC/NRR
D. Hoffman PSC Consultant
D. Alberstein GAT
J. Kennedy GAT
Enclosure 2
NRC ACTIONS
GENERAL
1) Provide guidance on the acceptability of using a document separate from
the Tech Specs for in-service inspection and testing requirements.
This document would then be referenced in the Tech Specs with NRC
approval of its content called for in the Admin. Controls.
2) Provide guidance on whether or not the Tech Specs should include LCOs
only on systems and components relied upon in the FSV-FSAR Chapter 14
analysis to protect the barriers to radiation release or should they
also include LCOs on systems and components which provide an additional
line of defense to prevent radiation release.
3) Provide guidance on whether components, which are required to function to
maintain other equipment within an environment for which it is
qualified, should also be in the Tech Specs (example, main steam
isolation valves) .
4) Is it acceptable to include for completeness in Section 3/4.3
"Instrumentation," trip setpoints for non-safety related items? These
would then not be subject to enforcement.
5) PSC would like to have agreement that when in the Startup or Low Power
modes it would be acceptable to proceed to the next higher power mode
even if they are in an LCO Action Statement. Currently, general LCO
3.0.6 prohibits this.
6) Provide guidance on how much detail associated with the operability of a
system (relief valve setpoints, valve position, water chemistry, etc. )
goes into the Tech Specs and how much is left to be picked up by
procedures which implement the defined term "OPERABLE."
SPECIFIC
1) Check whether or not adequate control on primary system He inventory is
provided by LCO 3.3.1 (PPS) and LCO 3.2.4.
2) Pg. 1-2 - Definition 1.9 - Is PSC original wording in 4/1/85 draft
acceptable?
3) Pg. 1-3 - Denfinition 1.14.- PSC wants to use the wording in their
4/1/85 draft since there is no Iodine, only noble gas, in
their primary coolant. Is this acceptable?
- 2 -
4) Pg. 3/4.2-9 - Surveillance b.2 Core Inlet Orifice Valves - Is the second
sentence understandable?
5) Pg. 3/4.3-1 - Instrumentation - The basis for this entire section is
contained in a PSC submittal of 6/21/85 (P-85214)
covering instrumentation setpoints changes. NRC review
and comment on the 6/21/85 PSC submittal is required.
6) Pg. 3/4.3-7 - Note (k) - Is note (k) acceptable as is or should its
requirements be included in Section 3/4.10 - "Special
Test Exceptions"?
7) Pg. 3/4.3-8 - PSC would like to use their wording from the 4/1/85
draft for the Action Statements on this page as well as
on pages 3/4.3-16, 23 and 31. Is this acceptable?
NRC's suggested wording is based upon the STS; PSC's
upon their existing Tech Specs.
8) Pg. 3/4.3-87 - LCO 3.3.3 Control Room Temperature Monitoring - PSC
would like to revise this LCO along the lines of the
BWR-STS. Is this acceptable?
9) Section 3/4.8 "Electrical Systems" - PSC wants to revise all of their
electrical system LCOs along the lines of the Tech Specs
for VEPCO's North Anna plants. Is this acceptable?
10) Pg. 3/4.7-1 - LCO 3.7.1.1 Boiler Feed Pumps - PSC relies on non-safety
grade boiler feed pumps in their safety analysis for
mitigating the effects of design basis accidents. Is this
acceptable and should there be a Tech Spec on these pumps?
NRC will review this LCO for completeness and provide any
comments to PSC.
11) Pg. 3/4.7-11 - LCO 3.7.3 "Instrument Air System" - Why was one hour
chosen as the time limit in Action (b)?
12) Pg. 3/4.6-37 - Surveillance 4.6.5.2-d "Reactor Bldg. Confinement" - Do
BWRs have a 4400 hr surveillance interval for continuously
operating charcoal adsorber exhaust filters?
13) Pg. 3/4.7-43- Surveillance 4.7.9-d - Control Room Ventilation System - Is
a control room positive pressure of 0.02 H2O acceptable per
NUREG-0737 requirements?
- 3 -
14) Section 6.0 - "Admin Controls" - What is the latest standard admin
controls section? PSC would like to use:
a) LER for safety limit violation report,
b) words from their current Tech Specs for staff
qualifications,
c) words from their 4/1/85 draft for the shift
technical advisor.
Are these changes acceptable? Also PSC wants to delete
words requiring an Independent Safety Engineering
Group. FSV approved to not have one?
Enclosure 3
PSC ACTIONS
1) To ensure adequate coverage of the He purification system PSC will
evaluate the need to add to LCO 3.7.5 "Primary Coolant
Depressurization" surveillance requirements on the availability
of standby pipe spools for emergency cooling and the operability of
interlocks and block valves which isolate the system upon a leak.
2) PSC will evaluate the need for an LCO on PCRV support ring temperatures
separate from the upgrade program.
3) PSC will add deck plate configuration surveillance to the Tech Specs.
4) PSC will evaluate the Tech Specs for their applicability to one loop
operation and propose changes where necessary to support one loop
operation.
5) Surveillance on a connection between the circulating water makeup
system and the service water pit will be added.
6) PSC will explore the following options for incorporation of in-service
inspection and testing requirements into the upgrade Tech Specs:
• reference ASME Code Section XI , Div. 2, with exceptions
- put all ISIT into the Tech Specs
- develop a document separate from the Tech Specs containing all
ISIT requirements which would be referenced in the Tech Specs.
7) Pg. 1-6 - Definition 1.28 - PSC will develop a definition that is
consistent with FSV analysis.
8) Pg. 1-7 - Definition 1.37 - PSC will develop a definition that is
consistent with FSV analysis.
9) Pg. 3/4.0-3 - LCO 4.0.3 - "Surveillance Frequencies" - PSC wants to
have the flexibility to interpret surveillance intervals
as requiring a check once any time during the specified
interval , not once at least so many hours/days. PSC
will prepare justification supporting their position.
10) Pg. 2-6 - Safety Limit 2.1 - Bases - PSC will provide in the next FSAR
update- information which supports the bases for Safety Limit
2.1.. Currently, the FSAR does not address the limits
contained in this Safety Limit and the Tech Spec bases
provides the only description of how the limits are derived.
- 2 -
11) The following comments refer to the draft Tech Specs provided in PSC
letter P-85242, dated 7/10/85, regarding interim Tech Specs for
reactivity control :
a) Pg. 3/4.1-2 - Surveillance 4.1.1.A.2 - PSC will consider requiring
surveillance of a flowrate in each individual CRDM
purge line when sufficient experience is gained with
the flow meters being installed on each of the
individual CRDM purge lines,with CRDM subheader
purge flow used as a backup.
b) Pg. 3/4.1-9 - Surveillance 4.1.2.6 - PSC is to clarify that the
rod in limit indication need be checked only once
during each startup, not every time a rod is
withdrawn.
c) Pg. 3/4.1-15 - Surveillance 4.1.3.D - PSC is to clarify when the
analog and digital rod position indications must be
checked when in the shutdown and refueling modes.
d) Pg. 3/4.1-44 - Surveillance 4.1.9 - PSC may propose a change as to
when reserve shutdown system operability is to be
checked when in the shutdown and refueling modes.
12) PSC is to recommend how changes to the Tech Spec bases are to be
processed. Handle as a 50.59 change or request separate NRC approval
of the change.
13) Pg. 3/4.2-1 - LCO 3.2.1 "Core Irradiation" - PSC is to propose
revisions to this LCO which add the control rod lifetime
and address appropriate limits depending on whether or
not the control rod is inserted or withdrawn.
14) Pg. 3/4.2-4 - Surveillance 4.2.2.2.b - PSC is to evaluate the need for
performing a channel functional test every 31 days
versus quarterly.
15) Pg. 3/4.2-11 - LCO 3.2.4 "Core Inlet Orifice Values/Min He Flow" - A
draft Tech Spec to replace this LCO, prepared by ORNL
(under contract with NRC - Rg. IV) , will be reviewed and
PSC will propose appropriate changes to the ,
specification.
16) PSC must ensure FSV operations personnel comments on the draft
specifications are obtained and incorporated prior to submittal of the
October 15, 1985 final draft.
- 3 -
17) Pg. 3/4.3-26 - Table 3.3.1-4 - PSC is to revise to correctly state
range of allowable values for items 2 and 3.
18) Pg. 3/4.3-27 - Table 3.3.1-4 - PSC will check on adding to this table
the rod withdrawal sequence prohibit function.
19) PSC is to evaluate which automatic protective functions currently
listed in the 4/1/85 draft are not safety items (are equipment
protection items) and may propose they be deleted from the Tech Specs.
20) Pg. 3/4.3-39 - Note (a 8) - PSC is to propose a different wording to
address the case of cycling in and out of a mode.
21) Pg. 3/4.3-61 - LC0 3.3.2.1 "Analytical Moisture Monitors" - PSC is to
re-evaluate the need for the PPS moisture monitors in
the "indicate" mode.
22) Pg. 3/4.3-65 - Table 3.3.2-1
a) PSC is to evaluate why radiation monitor RT-7312 is
not included in this table.
b) Verify that process monitor RT-21251 is addressed
in the environmental Tech Specs.
c) PSC will check on which, if any, of their radiation
monitors are considered criticality monitors and
ensure these are included in this table.
23) Pg. 3/4.3-70 - LC0 3.3.2.3 "Seismic Instrumentation" - PSC will
evaluate whether or not they can accept a requirement in
the action statement for a report to the NRC in 10 days
(vs. their proposal of 30 days) if the seismic
monitoring instrumentation is inoperable for more than
30 days.
24) Pg. 3/4.3-70 - Surveillance 4.3.2.3.2 - PSC will check the requirements
in this surveillance against previous commitments in a
letter to NRC on actions to be taken in the event a
seismic monitor is actuated.
25) Pg. 3/4.3-73 - LC0 3.3.2.4 "Meteorological Instrumentation" - PSC will
evaluate whether or not they can accept a requirement in
the action statement for a report to the NRC in 10 days
(vs. their proposal of- 30 days) if the meteorological
instrumentation is inoperable for more than 7 days.
- 4 -
26) Pg. 3/4.3-85 - LCO 3.3.2.7 "Power to Flow Ratio Recording,
Instrumentation" - PSC is to reevaluate this entire LCO
and propose an alternative specification.
27) Pg. 3/4.5-1 - LCO 3.5.1.1 "Helium Circulators" -
a) PSC is to evaluate the acceptability of operation
without buffer He as a circulator shaft seal (i .e. ,
don't require buffer He flow in the Tech Specs) .
b) PSC is to evaluate the need to specify maximum
circulator bearing water temperature in the Tech
Specs.
c) PSC is to evaluate the need to require a backup He
buffer gas supply be specified in the Tech Specs.
d) PSC is to evaluate the basis for the statements on
FSAR pages 4.2-6 and 4.2-22 regarding interlocks
which prevent circulator turbine drives from being
supplied simultaneously with both water and steam.
A recommendation will then be made on whether or
not the operability of these interlocks should be
required and checked via the Tech Specs.
28) PSC is to redraft LCOs 3.5.1.1 and 3.5.1 .2 in light of a-d above and to
propose less redundancy be required when decay heat is low (i .e. , long
time for recovery) .
29) PSC will provide documentation verifying that NRC has approved FSV for
operation with a non-safety grade means for decay heat removal
(feedwater drive of the He circulators) when the plant is
depressurized.
30) Pg. 3/4.5-9 - LCO 3.5.2.1 "Steam Generators"
a) PSC will evaluate the need to include in this LCO a
limit on reheater steam outlet temperature which
would be based upon keeping temperatures elsewhere
- in the S.G. within their design limits.
b) PSC will reevaluate requirements on relief valve
operability including the acceptability of continued
plant operation with less than the required number
of safety relief valves operable.
Also, the discrepancies between FSAR Table 10.2-2
and Tech Spec Table 4.5.2-1 regarding relief valve
setpoints needs to be resolved.
- 5 -
31) Pg. 3/4.5-13 - LCOs 3.5.2.2 and 3.5.2.3 "Steam Generators" - PSC is to
redraft these LCOs to allow less redundancy when decay
heat level or primary system temperatures are low.
32) Pg. 3/4.5-19 - LCO 3.5.3.3 "Emergency Condensate and Emergency
Feedwater Headers - PSC is to redraft this LCS to allow
less redundancy when decay heat level or primary system
temperatures are low.
33) Pg. 3/4.5-21 - LCO 3.5.4 "Firewater Supply System" - PSC is to consider
splitting this LCO into two parts - one for the power,
low power and startup modes and one for the shutdown and
refueling modes. Also this LCO will be clarified
regarding what functions and actions apply for decay
heat removal and which apply for fire protection.
34) Pg. 3/4.6-4 - LCO 3.6.1.2 "S.G./Circulator Penetrations" - PSC will
check on relief valve piping configuration and capacity
to determine if each relief valve alone is capable of
adequate pressure relief.
35) Pg. 3/4.6-16 - LCO 3.6.2 "LCS" - PSC is to redraft this LCO in
consideration of NRC comments and will retitle this LCO
the Reactor Plant Cooling Water System. PSC will also
clarify the allowable number of failed tubes.
36) Pg. 3/4.6-19 - LCO 3.6.3 "LCS Temperatures" - PSC will better define
what 100°F temperature limit applies to in item e.
37) Pg. 3/4.6-22 - Surveillance 4.6.4.1 - PSC will evaluate specifying more
detailed acceptance criteria for the tendon inspections.
38) Pg. 3/4.7-1 - LCO 3.7.1.1 "Boiler Feed Pumps" - PSC is to provide
documentation that NRC approved the use of non-safety
grade equipment (boiler feedpumps) to supply water to
drive the circulators during a depressurized cooldown
accident.
39) Pg. 3/4.7-3 - LCO 3.7.1.2 "Steam/Water Dump System" - PSC will
evaluate the need to specify that both steam/water dump
valves be operable.
40) Pg. 3/4.7-5 - LCO 3.7.1 .3 "Pressure Relief Valves"
a) PSC will evaluate the need to add safety valves for
the Bypass Flash Tank, Dearerating Heater, Main
Steam Line and Hot Reheat Line to this LCO.
- 6 -
b) PSC will reevaluate the addition of the low power
mode to the applicability.
c) PSC will check on the acceptability of having an
action statement allow operation at reduced power
when a relief valve is inoperable (similar to item 30b
above) .
41) Pg. 3/4.7-9 - LCO 3.7.3 "Hydraulic Power System" - PSC will propose an
addition to this LCO covering hydraulic oil temperature
and will assess this LCO with respect to one loop
operation.
42) Pg. 3/4.7-13 - LCO 3.7.4 "Service Water System" - PSC will evaluate
changing the applicability and actions (or perhaps
splitting this LCO into two) to allow more time for
restoration of equipment when decay heat or reactor
system temperatures are low.
43) Pg. 3/4.7-15 - LCO 3.7.5 "Primary Coolant Depressurization" - PSC will
evaluate alternative depressurization paths and
redrafting this LCO to ensure at least 2 depressurization
paths are available. Also, an action to require rapid
initiation of regeneration of a He purification train may
be added.
44) Pg. 3/4.7-18 - Action Statement - PSC wants to retain Actions a.3 and b
but will clarify.
45) Pg. 3/4.7-35 - Surveillance 4.7.7.e - PSC will evaluate the need for a
surveillance requirement on automatically operating
doors and dampers.
46) Pg. 3/4.7-37 - LCO 3.7.8 "ACM Diesel Generator"
a) PSC will evaluate whether or not Action b can be
removed if a fire watch is established.
b) PSC will evaluate adding diesel surveillance
requirements similar to those in -LCO 3.8.1.1 and
battery surveillance requirements similar to those
in LCO 3.5.4.
c) PSC is to evaluate the loads listed in Table 4.7.8-1
to ensure they address all required loads and to
see if the applicability of this LCO should be tied
to when these loads have to be operable.
- 7 -
47) Pg. 3/4.7-43 - Surveillance
a) Surveillance 4.7.9.d - PSC will provide information
on the design value for the control room pressure
when in the positive pressure mode of operation.
b) Surveillance 4.7.9.e - PSC will check on what
surveillance interval they committed to for
charcoal adsorber material as part of their
NUREG-0737 commitments.
48) PG. 3/4.8-1 - LCO 3.8.1.1 "A.C. Power Sources"
a) PSC will evaluate why the FSAR limits plant
operation to only 24 hours without the reserve
auxiliary transformer and make appropriate changes
to the FSAR and/or Tech Specs.
b) PSC will evaluate the acceptability of that portion
of action (a) which requires diesel engine start
checks if less than the full complement of A.C.
power sources is available.
49) PSC, as a general action, is evaluating the use of a uniform statement
whenever plant shutdown is required of 12 hours to be in the startup
mode and 12 more hours to be shutdown.
50) Pg. 3/4.8-3 - Surveillance 4.8.1.1.2.b - PSC will check their previous
commitments regarding fuel oil composition and make
this surveillance consistent with those commitments.
51) Pg. 3/4.8-5 - Surveillance 4.8.1.1.2 - PSC will check Westinghouse
PWR - STS, Rev. 5, for additional surveillance
requirements.
52) Pg. 3/4.8-15 - LCO 3.8.2.1 "D.C. Power Sources" - PSC will evaluate
whether the note at the bottom of the page should more
appropriately be an action statement. In either case
PSC will ensure that the wording does not allow two or
more battery banks to be inoperable at the same time.
This comment also applies to LCOs 3.8.2.2 and 3.8.3.1.
53) PSC, as a general action, is evaluating adding provisions which would
allow systems or equipment that have no redundancy to be out of service
for a short period of time.
- 8 -
54) Pg. 3/4.9-10 - LCO 3.9.4 "Spent Fuel Shipping Cask" - PSC will evaluate
what decay heat limits are associated with the spent
fuel shipping cask and evaluate their applicability to
this LCO.
55) Pg. 3/4.10-1 - LCO 3.10.1 - Xenon Stability - PSC will make this LCO
consistent with a recent submittal on Xe stability
testing.
56) Pg. 3/4.3-83 - LCO 3.3.2.6 "Chlorine Detection and Alarm System" - PSC
is to evaluate the action statement and whether or not
it is desirable to change control room ventilation
modes.
57) PSC is to add definitions for "TRIP SET POINTS" and "ALLOWABLE VALUE."
58) Pg. 3/4.6-24 - Table 4.6.4-1 - PSC will revise this table in the area
of tendon selection criteria to be consistent with the
NRC SER on this subject.
59) When preparing the final (formal ) submittal of the upgrade Tech Specs
PSC must provide justification for any addition or deletion of
requirements from the existing FSV Tech Specs. In submitting this
package as a license amendment the licensee must pay particular
attention to 10 CFR 50.91(a)(1) .
60) PSC will update and provide to NRC the cross reference between the
existing FSV Tech Specs and the upgrade Tech Specs.
SSINS No. : 6835
IN 85-69
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSI BEl4 COONMY commas
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORC
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 , ;d- .fin
f
August 15, 1985 I _° AUG $ 71985Qs1
IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 85-69: RECENT FELONY CONVICTION e(NtA1ING ON
REACTOR OPERATOR REQUALIFICATION TESTS
Addressees:
All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license (OL) or a
construction permit (CP). All NRC licensed reactor operators and senior
reactor operators.
Purpose:
This information notice is being issued to reemphasize the importance of
integrity in the reactor operator licensing process and to emphasize the
seriousness of the issue by mentioning the recent felony conviction and civil
penalties resulting from cheating on reactor operator requalification tests.
It is expected that recipients will review this information for applicability
to their facilities and consider actions, if appropriate, to preclude a similar
problem from occurring at their facilities. No specific action or written
response is required.
Description of Circumstances:
In November of 1984, a former supervisor of operations at Three Mile Island
Unit Two was found guilty in the United States District Court, Harrisburg,
Pennsylvania on two felony counts involving violations of Title 18, United
States Code, Sections 1001 and 1002. The former supervisor, who was an
NRC-licensed operator, had submitted as his own work examinations which had
been substantially done and prepared by someone else. The examinations were
submitted in 1979 as part of the operator requalification program. The former
supervisor was sentenced in March 1985 to 2 years probation, 400 hours of
community service, and a $2000 fine.
In addition to the individual felony conviction, the licensee (General Public
Utilities Nuclear) was previously fined $100,000 because the NRC holds
licensees responsible for the actions of their employees. The licensee also
was assessed $40,000 in civil penalties for cheating by other individuals on
licensee-administered quizzes and mock examinations.
IE Information Notice No. 84-11 was issued to highlight concerns with inaccu-
rate qualification records and deficiencies in reactor operator training
programs at other facilities.
8508130160
L 1 9[79/o c
IN 85-69
August 15, 1985
Page 2 of 2
Discussion:
General Public Utilities Nuclear has taken the following actions in regard to
their reactor operator training program to prevent recurrence of licensed
operator requalification problems.
1. The various individuals were disciplined relative to their level of
involvement in the cheating problem.
2. The licensee implemented new examination security procedures to prevent
recurrence of cheating.
3. Through letters and interviews, senior management repeatedly emphasized to
all employees their policy that cheating would not be tolerated and could
be the basis for termination of employment.
Applicants, operators, and plant staffs should be aware of the importance of
accurate and complete records. NRC will not tolerate cheating or other falsi-
fication of records.
No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.
If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the Regional
Administrator of the appropriate regional office or this office.
Edward ^Jordan, Director
Divisi of Emergency Preparedness
and gineering Response
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Technical Contact: J. C. Stewart, IE
(301)492-9061
Attachment: List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices
Attachment 1
IN 85-69
August 15, 1985
LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
IE INFORMATION NOTICES
Information Date of
Notice No. Subject Issue Issued to
85-68 Diesel Generator Failure At 8/14/85 All power reactor
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear facilities holding
Station Unit 1 an OL or CP
85-42 Loose Phosphor In Panasonic 8/12/85 Materials and fuel
Rev. 1 800 Series Badge Thermo- cycle licensees
luminescent Dosimeter (TLD)
Elements
85-67 Valve-Shaft-To-Actuator Key 8/8/85 All power reactor
May Fall Out Of Place When facilities holding
Mounted Below Horizontal Axis an OL or CP
85-66 Discrepancies Between 8/7/85 All power reactor
As-Built Construction facilities holding
Drawings And Equipment an OL or CP
Installations
85-65 Crack Growth In Steam 7/31/85 All PWR facilities
Generator Girth Welds holding an OL or CP
85-64 BBC Brown Boveri Low-Voltage 7/26/85 All power reactor
K-Line Circuit Breakers, With facilities holding
Deficient Overcurrent Trip an OL or CP
Devices Models OD-4 and 5
85-63 Potential for Common-Mode 7/25/85 All power reactor
Failure of Standby Gas Treat- facilities holding
ment System on Loss of Off- an OL or CP
Site Power
85-62 Backup Telephone Numbers to 7/23/85 All power reactor
the NRC Operations Center facilities holding
an OL and certain
•
fuel facilities
OL = Operating License
CP = Construction Permit
Hello