HomeMy WebLinkAbout851179.tiff SSINS No. : 6835
IN 85-80
UNITED STATES WE1? frr'TT
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ['Th ,;;^, r.
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT ` ,`' � �71�? ', r
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 f OCT 2 91985 1'iI
October 15, 1985 V I
GREELEY. COLO.
IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 85-80: TIMELY DECLARATION OF AN EMERGENCY CLASS,
IMPLEMENTATION OF AN EMERGENCY PLAN, AND
EMERGENCY NOTIFICATIONS
Addressees:
All nuclear power facilities holding an operating license (OL) or a construction
permit (CP).
Purpose:
This information notice is provided to describe an instance when an emergency
condition was not classified and declared in a timely manner and to clarify the
requirement for licensees to adequately notify the NRC Headquarters Operations
Officer of emergencies. The NRC expects that recipients will review this
notice for applicability to their facilities. Suggestions contained in this
notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or
written response is required.
Description of Circumstances:
Davis-Besse:
At 1: 35 a.m. on June 9, 1985, the Davis-Besse plant experienced a complete loss
of main and auxiliary feedwater for nearly 12 minutes. This event is described
in more detail in Information Notice 85-50, "Complete Loss of Main and Auxiliary
Feedwater at a PWR Designed by Babcock & Wilcox," and NUREG-1154, "Loss of Main
and Auxiliary Feedwater Event at the Davis-Besse Plant on June 9, 1985. " The
emergency plan identified the loss of feedwater event as a Site Area Emergency.
However, it appears that all knowledgeable personnel in the control room were
occupied with stabilizing the plant and, thus, were not able to classify the
event as a Site Area Emergency and activate the emergency plan. It is possible
that had the plant not been brought to a stable condition quickly and had plant
safety further degraded, the efforts of all knowledgeable personnel in the
control room would have been required for recovery efforts, further delaying
initiation of appropriate onsite and offsite emergency response.
At 2: 11 a.m. , the shift technical 'advisor (STA) called the NRC Operations
Center from the control room using the Emergency Notification System to report
the event pursuant to 10 CFR 50. 72. At the beginning of the event, the STA
had been in his quarters in the administration building, which is outside the
851179
8510150022 �°/ie/as
IN 85-80
October 15, 1985
Page 2 of 3
protected area about a half mile from the plant. Although the STA mentioned
the trip of the main and auxiliary feedwater pumps, the STA did not describe
the length of time that the plant was totally without feedwater or the difficulty
the plant had in restoring auxiliary feedwater. No Emergency Class was declared,
nor was the fact conveyed to the NRC that plant conditions which warranted the
declaration of a Site Area Emergency had existed for nearly 12 minutes.
At 2: 26 a.m. , the STA informed the NRC that an Unusual Event had been declared
at 2: 25 a.m. The STA also informed the NRC that although the emergency plan
identified the total loss of feedwater event as a Site Area Emergency, the plant
was no longer in this emergency action level at this time. At 2: 29 a.m. , the
licensee informed the county that an Unusual Event had been declared. The licensee
depended on a procedure that required the county to notify the State of Ohio.
However, because the county could not reach the local state representative, the
State of Ohio was not notified of the Unusual Event declaration until after the
event had been terminated, more than 6 hours after its declaration.
At Davis-Besse, the emergency plan is initially implemented by the shift
supervisor, who also has primary responsibility for ensuring that the plant is
maintained in a safe condition. Because of the competing priorities of (1)
directing attention to necessary recovery actions to obtain a safe and stable
plant and (2) reviewing the emergency plan and initiating its actions, there
was a substantial delay in declaring an Emergency Class and implementing the
emergency plan If the June 9 event had progressed in severity, valuable-Uwe
needed to initiate appropriate onsite and offsite response to the emergency
would have been lost.
Corrective actions being undertaken by the licensee as a result of this event
include a number of operational and procedural changes that include but are
not limited to the following: The STA shift schedule will be changed from a
24-hour duty day to rotating 12-hour shifts. The STA will spend the entire
shift within the protected area, and the STA office will be located within 1 to
2 minutes of the control room. The STA will be trained as an Interim Emergency
Duty Officer to advise the shift supervisor in event classification and protective
action. The licensee will make emergency notifications directly to the State
of Ohio.
Point Beach:
On July 25, 1985, at 7: 25 a.m. (eastern time) , Point Beach Unit 1 experienced
an event involving loss of offsite power. Point Beach Unit 2 continued to
operate normally during this event. Because of the incomplete understanding of
the event by those making the notification to the NRC Operations Center, the
NRC Operations Center was not made aware of the details of the event. At 7: 37
a.m. , a security guard called the NRC Operations Center to notify the NRC that
Point Beach Unit 1 had declared an Unusual Event. The explanation for the
Unusual Event was that the plant had a turbine runback. When the NRC Headquarters
Operations Officer asked questions, the security guard was unable to provide
additional information because of his limited technical knowledge of the plant
and because the call was made from a location outside the control room where
the security guard could not obtain additional information from the operators
involved.
IN 85-80
October 15, 1985
Page 3 of 3
The NRC Headquarters Operations Officer called the control room, and as a result
of asking questions learned that a station transformer had been lost. However,
not until 21 hours later, when the plant notified the NRC Headquarters Operations
Officer that the Unusual Event was terminated, did the NRC Headquarters Operations
Officer learn that there had actually been a loss of offsite power.
Discussion:
Licensees should not delay the declaration of an Emergency Class when conditions
warrant such a declaration. Delaying the declaration can defeat the appropriate
response to an emergency. It is the licensee' s responsibility to ensure that
adequate personnel , knowledgeable about plant conditions and emergency plan
implementing procedures, are available on shift to assist the shift supervisor
to classify an emergency and activate the emergency plan, including making
appropriate notifications, without interfering with plant operation.
When 10 CFR 50. 72 was published in the Federal Register (48 FR 39039), the NRC
made clear its intent that notifications on the Emergency Notification System
to the NRC Operations Center should be made by those knowledgeable of the
event. If the description of an emergency is to be sufficiently accurate and
timely to meet the intent of the NRC' s regulations, the personnel responsible
for notification must be properly trained and sufficiently knowledgeable of the
event to report it correctly. The NRC did not intend that notifications made
pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 would be made by those who do not understand the event
that they are reporting.
No written response to this information notice is required. If you need
additional information about this matter, please contact the Regional Adminis-
trator of the appropriate NRC regional office or the technical contact listed
bel ow.
SiDiavanidsrdioEr ,EmdanergenDirectorcyPreparedness
veering Response
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Technical Contact: Eric W. Weiss, IE
(301) 492-9005
Attachment: List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices
Attachment 1
IN 85-80
October 15, 1985
LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
IE INFORMATION NOTICES
Information Date of
Notice No. Subject Issue Issued to
85-17 Possible Sticking Of ASCO 10/1/85 All power reactor
Sup. 1 Solenoid Valves facilities holding
an OL or CP
85-79 Inadequate Communications 9/30/85 All power reactor
Between Maintenance, facilities holding
Operations, And Security an OL or CP; research
Personnel and nonpower reactor
facilities; fuel
fabrication and
processing facilities
85-78 Event Notification 9/23/85 All power reactor
facilities holding
an 0L or CP
85-77 Possible Loss Of Emergency 9/20/85 All power reactor
Notification System Due To facilities holding
Loss Of AC Power an OL or CP
85-76 Recent Water Hammer Events 9/19/85 All power reactor
facilities holding
an OL or CP
85-75 Improperly Installed Instru- 8/30/85 All power reactor
mentation, Inadequate Quality facilities holding
Control And Inadequate Post- an OL or CP
modification,Testing
85-74 Station Battery Problems 8/29/85 All power reactor
facilities holding
an OL or CP
84-70 Reliance On Water Level 8/26/85 All power reactor
Sup. 1 Instrumentation With A facilities holding
Common Reference Leg an OL or CP
85-73 Emergency Diesel Generator 8/23/85 All power reactor
Control Circuit Logic Design facilities holding
Error an OL or CP
OL = Operating License
CP = Construction Permit
SSINS No. : 6835
IN 85-82
UNITED STATES l
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION L • _ \ / •'i
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT N
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 0CT 2 91985
October 18, 1985 OREELEY: COLCQQ
IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 85-82: DIESEL GENERATOR DIFFERENTIAL PROTECTION
RELAY NOT SEISMICALLY QUALIFIED
Addressees:
All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license (OL) or a
construction permit (CP).
Purpose:
This information notice is provided to alert licensees of a potentially signif-
icant safety problem involving a General Electric (GE) Model 12CFD relay that
is not seismically qualified for Class IE service when in the de-energized
state of operation. The relay is used for protection of an emergency diesel
generator (EDG) against phase-to-phase or phase-to-ground electrical faults
(shorts) by both boiling water reactor (BWR) and pressurized water reactor
(PWR) nuclear power generating stations.
It is suggested that recipients review this information for applicability to
their facilities and consider actions, if appropriate, to preclude similar
problems occurring at their facilities. However, suggestions contained in this
information notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific
action or written response is required.
Description of Circumstances:
Licensees of BWR and PWR nuclear generating stations have reported using a
high-speed differential protection relay that has been declared by the manufac-
turer to be not seismically qualified for the service intended. The relay, GE
Model 12CFD, which is being used for emergency diesel generator protection
against electrical shorts and grounds at the generator output, has not been
seismically qualified to operate in the de-energized state for this applica-
tion. Generally, the relay operates in the de-energized position before EDG
operation. However, it then operates in the energized position whenever the
EDG provides an electrical output to essential Class IE components. The safety
concern of this issue involves an inadvertent activation of the normally
de-energized relay from a seismic event. Momentary activation of the relay,
in the circuits examined, blocks the automatic start feature of the EDG during
certain emergency plant conditions through operation of another relay in the
system.
8510150080
c1n'"Lq iO/3CJ�85
IN 85-82
October 18, 1985
Page 2 of 3
On June 17, 1985, Kewaunee Nuclear Power Generating Station notified the NRC
that the high-speed differential relay being used for diesel generator protec-
tion at their plant did not meet the seismic requirements for that application
when the relay was in the de-energized mode. Kewaunee had discovered that the
relay, GE 12CFD series,, had earlier failed to meet seismic requirements under
similar circumstances at the Arkansas Unit 1 Nuclear Generating Station in
November 1981. The short term corrective measure taken by Kewaunee to resolve
the issue was to defeat the relay trip function. The long term corrective
measures are currently under review.
At Palisades, while finalizing the environmental qualification plan for the
diesel generator control panel', the licensee discovered that the GE high-speed
differential relays specified by design drawings would not meet the seismic
requirements for the service intended at that plant when the relay was in the
de-energized mode. The relay was identified as GE Model 12CFD and was being
used in an application similar to that at the Kewaunee plant above. The
licensee` of Palisades has since replaced all deficient relays with relays
seismically qualified for service in all modes of operation.
Background:
An event occurred at Arkansas Unit 1 plant on November 19, 1981, when the plant
was operating at 90% of full power. An alarm sounded alerting operations
personnel that the generator lockout relay, associated with the plant' s No. 1
EDG, had ,tripped. The licensee' s investigation of this occurrence revealed
that the "C" phase differential relay (one relay is used for each phase of the
three-phase system) had activated and caused a generator lockout relay to trip
even though the affected' EDG was not operating at the time. A walk through by
persons in the EDG area revealed that the EDG exiter cubicle, which houses the
differential relays, may have been opened and reclosed with sufficient force to
cause spurious operation of the differential relay, GE Model 12CFD. Subsequent
investigation by the licensee concluded that the relay did not meet the minimum
seismic qualifications in that plant' s- design when the EDG is in the standby
mode and the relay is in a de-energized state. A similar problem was identi-
fied with the same make and model differential relays at both Brunswick Unit 2
and at Salem Unit 1 in early 1982.
Arkansas Unit 1, Brunswick Unit 2, and Salem Unit 1 have since replaced the
deficient relays with a relay that GE considers more suitable and seismically
qualified for the application discussed above.
The NRC review of the above problems concluded that the relays should be
seismically qualified in their energized and de-energized states to preclude
their spurious activation during a seismic event. Additionally, review of GE' s
GER 3069 report, "Relay Protection of Class IE Systems," shows that the 12CFD
differential relays were successfully tested for 3. 5 g in the energized modes
anc 0. 75 g in the de-energized mode. The calculated required g-level
capacit, . including the effects of floor response. for this equipment at
IN 85-82
October 18, 1985
Page 3 of 3
Arkansas Unit 1 exceeded the qualified g level of the 12CFD relay in the
de-energized mode by a factor of about three. Review of GE' s GER 3069 report
also revealed that GE type IJD differential relays do meet seismic requirements
in all modes of operation mentioned above and is the GE recommendation for
replacement of the differential relay in question.
No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.
If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the Regional
Administrator of the appropriate regional office or this office.
dward . Jord" an, Director
Divisi of Emergency Preparedness
and ngineering Response
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Technical Contact: Vincent D. Thomas
301-492-4755
Attachment: List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices
Attachment 1
IN 85-82
October 18, 1985
LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
IE INFORMATION NOTICES
Information Date of
Notice No. Subject Issue Issued to
85-81 Problems Resulting In 10/17/85 All power reactor
Erroneously High Reading facilities holding
With Panasonic 800 Series an OL or CP and
Thermoluminescent Dosimeters certain material
and fuel cycle
licensees
85-80 Timely Declaration Of An 10/15/85 All power reactor
Emergency Class Implementa- facilities holding
tion Of An Emergency Plan, an OL or CP
And Emergency Notifications
85-17 Possible Sticking Of ASCO 10/1/85 All power reactor
Sup. 1 Solenoid Valves facilities holding
an OL or CP
85-79 Inadequate Communications 9/30/85 All power reactor
Between Maintenance, facilities holding
Operations, And Security an OL or CP; research
Personnel and nonpower reactor
facilities; fuel
fabrication and
processing facilities
85-78 Event Notification 9/23/85 All power reactor
facilities holding
an OL or CP
85-77 Possible Loss Of Emergency 9/20/85 All power reactor
Notification System Due To facilities holding
Loss Of AC Power an OL or CP
85-76 Recent Water Hammer Events 9/19/85 All power reactor
facilities holding
an OL or CP
85-75 Improperly Installed Instru- 8/30/85 All power reactor
mentation, Inadequate Quality facilities holding
Control And Inadequate Post- an OL or CP
modification Testing
OL = Operating License
CP = Construction Permit
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