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Home My WebLink About20043044.tiff October 7 2004 Board of Assessment Appeals State of Colorado Docket No. 40171 County Schedule No. R6265186 & R6411486 Petitioner's Rebuttal Tagawa Greenhouses Petitioner vs. Weld County Board of County Commissioners Respondent. Attached is petitioners rebuttal for the October 12,2004 Board of Assessment Appeals hearing. F& S Tax Consultants By: ✓-/Gl ./ Ronald C Sandstrom 11540 W. 69th Way Arvada, CO 80004 (303)424-0683 CERTIFICATE OF MAILING I hereby certify that I served each of the following with a true and correct copy of the foregoing by hand delivery on October 7,2004: County Board of Commissioners Weld County 915 Tenth St. Greely, CO 80632 Ronald C. Sandstrom 4 2004-3044 77 /l //- `/ (2 : S r#4 4scesti a . d VALUATION DATA REBUTTAL Docket 40171 Restricted Report For Ad Valorem Tax Purposes Agricultural Tagawa Greenhouses 17999 Weld County Rd. 4 Brighton, Colorado Schedule No. R6265186 & R6411486 As Of June 30, 1998 Prepared by: R.C. Sandstrom Oct. 7, 2004 CONTENTS Marshall Swift November 1996 manual Sec 64 p. 6 Greenhouses A The Appraisal of Real Estate B Depreciation C Supplemental Brief of Petitioner Busch Greenhouses D Re: applicability of Del Mesa Farms: issue personal property Appendix A(Del Mesa Farms vs Wade Hall) Appendix B (Del Mesa Farms vs Theresa Bacus) Appendix C (Home Depot vs Pueblo County) Boulder Country Club vs Boulder County Board of Commissioners E • SECTION 64 PAGE 6 November 1996 GREENHOUSES COMMERCIAL GREENHOUSES RESIDENTIAL GREENHOUSES The following are average costs per square foot for commercial straight wall (8') growing The following are average costs per square foot for stock residential greenhouses with greenhouses with either glass or fiberglass covering. Foundations, roof vents, lighting, and standard glazing of double strength glass with one end wall door. Foundations and vents are water service are included, but no floor, heating or cooling or special water spray devices or included but no floor, heat, electrical, plumbing or watering devices. Costs are based on piping.All costs are based on professional labor. For amateur workmanship or work done by professional labor.For amateur workmanship,decrease costs by 15%to 25%.The low end of grower help, costs should be decreased by 25%to 35%. Custom institutional greenhouses the cost range represents wood or cheap aluminum greenhouses with plain stem walls while may'run two to three times listed costs. the high end is a weatherproofed, concealed connection,tubular framed structure. The high ADJUSTMENTS end good colored frame may be full length or set on a high cost masonry stem wall.Custom Concrete stem wall, add $7.00 per fin. ft. designed installations can run 25% higher. Cheap pipe frame structures can run 25% lower. Tempered glass, add 15%. Doubleglazed, 10%. For polyethylene covers, see Commercial Adjustments. Structural polycarbonate, add 25%. .aa` as.t Acrylic sandwich, add 55%. AREA EVEN SPAN PLAIN GABLE END LEAN-TO •' "' •w7� '� ssm, Curtain walls, deduct 5%. SQ.FT. COST RANGE WALL DEDUCTION COST RANGE .µ ,# Double polyglazed, deduct 15%. 50 $35.50—$55.00 $150—$200 $35.00—$57.75 ---,..�,.. - -- Polyethylene cover, deduct 25%. 100 30.50— 47.25 320— 410 29.00— 47.50 Semi-circular structures, deduct 30%. 150 28.00- 43.00 320- 410 26.25- 42.50 Modified bow (3' side wall), deduct 25%. 200 26.25- 40.50 410- 520 24.25- 39.25 QUALITY AND AREA IN SQUARE FEET 250 25.00- 38.50 410- 520 22.75- 39.00 TYPE 2,000 5,000 10,000 20,000 50,000 100,000 300 24.25- 37.00 410- 520 21.75- 35.00 400 22.75- 34.75 520- 695 20.25- 32.50 Good aluminum or 600 20.75- 31.75 520- 695 18.25- 29.00 galvanized steel $21.00 $17,05 $14.55 $1240 $10.05 $8.60 800 19.50- 29.75 520- 695 16.75- 26.75 Average steel frame 16.15 13.05 11.15 9.50 7.70 6.55 1,000 18.50- 28.25 645- 900 Low cost,wood or pipe frame 12.40 10.00 8.55 7.25 5.85 5.00 HEATING AND VENTILATING For gable end doors, add or deduct $375 to$825 each. For commercial doors, add 25%. TYPE CLIMATE MILD MODERATE EXTREME For tempered or laminated safety glass or structural polycarbonate, add 25%. For tinted or heat reflective glass, add 15%to 20%. For insulated glass, add 40%to 80%. Hot water or steam $3.00 $3.85 $4.90 Heaters-$425 to$675; Humidifiers -$325 to$900; Coolers-$650 to $1,000; Ventilating Gas furnaces 1.30 1.95 2.90 fans - $215 to $475; Planting benches - add 100% to commercial bench costs. CC Suspended space heaters .90 1.20 1.65 Partitions, glazed, per square foot of partition — $6.75 to $9.00. add for fan-jet duct distribution .60 .85 1.20 UNIT COSTS(See Section 53 for more detailed costs.) COST RANGE SOLAR ROOMS Humidifiers,each $ 350.00 to $1,400.00 Exhaust fan cooling assembly,per unit 650.00 to 1,325.00 The following are average costs per square foot for three-sided lean-to glass solar roams Water-drip humidity pad assembly,per sq.ft.of pad 8.00 to 12.00 with curved eaves attached to a permanent structure used for living space or commercial Automatic vent and/or environmental controls,per unit 650.00 to 1,275.00 applications.Costs include one end wall door,foundations and vents or windows, Floor,heat, Automatic chemical Injectors(excluding tanks),per unit 1,000.00 to 3,000.00 electrical and plumbing are not included.The low end of the cost range represents tempered glazing in a good metal tubular frame while the high end has insulated, coated and tinted Automatic water controls,per unit 200.00 to 475.00 Traveling boom sprayer,per linear foot of rail 40.00 to 65.00 safety glass. Custom designed installations can run up to 50/° higher depending pn the quality of finish work. Automatic sidewall curtain assembly,per linear foot 6.50 to 8.25 _ Concrete curb,per linear foot 1.75 to 3.50 AREA COST AREA COST MISCELLANEOUS SQUARE FOOT COSTS SQ.FL RANGE SQ.Ft RANGE • r Gravel Asphalt Concrete - 50 $64.00- $170.00 300 $41.25- $109.00 Floors or walks $ .31 to $ .45 $1.10 to $1.70 $1.55 to $2.75 f a ,. re, , as. s- i 100 54.00• 143.25 400 38.00- 101.50 Plastic Wood Slat Solid Propogating `, .. , IT 150 48.75- 129.50 600 34.25- 92.00 Planting benches .... $2.25 to $3.50 $3.40 to $4.00 $3.75 to $6.75 - . ' 200 45.25- 120.75 800 32.25- 85.50 Spray Mist Drlptube _ . 250 42.50- 114.25 1,000 30.25- 81.00 Water system,plastic $ .09 to $ .17 $ .16 to $ .26 $ .21 to $ .33 LATH HOUSES 'Costs per square foot Include post and girder structure and concrete piers. For gable end and door adjustments, see table above including glazing'additives. ° TYPE 1,000 2,500 5,000 10,000 25,000 50,000 Extra tall bays, add 15%. For laminated wood framing, add 10%. Straight eaves,deduct 7%. For corner hips and valleys, add $17.50 to $29.25 per square foot to corner area. Aluminum lath $10.00 $8.70 $7.80 $7.05 $6.10 $5.50 For decorative lights incorporated into frame members, add$11.25 to$17.00 per linear foot. Wood lath 5.35 4.65 4.15 3.75 3.25 2.90 For built-in shades, add $8.00 to $16.50 per square foot of covered area. For motorized Netted shadehouse .. 4.05 3.30 2.85 2.45 2.00 1.70 operation, add $550.00 to $1,275.00 per operator. 11/96 • The Appraisal of Real Tierelfth..Editinn Estate ute. IIApraisal �ii,, In Institutee pmhagovam p mgeng 875 North Michigan Avenue•Chicago,Illinois 60611-1980 Heal Estate Solutions www.appraisalinstitute.org Q A Theraatm .4 trii loped affects the provide estimates of entrepreneurial profit Because different sources of data entrepreneurial reflect costs in different ways,the appraiser should identify where the entrepre- terties such as neurial profit is considered in the estimate—i.e.,whether it is an item already timate of a specula- included in the sum of total cost and land value or a stand-alone item added to to the entrepreneur the sum of total cost and land value. turn may differ ever,the issue is Depredation the proportionate Depreciation is the difference between the contributory value of an improvement overall property and its cost at the time of appraisal: ze most of their Reproduction or Replacement Cost of IImprovementImprovementnecessarily the -Contnbuoa Improvement yValue of ation •may not be Deprec ers was acting as By estimating the depreciation incurred by an improvement and deducting this =ten reflect the estimate fiom the improvement's reproduction or replacement cost,an appraiser can ugh costs of the conclude the depreciated cost of the improvement.This depreciated cost approxi- mates the improvement's contribution to the property's market value as illustrated in properties may not ies,which further Figure 142.(Techniques for estimating depreciation are discussed in Chapter 16.) at.Theoretically, Depreciation in an improvement can result from three major causes operat- t an entrepreneur- mg separately or in combination: • Physical deterioration—wear and tear AVM14.1 Depreciation's Portion the value estimate from regular use and the impact of the of Cost neurial profit has elements. t could be • Functional obsolescence—a flaw in the m includes a profit - Ditylielatien sus(e.g., structure,materials,or design that diminishes the function,utility,and = may or may not value of the improvement. Contributory Value CONTRACTOR • External obsolescence—a temporary of Improvement ,ated)by an or permanent impairment of the ttcepts of ptgxt utility or salability of an improvementDepredation Is the chfference between or property due to negative influences the matt value van teteetwereent and and risk outside the property.(External its reproduction or replacement cyst at to efforts of the obsolescence may result from adverse the time of appraisa6The dipredwed cost projects in which market conditions.Because of its of the improvement an be considered an rial profit is fixed location,real estate is subject to indication of contribu- tion external influences that usually cannot e of an individual be controlled by the owner, -esponsble for property landlord,or tenant.) he project's 2. Many of the terms appraisers use are also used by accountants,economists,and other real estate professionals.The term amued depreeiation,which appeared in previous editions of The AfpraisalofReal Estate,was originally bosso..Ld from accounting practice.In accounting the udes both a term refers to the total depreciation taken on an asset from the time of purchase to the s is often already present,which is normally deducted from an asset's account value to derive net book value. e direct costs. While armed on has long been used in an deprman appraisal context,the more concise term depredation is equally suitable and has been used throughout this edition. • DEPRECIATION Is the difference between the market value of an improvement and its reproduction or replacement cost at the time of appraisal. The depreciated cost of the improvement can be considered an indication of the improvement's contribution to the property's market value. "The Appraisal of Real Estate"Twelfth Edition, Appraisal Institute. See also"Physical deterioration, Functional obsolescence, External obsolescence." Attached. Reproduction or Replacement Cost of Improvements -Contributory Value of Improvement Depreciation Summary of Economic Obsolescence calculation: Sales Price of Property -Market Value of residences Adjusted selling price of land and improvements -Market value of land Market value of improvements Replacement/reproduction cost of improvements -Market value of improvements Depreciation(all forms) -Physical deterioration of improvements External obsolescence of improvements External obsolescence/(Replacement cost-Physical deterioration)=%of external obsolescence See; Colorado & Utah Coal Company vs. Rorex 369 P. 2d 796, 149 Colo. 502, 513 (1962) "Whenever obsolescence is known to the Assessor,whether through his efforts or those of others, it should be a component of value of the item to be assessed." C • BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS, STATE OF COLORADO Address: 1313 Sherman Street,Room 315 Denver,CO 80203 Phone Number. (303) 866-5880 Fax Number. (303) 8661185 Petitioner. BUSCH GREENHOUSES Respondent: ADAMS COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS Attorney For Petitioner. Docket Number: 37889 Name: William A.McLain Address: William A.McLain, P.C. 3962 S. Olive Street Denver,CO 8023 7-203 8 Phone Number (303)759-0087 Fax Number. (303)759-0387 E-mail: wamclain@comcastnet Atty.Reg": 6941 SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF PETITIONER BUSCH GREENHOUSES 1) NOW COMES Petitioner Busch Greenhouses, by William A. McLain, P.C., its attorney, and as its supplemental brief on the issue of the applicability of Del Mesa Farms v. Board of Equalization of Montrose County, 956 P.2d 661 (Colo. App. 1998), to the issue of the treatment of personal property and/or fixtures in this appeal, states as follows: The case of Del Mesa Farms v. Board of Equalization of Montrose County, 956 P.2d 661 (Colo. App. 1998) is applicable to the issue of the treatment of personal property in this case as to each separate year included in this appeal. The case of Del case of Del Mesa Farms v. Board of Equalization of Montrose County, 956 P.2d 661 (Colo_ App. 1998), was decided on April 2, 1998. It involved the appeal by Montrose County of an order of the Board of Assessment Appeals reducing the valuation of poultry buildings for the 1996 tax year. The BAA reduced the valuation of the poultry buildings by the amount attributed to certain items, which the BAA classified as personal property rather than real property fixtures. The items in dispute included fans, foggers, heaters and water curtains used to regulate the environment of the chickens in the poultry houses. These items were affixed or otherwise incorporated into the building structures of the poultry houses. The testimony in this case was that the similar items in the greenhouses owned by Busch Greenhouses were used to regulate the environment of the plants, which were raised in the greenhouses,and for no other purpose. The Court of Appeals cited the statutory fixture definition, which excluded machinery, equipment and other articles related to a commercial or industrial operation, which are affixed to the real property for proper utilization of such articles. That definition was adopted by the General Assembly prior to 1996. The Court of Appeals also cited the personal property definition, which included the same reference to machinery, equipment and other articles related to a commercial or industrial operation, which are affixed to the real property for proper utilization of such articles. That definition was adopted by the General Assembly prior to 1996. The Property Tax Administer had also construed these statutory provisions prior to January, 1997, as noted by the Court of Appeals in the case of Del Mesa Farms v. Board of Equalization of Montrose County, 956 P.2d 661 (Colo. App. 1998). The Court of Appeals then stated that regardless of whether a particular item is affixed to a building and may otherwise constitute a fixture system, the item constitutes personal property if its use is primarily tied to a business operation. The next case which the Court of Appeals reviewed which dealt with this issue was the case of Del Mesa Farms v. Wade Hall, 98 CA 1611 (Colo. App. 8/12/99). Although this case was not selected for publication by the Court of Appeals, it was included in the Assessor's Reference Library, Vol. 3, p. 5.98 — 5.104 (a copy of these pages from the Assessor's Reference Library is attached as Appendix A). This case 1 • involved the 1997 valuation for assessment of poultry houses in Delta County. The Court of Appeals held that, based on the doctrine of stare decisis, the case of Del Mesa Farms v. Board of Equalization of Montrose County, 956 P.2d 661 (Colo. App. 1998) applied, and the curtain walls and fans in the Delta County poultry houses were personal property for the 1997 property tax year. The Court of Appeals held that since the trial court found that the primary purpose of the ventilation system and curtain wall was for the chicken operation, it correctly determined that these items were personal property. In the case of the similar items in Busch Greenhouses' operation, the testimony was even more compelling. There the heating, cooling, ventilation, plumbing and electrical systems in the greenhouses for regulating the environment for the growing of plants in the greenhouses was not only their primary purpose, it was their only purpose. The next case in which the Court of Appeals reviewed this issue was Del Mesa Farms v. Theresa Bacus, 99 CA 527 (Colo. App. 2/24/2000). Although this case was not selected for publication by the Court of Appeals, it was included in the Assessor's Reference Library, Vol. 3, p. 5.105 — 5.115 (a copy of these pages from the Assessor's Reference Library is attached as Appendix B). The Court of Appeals again relied on the case of Del Mesa Farms v. Board of Equalization of Montrose County, 956 P.2d 661 (Colo. App. 1998), and held that the heating, cooling, ventilation, plumbing and electrical systems in the poultry houses used to regulate the environment of the chickens were personal property. It also said that the distinction between fixtures and personal property was previously decided in the 1990 case of Morning Fresh Farms v. Weld County Board of Equalization, 794 P.2d 1073 (Colo. App. 1990). Montrose County argued that the Morning Fresh Farms case was distinguishable, but the Court of Appeals disagreed. Finally, in Home Depot USA, Inc. v. Pueblo County Board of Commissioners, 50 P.3d 916 (Colo. App. 2002), the Court of Appeals, in a case dealing with the 1998 and 1999 property tax years, relied on Del Mesa Farms v. Board of Equalization of Montrose County, 956 P.2d 661 (Colo. App. 1998). It went on the say in that case that: "Contrary to taxpayer's argument, it is immaterial whether these systems could also be used by other types of businesses that could also occupy the building. The determinative issue is whether these items are primarily related to business operations in the building, as opposed to primarily serving the operations of a building in general. See Del Mesa Farms v. Bd. Of Equalization, supra." Home Depot USA, Inc., supra, 920 — 921 (a copy of this case is attached hereto as Appendix C). It is also immaterial whether the systems in Busch Greenhouses' greenhouses could also be used by other types of businesses that could also occupy the greenhouses. The determinative issue is whether the heating, cooling, ventilation, plumbing and electrical systems are primarily related to the business operations in the greenhouses. The testimony is this case was that the only use of these items related to the business operations,the raising of plants, in the greenhouses. 2 A review of all these cases reveals that the General Assembly had placed the definitions of personal property and fixtures relied on by Busch Greenhouses in statute prior to 1997 and 1998, the tax years at issue in this case. Based on these definitions,the items in Busch Greenhouses' greenhouses were personal property. The Court of Appeals has held that the case of Del Mesa Farms v. Board of Equalization of Montrose County, 956 P.2d 661 (Colo. App. 1998), followed the decision of Morning Fresh Farms v. Weld County Board of Equalization, 794 P.2d 1073 (Colo. App. 1990), a case which was decided by the Court of Appeals in 1990. The Morning Fresh Farms case also supports the personal property classification in this case. The Court of Appeals applied the decision in Del Mesa Farms v. Board of Equalization of Montrose County, 956 P.2d 661 (Colo. App. 1998), to cases which involved both the 1997 and the 1998 property tax years,the tax years at issue in this case. For the reasons stated herein, it is clear that the case of Del Mesa Farms v. Board of Equalization of Montrose County, 956 P.2d 661 (Colo. App. 1998), and the others cited in this brief, require that the heating, cooling, ventilation, plumbing and electrical systems in the greenhouses used to regulate the environment of the plants be classified as personal property. It is also clear that the case of Del Mesa Farms v. Board of Equalization of Montrose County, 956 P.2d 661 (Colo. App. 1998), is applicable to each separate year included in this appeal. William A. McLain, P.C. By: M / ►9CJLt b1ti. William A.McLain (#6941) 3962 S. Olive Street Denver, CO 80237-2038 Telephone: (303)759-0087 Fax: (303)759-0387 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was placed in an envelope, properly addressed, and mailed to the following by United States Mail, postage prepaid, on August 16, 2004: Jennifer Wascak Leslie,Esq. Assistant County Attorney Adams County Attorney's Office 450 South 4th Street Brighton, CO 80601 • Otk:�ia; 3 5.98 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS August 12, 1999 No. 98CA1611 NOT SELECTED FOR PUBLICATION Del Mesa Farms, a California corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Wade Hall, County Assessor of the County of Delta, State of Colorado, and Board of County Commissioners of the County of Delta, State of Colorado, sitting as the Delta County Board of Equalization, Defendants-Appellants. Appeal from the District Court of Delta County Honorable J. Steven Patrick, Judge No. 97CV113 Division I JUDGEMENT AFFIRMED Opinion by JUDGE DAVIDSON Metzger and Criswell, JJ., concur William A. McLain,P.C.,William A. McLain,Denver, Colorado,for Plaintiff-Appellee Bradley K. Kolman,Delta County Attorney, Delta, Colorado,for Defendants-Appellants 15-DIVISION-AS PUB ARL 3 1-89 Revised 1-04 Q49,7--2l,\.v A 5.99 In this property tax case, defendants, the Delta County Assessor and the Delta County Board of Equalization (collectively the County), appeal from a district court judgment reducing the 1997 tax year valuation placed on certain components of property owned by plaintiff, Del Mesa Farms (taxpayer), that taxpayer used in its poultry operations. Considering itself bound by existing precedent, the district court classified the land involved in the poultry operations as "agricultural land," and classified certain items used in the poultry buildings as tax-exempt personal property agricultural equipment. We affirm. The relevant facts are not in dispute. Taxpayer owns five separate parcels of property in Delta County that it uses in its poultry operations. One of these properties is a "breeder" facility, where chickens are used for egg production. The other four properties are "pullet" facilities, where day- old chicks are raised until reaching the stage when they are transferred to a breeder facility. Most of the feed for the chickens is purchased from other sources. Two classification issues were in dispute in the district court proceedings. The first was whether the land used in conjunction with the poultry buildings met the criteria for "agricultural land" classification as a "farm." If so, the next issue was whether certain curtain walls and fans used 1. 15-DIVISION-AS PUB ARL 3 1-89 Revised 1-04 . • 5.100 as a ventilation system in the poultry buildings constituted tax-exempt personal property items of agricultural equipment as opposed to taxable fixtures. Based on the doctrine of stare decisis, the district court ruled in favor of taxpayer on these classification issues. Specifically, relying on Morning Fresh Farms. Inc. v. Weld County Board of Equalization. 704 P. 2d 1073 (Colo. App. 1990), the district court ruled that the land used in taxpayer's poultry operations should be classified as "agricultural land" as a "farm." Next, relying on Del Mesa Farms v. Board of Equalization 956 P. 2d 661 (Colo. App. 1998), the district court also ruled that the curtain walls and fans were items of personal property used in the farming operation, finding that the testimony at trial established that the primary purpose of these items was for the chicken operation. The district court later reduced the 1997 tax year valuations of taxpayer's properties in accordance with these rulings, and this appeal followed. I. The County first challenges the classification of the land used in taxpayer's poultry operations as "agricultural land." Specifically, the County contends that the Morning Fresh Farms case is inconsistent with the pertinent statutory requirements and that, therefore, we should decline to follow it. 2. 15-DMSION-AS PUB ARL 3 149 Revised 1-04 • 5.101 Alternatively, the County contends that the Morning Fresh Farms case is factually distinguishable. We reject these contentions. To the contrary, we agree with taxpayer that Morning Fresh Farms is dispositive of the land classification issue. In Morning Fresh Farms a division of this court held that the land devoted to a similar "chicken operation" involving both the production of eggs and replacement laying hens met the statutory definition of a "farm." Although the chicken operation was "self-contained" and the livestock never touched the ground, the Morning Fresh Farms court held that such acreage was used to produce "agricultural products" which thereby emanated from the productivity of the farm's land and, therefore, the personal property used in the chicken operation qualified for tax exemption as "agricultural equipment." See Colo. Const. art. X, §3(I)(c); §§39-1-102(1 .1), 39-1- 102(1.3), & 39-1-102(3.5), C.R.S. 1998. The County argues that the chicken operation in Morning Fresh Farms as well as here, was not a "farm" because neither the chickens nor the eggs originated from the "land's" productivity. Specifically, the County suggests that, to emanate from the land's productivity, an "agricultural product" must either be grown as crops, or somehow be physically contiguous to the 3. 15-DIVISION-AS PUS ARL 3 1-89 Revised 1-04 5.102 "parcel of land." However, as pointed out in Morning Fresh Farms since "agricultural products" include "animal products" derived from "animal husbandry," we agree with taxpayer that the agricultural products at issue there and here - - eggs and replacement laying hens - - "originate from the productive use of the land in the sense that there were no replacement laying hens until Del Mesa Farms, through animal husbandry, raised them on the land, and no eggs until Del Mesa Farms, again through animal husbandry, created the environment on the land for them to be laid." Moreover, notwithstanding the County's assertion that the statutory interpretation set forth in Morning Fresh Farms was contrary to the intent of the General Assembly, we note that, despite numerous amendments to other provisions regarding other "agricultural" classification requirements, the pertinent statutory provisions have remained unchanged over the years since that decision was issued. We also reject the County's argument that Morning Fresh Farms is factually distinguishable from this case based on certain characteristics of taxpayer's poultry operations. Contrary to the County's argument, the holding in Morning Fresh Farms was not based on the "chicken operation" being a part of a larger agricultural endeavor, and there is no such requirement for agricultural 4. 15-DIVISION-AS PUB ARL 31-89 Revised 1-04 5.103 classification of the land involved in such poultry operations. Rather, as noted by taxpayer, it was stressed in Morning Fresh Farms that the chicken operation was separate from the other portions of that farm, and, as here, only a small portion of the chicken feed came from other agricultural activities on other parts of the taxpayer's land. Furthermore, the "chicken operation" in Morning Fresh Farms involved both types of poultry operations, and therefore, the holding in Morning Fresh Farms was not limited to the site of taxpayer's breeder operations in producing eggs, but also was applicable to the sites of taxpayer's pullet operations in raising replacement laying hens. II. The County also argues that, as a matter of law, the curtain walls and fans used in taxpayer's poultry buildings should be classified as taxable fixtures rather than tax-exempt items of personal property. The County's argument to the contrary notwithstanding, Del Mesa Farms v. Board of Equalization suora• is dispositive of this contention. In Del Mesa Farms a division of this court held that the same types of property items used for the same purposes in taxpayer's poultry buildings in its related operations in a neighboring county met the statutory criteria for classification as tax-exempt personal property rather than taxable real 5. 15-DIVISION-AS PUB ARL 3 1-89 Revised 1-04 5104 property fixtures. See Colo. Const. art. X, §3(1)(c); §§39-1-102(1.3), 39-1- 102(4), & 39-1-102(11), C.R.S. 1998. Here, the trial court found that the primary purpose of the ventilation system and curtain wall was for the chicken operation and, therefore, correctly determined that these items were personal property as defined in §39-1-102(11). We find the County's remaining contentions of error to be unpersuasive. Judgment affirmed. JUDGE METZGER and JUDGE CRISWELL concur. 6. 15-DMSION-AS PUB ARL 3 1-89 Revised 1-04 5.105 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS February 24, 2000 No. 99CA0527 NOT SELECTED FOR PUBLICATION Del Mesa Farms, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Theresa Bacus, County Assessor of the County of Montrose and Board of County Commissioners of the County of Montrose, State of Colorado, sitting as the Montrose County Board of Equalization, Defendants-Appellants Appeal from the District Court of Montrose County Honorable J. Steven Patrick, Judge No. 97CV164 • Division II JUDGEMENT AFFIRMED Opinion by JUDGE PLANK Davidson and Dailey, JJ., Concur William A. McLain, P.C., William A. McLain, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee J. Patrick Coleman, Montrose County Attorney, Montrose, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellants 15-DIVISION-AS PUB ARL 31-89 Revised 1-04 • 5.106 • The Montrose County Assessor and the Montrose County Board of Equalization (collectively the "County") appeal a decision of the trial court ruling that the land of the taxpayer, Del Mesa Farms, is agricultural and that certain equipment used on the facility is tax-exempt personal property. We affirm. The parties waived a trial and submitted this case to the trial court on stipulated facts. The taxpayer owns seven parcels of real property in Montrose County. Each parcel contains "breeder facilities" in which chickens are bred. The eggs that are produced are shipped to other facilities, which hatch them and raise the chickens to be processed for food. The breeding hens are sold, also to be processed for food, after approximately sixty-six weeks, at which time the facilities are cleaned and new hens are moved in. The county classified the taxpayer's land as "all other agricultural" property and the various equipment as fixtures. The taxpayer appealed that determination to the district court, which reversed the board of equalization and ruled that the taxpayer's real property should be classified agricultural and that the equipment at issue was personal property exempt from taxation. The county appeals those rulings. 1. 15-DIVISION-AS PUB ARL 3 1-89 Revised 1-04 5.107 I. The county contends that the trial court misconstrued the applicable statutes when it ruled that the taxpayer's land should be classified agricultural. We disagree. Section 39-1-102(1.6)(a), C.R.S. 1999, provides in pertinent part: "Agricultural land", whether used by the owner of the land or a lessee, means one of the following: (I) A parcel of land, whether located in an incorporated or unincorporated area and regardless of the uses for which such land is zoned, that was used the previous two years and presently is used as a farm or ranch, as defined in subsection (3.5) and (13.5) of this section . . . . "Agricultural land" under this subparagraph (I) includes land underlying any residential improvement located on such agricultural land and also includes the land underlying other improvements if such improvements are an integral part of the farm or ranch and if such other improvements and the land area dedicated to such other improvements are typically used as an ancillary part of the operation. . . . . (emphasis added) The parties agree that the land at issue is not used as a ranch as defined in §39-1-102(13.5), so we turn to the definition of a "farm" in §39- 1-102(3.5): "Farm" means a parcel of land which is used to produce agricultural products that originate from the land's productivity for the primary purpose of obtaining a monetary profit. 2. 15-DIVISION-AS PUB ARL 3 1-89 Revised 1-04 5.108 The term "agricultural products" is defined in §39-1-102(1.1): (P)lant or animal products in a raw or unprocessed state that are derived from the science and art of agriculture, regardless of the use of the product after its sale and regardless of the entity that purchases the product. "Agriculture", for the purposes of this subsection (1.1), means farming, ranching, animal husbandry, and horticulture. This court has previously determined that land used for the production of eggs meets the definition of a farm in §39-1-102(3.5), and is properly classified as agricultural. Morning Fresh Farms, Inc. v. Weld County Board of Equalization, 794 P. 2d 1073 (Colo. App. 1990). The county nevertheless asserts that the holding in Morning Fresh Farms is contrary to the plain language of the statute and that we should not follow that decision. We are not persuaded. The county argues that the phrase "agricultural products that originate from the land's productivity" cannot include eggs produced by hens that never touch the ground and are kept in cages in a production facility building. The taxpayer responds that such a construction of the statute would limit farms to parcels of land used solely for the raising of crops, which directly 3. 15-DIVISION-AS PUB ARL 3 1-89 Revised 1-04 5.109 "originate from the land's productivity." The definition of agricultural products in §39-1-102(1.1) includes the products of "animal husbandry." Any construction of the statute that would inherently exclude from the definition of a farm all facilities engaged in animal husbandry would ignore the legislature's clearly expressed intention that the agricultural classification includes facilities engaged in such activities. Instead, we must, when possible, construe a statutory scheme to give consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all its parts. Mason v. Adams, 961 P. 2d 540 (Colo. App. 1997). However, the county also argues that some forms of animal husbandry do directly originate from the land's productivity. It urges a construction that would limit the definition of a farm engaged in animal husbandry to those facilities in which the animals are either fed with crops raised on the same land, are grazed on the land, or where the animals are kept on the ground and thus derive some benefit directly from the land. Such a construction, however, assumes factors not contained in the statute. Instead, in the absence of some ambiguity, we must apply the statute as written. Board of County Commissioners v. Bainbridge, Inc. 929 P. 2d 691 (Colo. 1996). 4. 15-DIVISION-AS PUB ARL 3 1-89 Revised 1-04 5.110 We conclude that the legislature intended to include facilities engaged in animal husbandry for profit within the definition of a farm set forth in §39-1-102(3.5), regardless of whether the animals involved ever touch the ground, are grazed on the land, or are fed with crops raised on the land. It is axiomatic that land used to support buildings is in productive use, and if those buildings are used in the production of agricultural products, then those products derive from the productivity of the land. See Morning Fresh Farms, Inc. v. Weld County Board of Equalization supra. Accordingly, based upon the stipulated facts, we agree with the trial court that the taxpayer's land was properly classified as agricultural pursuant to §39-1-102(1.6)(a)(I). II. The county also asserts that, even if the taxpayer's land is agricultural, certain equipment used in support of its egg production operations should be classified as fixtures subject to property taxation rather than as tax-exempt personal property. We also disagree with this contention. The parties stipulated that the items of property at issue consist of the heating, cooling, ventilation, plumbing, and electrical systems in the taxpayer's facilities, all of which are affixed to the buildings and used to 5. 15-DIVISION-AS PUB ARL 3 1-89 Revised 1-04 5.111 regulate the environment of the chickens. The county classified the equipment as fixtures and therefore subject to property tax. The taxpayer appealed, and the trial court reversed the county's determination and ruled that such equipment is, pursuant to statute, tax-exempt personal property. Pursuant to Colo. Const. art. X, §3, and §39-3-122, C.R.S. 1999, "agricultural equipment which is used on the farm or ranch in the production of agricultural products" is exempt from property tax. Section 39-1-102(1 .3) provides, in pertinent part: "Agricultural equipment which is used on the farm or ranch in the production of agricultural products" means any personal property used on a farm or ranch . . . for raising or breeding livestock for the primary purpose of obtaining a monetary profit and includes any mechanical system used on the farm or ranch for the conveyance and storage of animal products in a raw or unprocessed state, regardless of whether or not such mechanical system is affixed to real property. Section 39-1-102(4) provides, in pertinent part: `Fixtures' means those articles which, although once movable chattels, have become an accessory to and a part of real property by having been physically incorporated therein or annexed or affixed thereto. `Fixtures' includes systems for the heating, air conditioning, ventilation, sanitation, lighting, and 6. 15-DIVISION-AS PUB ARL 3 1-89 Revised 1-04 5.112 plumbing of such building. `Fixtures' does not include machinery, equipment, or other articles related to a commercial or industrial operation which are affixed to the real property for proper utilization of such articles. The issue before us, then, is whether the taxpayer's heating, cooling, ventilation, plumbing, and electrical systems, which are admittedly affixed to the buildings, constitute equipment "related to a commercial or industrial operation" that are affixed to the buildings for their "proper utilization" and, if so, whether that characterization supersedes the express language in §39- 1-102(4) defining "heating, air conditioning, ventilation, sanitation, lighting, and plumbing" systems as fixtures. This precise issue was presented to this court by these same parties, although relating at least in part to different equipment, in Del Mesa Farms v. Board of Equalization 956 P. 2d 661 (Colo. App. 1998). There, another division of this court determined, pursuant to the same statutory provisions 7. 15-DIVISION-AS PUB ARL 3 1-89 Revised 1-04 5113 cited above, that the taxpayer's "wooden slats used to nest the chickens and certain fans, foggers, heaters, and water curtains" were tax-exempt personal property even though they were affixed to the buildings. That division concluded that the statutes at issue expressed the relevant distinction as "between items that are related to the operation of a building in general and items that are related to the operation of a business in the building." Del Mesa Farms v. Board of Equalization supra, 956 P. 2d at 664. Another division of this court reached the same conclusion in Morning. Fresh Farms. Inc. v. Weld County Board of Equalization supra. There, the equipment at issue was affixed to the building and was used for gathering, conveying, washing, sorting, refrigerating, and storing eggs. The county argues that Morning Fresh Farms is distinguishable and that Del Mesa Farms was wrongly decided because its holding is plainly contrary to the express language of §39-1-102(4), and the county urges that we reach a different conclusion. We are not persuaded. On its face, §39-1-102(4) contains an ambiguity, for it is not inconceivable that a particular item of equipment could be both a system for "heating, air conditioning, ventilation, sanitation, lighting, and plumbing" 8. 15-DIVISION-AS PUB ARL 3 1-89 Revised 1-04 5.114 as well as being "machinery, equipment, or other articles related to a commercial or industrial operation which are affixed to the real property for proper utilization of such articles." See General Electric Co. v. Niemet 866 P. 2d 1361 (Colo. 1994) (a statute is ambiguous if it is reasonably susceptible of more than one construction). Indeed, the equipment at issue here plainly falls within both categories, and the statute is thus ambiguous when applied to that equipment. In our view, the Del Mesa Farms and Morning Fresh Farms courts, while not expressly noting an ambiguity, each chose to construe the statutory definition of fixtures in favor of the taxpayer in light of this inherent ambiguity. See Leprino v. Huddleston 902 P. 2d 962 (Colo. App. 1995) (ambiguous tax statute should be construed in favor of the taxpayer). To appropriately resolve the ambiguity, we adopt the rule set forth in Del Mesa Farms: machinery, equipment, or other articles that are affixed to a building and that are related to the operation of a business within that building are personal property, not fixtures. Here, the equipment is essential for the proper production of eggs and poultry, and it is not installed in the building or used for any other purpose. Accordingly, we conclude that it is equipment related to a commercial 9. 15-DIVISION-AS PUB ARL 3 1-89 Revised 1-04 5.115 operation, necessarily affixed to the buildings for its proper use, and thus it is tax-exempt personal property pursuant §39-1-102(4). The judgment if affirmed. JUDGE DAVIDSON and JUDGE DAILEY concur. to. 15-DIVISION-AS PUB ARL 3 1-89 Revised 1-04 LexisNexis(TM)CD Page 1 of 4 Document 1 of 1 Source: Colorado Primary Law/Colorado Judicial Decisions/COURT OF APPEALS OF COLORADO/2002/50 P.3d 916::Home Depot USA, Inc. v. Pueblo County Bd. of Comm'rs::May 9, 2002, Decided Home Depot USA,Inc., Petitioner-Appellant,v. Pueblo County Board of Commissioners, Respondent- Appellee,and Colorado State Board of Assessment Appeals,Appellee. COURT OF APPEALS OF COLORADO, DIVISION ONE 50 P.3d 916; 2002 Colo.App.LEXIS 705 Court of Appeals No.00CA2328 May 9,2002,Decided Editorial Information: Subsequent History Released for Publication July 16, 2002. Editorial Information:Prior History Colorado State Board of Assessment Appeals No. 36955. Disposition ORDER AFFIRMED. Counsel Munger Chadwick, P.L.C., Mark E. Chadwick, Tucson, Arizona, for Petitioner- Appellant Daniel C. Kogovsek, Pueblo County Attomey, Tami Yellico, Assistant County Attorney, Terry Hart, Assistant County Attorney, Pueblo, Colorado, for Respondent-Appellee. No Appearance for Appellee. Judges: Opinion by JUDGE KAPELKE. Metzger and Rothenberg,JJ., concur. Opinion Opinion by: KAPELKE (50 P.3d 918) Opinion by JUDGE KAPELKE In this property tax case, petitioner, Home Depot USA, Inc. (taxpayer), appeals from an order of the Board of Assessment Appeals(BAA)concerning the taxable personal property at taxpayers store in Pueblo County. The BAA rejected taxpayers challenges to the valuation and classification of the subject property for the 1998 and 1999 tax years, as assigned by the county assessor and previously upheld by respondent, the Pueblo County Board of Commissioners(BOCC).We affirm. After taxpayer's petition for abatement or refund was denied by the BOCC,taxpayer appealed to the BAA. In de novo evidentiary proceedings before the BAA, taxpayer and the BOCC presented evidence in support of their opposing valuation and classification positions. Taxpayer's appraisal witness valued the subject property, hundreds of items of personal property at the store, at a total of$480,940 for each of the two tax years. In reaching this valuation,the witness relied primarily on a market approach analysis, using certain used equipment pricing guides when available and pricing information from various web sites for other items.The items were valued as of December 31, 1998, and this valuation was applied to both tax years. Taxpayer's valuation did not include certain items that taxpayer contended should be classified as real property, rather than as personal property. Specifically, taxpayer's appraisal witness asserted that a pneumatic tubing system used for cash deliveries within the building and a sensormatic system in the building used to prevent theft constituted real property fixtures. That witness also opined that exterior signs and nonfunctioning kitchen and bath displays constructed in the building should be classified as real property. In contrast, the BOCC presented evidence in support of the county assessor's valuation of the subject Aga/8Q LexisNexis(TM) CD Page 2 Of 4 property at a total of$ 1,455,586 for the 1998 tax year, and $ 1,453,828 for the 1999 tax year. These valuations were based solely on the application of a cost approach analysis and included those items in dispute that taxpayer contended were properly classified as real property. Following the hearing,the BAA denied taxpayer's petition, thus upholding the valuation and classification of the subject property assigned by the county assessor.Although the BAA found the market approach to be an appropriate methodology here, it ultimately found taxpayer's market approach evidence to be unpersuasive because of various deficiencies.Based on its consideration of ail the valuation evidence,the BAA found that there was insufficient information to determine an accurate valuation under the market approach, but found that the BOCC's cost approach evidence was sufficient to show that the assigned valuations were cored. The BAA was also ultimately persuaded that each of the disputed items should be classified as personal property. Taxpayer first contends that the BAA's valuation determinations cannot stand because the assessor and the BAA failed to give appropriate consideration to the market approach as required by law.We perceive no reversible error in the BAA's rulings on the valuation issues under the applicable standard of review. As noted by taxpayer, a reviewing court must set aside a BAA decision if it reflects a failure to abide by the statutory scheme for calculating property tax assessments. Bd. of Assessment Appeals v. E.E. (50 P.3d 919} Sonnenberg&Sons, Inc., 797 P.2d 27 (Colo. 1990); see§24-4-106(7), (11)(e), C.R.S. 2001. By statute, the valuation of personal property for property tax purposes must be determined by"appropriate consideration"of such of the three appraisal approaches as are applicable to the appraisal of the property, that is,the cost approach, the market approach, and the income approach. Sections 39-_1-103(5)(a), 39-1-104 (12.3)(a)(I), C.R.S. 2001. Consequently, if an approach to value is applicable, it must be given appropriate consideration by the assessor, as well as by the BAA, as the trier of fact. Cherry Hills Country Club v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 832 P.2d 1105 (Colo. App. 1992); see Bd. of Assessment Appeals v. E.E. Sonnenberg& Sons, Inc., supra. In this regard, we note that the proceedings before the BAA were de novo and that the scope of our review is limited to the propriety of the BAA's determinations, not those of the assessor. See§§39-2-125(1)(f), 39-10- 114.5(2), C.R.S.2001. Thus, if the BAA's determinations are sustainable, any impropriety in the limited extent of the assessors consideration of the market approach would be harmless error, providing no basis for reversal of the BAA's ruling. See Cherry Hills Country Club v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, supra;see also Johnston v. Park County Bd. of Equalization, 979 P.2d 578 (Colo. App. 1999). Contrary to taxpayer's argument, the BAA did not disregard or fail to consider its valuation evidence under the market approach. Rather, the BAA expressly considered and weighed that evidence, but ultimately found it unpersuasive. The BAA noted that taxpayer's appraisal witness failed to provide descriptive testimony and supporting documentation specifically indicating how he derived his market valuations of numerous personal property items from his pricing sources. For example, the year of manufacture was not provided for any of the personal property items, and make and model information was lacking as to numerous items. Taxpayer also did not submit any detailed information from the used equipment pricing guides themselves. The BAA further noted that taxpayer's appraisal witness applied the same valuation to both tax years, notwithstanding the additions and deletions of various items of personal property from year to year,thus calling into question the accuracy of the inventory upon which taxpayer's valuations were based. Taxpayers appraisal witness also apparently used the same pricing information for each tax year, without adjustment for any particular tax year. The BOCC's valuation witness, a personal property department supervisor in the assessor's office, testified that he had considered all three approaches to valuation before determining the property's value. He ultimately based the valuation on the cost approach. He elected not to use the income approach because none of the property items were leased,and he did not use the market approach because he had been unable to find any comparable sales in the jurisdiction. He further noted that the assessor's office had attempted to find sales outside the jurisdiction, but because Home Depot deals directly with the manufacturer, comparable sales information was unavailable. LexisNexis(TM) CD Page 3 of 4 The BAA concluded that the market value approach was an appropriate method of valuation, but that without detailed information on the source and year of manufacture, it was difficult to determine whether the taxpayer's market valuation was correct. It is the function of the BM, not a reviewing court, to weigh the evidence and resolve any conflicts. Bd. of Assessment Appeals v. E.E. Sonnenberg&Sons, Inc., supra. Moreover, the BAA, as the trier of fact, is not bound to accept as dispositive even the uncontroverted evidence of a single party, but may properly consider any reasonable inferences and circumstances tending to weaken or discredit such evidence. Weingarten v. Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 876 P.2d 118(Cob.App. 1994). Under the applicable standard of review; we will not reweigh the evidence presented or substitute our judgment for that of the BAA as to its factual determinations ultimately(50 P.3d 920}crediting the BOCC's cost approach valuations and discrediting taxpayer's market approach valuations. Because the BAA's factual findings as to the appropriate valuation of the subject property for the 1998 and 1999 tax years are supported by competent and substantial evidence in the record as a whole, its valuation determinations will not be disturbed on review. See§24-4-106(7), (11)(e); Lawrence v. Bd. of Equalization, 989 P.2d 232(Cob.App. 1999). II. Next,taxpayer contends that the BAA erroneously classified each of the disputed items as personal property. Again,we find no basis for reversal. The ultimate determination as to the appropriate classification of property for property tax purposes involves mixed issues of law and fact Thus, under the applicable standard of review, the BAA's classification determinations must be sustained if they have a reasonable basis in law and are supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Johnston v. Park County Bd. of Equalization, supra;see§24-4-106(7), (11)(e). Furthermore, the burden of proof in BAA proceedings is on the taxpayer to establish the basis for any reclassification claims concerning the subject property. See Palmer v. Bd. of Equalization, 957 P.2d 348 (Cob.App. 1998); see also Johnston v. Park County Bd. of Equalization, supra. For property tax purposes, "personal property'is generally defined as everything that is the subject of ownership and that is not included within the term"real property."Section 39-1-102(11), C.R.S. 2001. Pursuant to§39-1-102(14)(c), C.R.S. 2001, "real property" is defined as including"improvements,"which, pursuant to§39-1-102(7), C.R.S. 2001, include all structures, buildings, and fixtures erected upon or affixed to land. The term"fixtures" is generally defined as items that, although once movable chattels, have become an accessory to and a part of real property by having been physically incorporated in or affixed to it Section 39- 1-102(4), C.R.S.2001. Nevertheless, these statutory provisions go on to exclude from the definition of "fixtures""machinery,equipment, or other articles related to a commercial or industrial operation which are affixed to the real property for proper utilization of such articles."Such items are specifically included within the statutory definition of"personal property" under corresponding provisions of§ 39-1-102(11). A.The Pneumatic and Sensormatic Systems The pneumatic and sensormatic systems have been affixed to or physically incorporated in the building and serve different business needs in the operation of taxpayer's store. Taxpayer sought to reclassify these items from personal property to real property as fixtures, but the BAA was not persuaded. In distinguishing between real property fixture systems and personal property items under the foregoing statutory provisions, a division of this court ruled that a distinction must be drawn between items that are related to the operation of a building in general and items that are related to the operation of a business in the - building. Del Mesa Farms v. Bd. of Equalization, 956 P.2d 661 (Colo.App. 1998). Specifically, the division in that case held that, regardless whether a particular item is affixed to a building and may otherwise constitute a fixture,the item constitutes personal property if its use is primarily tied to a business operation. Applying this test,the BAA ruled that the pneumatic and sensrnmatic systems are primarily tied to the business operations of taxpayer and should therefore be classified as personal property. Because these classification determinations have a reasonable basis in law under§39-1-102(4), (11)and are supported by LexisNexis(TM)CD Page 4 of 4 the evidentiary record, the BAA's ruling as to these items will not be disturbed on review. See§24-4-106(7), (11)(e); Del Mesa Farms v. Bd. of Equalization, supra. Contrary to taxpayer's argument, it is immaterial whether these systems could also be used by other types of businesses that could(50 P.3d 921)occupy the building.The determinative issue is whether these items are primarily related to business operations in the building, as opposed to primarily serving the operations of a building in general. See Del Mesa Farms v. Bd. of Equalization,supra. We also note that, in support of its arguments in this regard,taxpayer relies on certain provisions in a former version of one of the reference manuals published by the Property Tax Administrator(PTA). However, the PTA has since revised this reference manual concerning this issue, and it now incorporates the test set forth in Del Mesa Farms. See 5 Assessors Reference Library§II, at 2.21 (rev. Mar.2000). B. The Kitchen and Bath Displays and the Exterior Signs The kitchen and bath displays and the exterior signs have also been affixed to the building or the land. Taxpayer sought to reclassify these items from personal property to real property improvements, but again the BAA was not persuaded. Resolving the conflicts in the evidence concerning these items adversely to taxpayer's position, the BAA found that the kitchen and bath displays are of a temporary nature, having a considerably shorter life than that of the building itself,and that the signs are not permanently attached, but instead could be easily removed. Based on these factual determinations, the BAA ruled that there was an insufficient basis to reclassify these items from personal property to real property. Again,we may not reweigh the evidence presented or substitute our judgment for that of the BAA on such factual matters.The BAA's classification determinations as to these items must be sustained on review, because they have a reasonable basis in law and are supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. See§24-4-106(7), (11)(e);Johnston v. Park County Bd. of Equalization, supra. Taxpayer's remaining contentions of error are also unpersuasive. Finally, in view of our disposition of the issues,we need not address the alternative arguments advanced by the BOCC. The BAA's order is affirmed. JUDGE METZGER and JUDGE ROTHENBERG concur. ®2004 Matthew Bender&Company, Inc.,.a member of the LexisNexis Group.All rights reserved. Use of this product is subject to the restrictions and terms and conditions of the Matthew Bender Master Agreement. COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS Court of Appeals No. 02CA0837 Colorado State Board of Assessment Appeals No. 39361 Boulder Country Club, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Boulder County Board of Commissioners, Respondent-Appellee, and Colorado State Board of Assessment Appeals, Appellee. ORDER REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS Division V Opinion by JUDGE TAUBMAN Casebolt and Nieto, JJ. , concur April 24, 2003 William A. McLain, P.C. , William A. McLain, Denver, Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellant H. Lawrence Hoyt, County Attorney, Robert R. Gunning, Assistant County Attorney, Boulder, Colorado, for Respondent-Appellee No Appearance for Appellee L_. 1 In this property tax case, Boulder Country Club (taxpayer) , appeals from an order of the Board of Assessment Appeals (BAA) denying taxpayer' s abatement and refund petition. We reverse and remand. The facts are not disputed. The taxpayer' s property is used as a golf course country club. This appeal involves the tax years 1999 and 2000. The property' s stipulated actual value for the tax year 1999 was $5, 700, 000. In tax year 2000, the Boulder County Assessor set the actual value of the property at $7, 433, 900. Taxpayer filed a protest with the assessor and sought adjustment for the tax year 2000 property valuation. After the assessor denied its protest, taxpayer appealed to the Boulder County Board of Equalization (BCBOE) . BCBOE denied taxpayer' s appeal and mailed notices of denial to taxpayer in August 2000. Taxpayer received these notices, but did not appeal further. In August 2001, taxpayer filed a petition for abatement and refund regarding the property' s 2000 valuation. The parties stipulated that there was no change in the property between 1999 and 2000 that would affect its actual value. After a hearing, the BAA denied taxpayer' s petition. The BAA concluded that taxpayer' s petition fell within a statutory provision that prohibits an abatement or refund of taxes based on overvaluation if the taxpayer has already protested the valuation for the same tax year 2 and received a written notice of determination. This appeal followed. On appeal, taxpayer contends the BAA erred in denying its petition for abatement. Specifically, taxpayer argues that the abatement petition was based on "erroneous valuation for assessment, " not on "overvaluation, " so that the statutory prohibition is inapplicable. We agree. Appellate courts review interpretations of statutes de novo. Pueblo Bancorporation v. Lindoe, Inc. , 63 P. 3d 353, 361 (Colo. 2003) . When construing statutes, a court' s primary purpose is to effectuate the intent of the General Assembly. To determine intent, courts first look to the statutory language, giving words and phrases their commonly accepted meaning. Archibold v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 58 P. 3d 1031, 1038 (Colo. 2002) . In addition, courts should give effect to every word where possible and not presume the General Assembly used language idly. Colo. Ground Water Comm'n v. Eagle Peak Farms, Ltd. , 919 P.2d 212, 219 (Colo. 1996) . However, courts will not follow a statutory construction that leads to an absurd result. Lamb v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co. , P. 3d (Colo. App. No. 01CA2544, Nov. 7, 2002) . All real and personal property is appraised and valued for 3 property tax purposes by the county assessor using a reassessment cycle consisting of two full calendar years. Sections 39-1- 103 (5) (a) , 39-1-104 (10.2) (a) , C.R. S. 2002 . However, an assessor may increase or decrease a property' s actual value in an intervening year for "any unusual conditions, " which are specifically defined. Section 39-1-104 (11) (b) (I) , C.R.S. 2002; see also 24, Inc. v. Bd. of Equalization, 800 P. 2d 1366 (Colo. App. 1990) . The valuation of a taxpayer' s property for both years in the reassessment cycle should be the same, absent statutory exceptions. Cherry Hills Country Club v. Bd. of County Comm' rs, 832 P. 2d 1105, 1109 (Colo. App. 1992) . To contest the tax assessed on real property, a taxpayer may either file a protest and adjustment pursuant to § 39-5-122, C.R.S. 2002, or initiate an abatement and refund procedure under § 39-10-114, C.R.S. 2002. Prop. Tax Adm' r v. Prod. Geophysical Servs. , Inc. , 860 P.2d 514, 519 (Colo. 1993) . The protest and adjustment procedure and abatement and refund procedure are separate and independent mechanisms for determining property tax disputes and are governed by different statutes. Huerfano County Bd. of County Comm' rs v. Atl. Richfield Co. , 976 P.2d 893, 896 (Colo. App. 1999) . On the one hand, taxpayer argues that Cherry Hills Country 4 Club, supra, 832 P.2d at 1109, governs our analysis. However, we conclude Cherry Hills is not determinative of the issue before us. In Cherry Hills, the property was valued at $9, 400, 000 for the tax year 1989 and $6, 500, 000 for 1990. There, the taxpayer sought to reduce the property valuation for 1989 to the 1990 amount. A division of this court concluded that the valuation of the taxpayer' s land for the 1989 tax year should be reduced to the 1990 valuation because the board of equalization in fact revalued the property at $6, 500, 000 for 1990. In contrast, here, there were no adjustments made to the property' s valuation for the intervening year in 2000. Specifically, the parties agree that there were no changes to the property between 1999 and 2000 that would affect its value. On the other hand, the county argues that Yale Investments, Inc. v. Property Tax Administrator, 897 P.2d 890 (Colo. App. 1995) , determines the outcome in this case. We also disagree with the county. In Yale, a division of this court rejected a taxpayer' s argument that an abatement petition was based on an illegal tax or erroneous valuation rather than an overvaluation. There, the taxpayer' s property was valued at $1,200, 000 for the tax years 1989 and 1990. The taxpayer' s predecessor filed an abatement petition for both tax years based on overvaluation. The abatement 5 petition was granted for tax year 1989, but not for tax year 1990. On appeal, the taxpayer argued that the 1990 taxes were illegal or erroneous because the abatement petition for the tax year 1989 had been granted. The Yale division concluded that an abatement for the tax year 1989 did not render the 1990 tax illegal or erroneous because the 1990 abatement petition was specifically based on overvaluation. The division held that the 1990 abatement petition was statutorily barred because the taxpayer had previously filed a protest and adjustment appeal based on an overvaluation. See § 39-10-114 (1) (a) (I) (D) , C.R.S. 2002 (this addition to the statute became effective in 1990) . In contrast, here, the abatement petition is not based on overvaluation, but on an erroneous valuation for assessment. Therefore, Yale is not determinative of the outcome. Taxpayer also relies on Board of Assessment Appeals v. Benbrook, 735 P.2d 860 (Colo. 1987) , to support its position that its petition for abatement is based upon "erroneous valuation for assessment" and not on "overvaluation. " There, a residential building was converted from apartments to condominiums in 1979, an intervening year. The assessor considered the conversion a change in the use of the land and increased the property' s valuation. Based on a former version of § 39-10-114, the supreme court concluded that the tax increase was partially illegal and held 6 that " [t]here is no need to characterize the tax paid as wholly illegal before the taxpayer may obtain abatement and refund. " Bd. of Assessment Appeals v. Benbrook, supra, 735 P.2d at 869. In a footnote, the Benbrook court noted that the taxpayers may have been entitled to seek relief under the abatement and refund procedure without first filing a protest seeking adjustment because "they could argue that their taxes were levied erroneously or illegally due to erroneous valuation for assessment because the assessor changed the valuation for assessment in a nonbase year. " Bd. of Assessment Appeals v. Benbrook, supra, 735 P.2d at 869 n. 16. Taxpayer argues that because Benbrook was decided before "overvaluation" was included as a basis for abatement and refund, the court' s discussion of "erroneous valuation for assessment" could not have been referring to "overvaluation." The county, however, argues that Benbrook is distinguishable from the present case because the assessor here did not increase the value of the property for the intervening year. Instead, the assessor valued the property at $7, 433, 900 for both tax years 1999 and 2000. The parties entered into a stipulation to reduce the property' s value for 1999, and this value reduction did not render the 2000 valuation erroneous. We reject the county' s contention, based on Benbrook, that 7 the term "erroneous valuation for assessment" applies only to actions by the assessor. The abatement and refund statute is not so limited. See § 39-10-114 (1) (a) (I) (A) , C.R.S. 2002 . Accordingly, we engage in a statutory analysis and conclude that taxpayer' s position is correct. A petition for abatement and refund of real property taxes is governed by § 39-10-114 (1) (a) (I) , C.R. S. 2002, which provides in pertinent part: (A) Except as otherwise provided . . . if taxes have been levied erroneously or illegally, whether due to erroneous valuation for assessment, irregularity in levying, clerical error, or overvaluation, the treasurer shall report the amount thereof to the board of county commissioners, which shall proceed to abate such taxes in the manner provided by law. (D) No abatement or refund of taxes shall be made based upon the ground of overvaluation of property if an objection or protest to such valuation has been made and a notice of determination has been mailed to the taxpayer . . . . (Emphasis added. ) Here, taxpayer concedes that it previously filed a protest and adjustment for the tax year 2000. Nevertheless, taxpayer argues that the prohibition in § 39-10-114 (1) (a) (I) (D) does not apply because the abatement petition was based on an "erroneous valuation for assessment" rather than "overvaluation." We agree. Specifically, the abatement petition provides: 8 The p[ur]pose of the abatement petition is to conform the 2000 value of the subject property to the 1999 value which was established by stipulation dated Jan. 18, 2001. A copy of the 1999 stipulation is attached. The 2000 value is an erroneous valuation for assessment pursuant to the Colorado Court of Appeals decision in Cherry Hills Country Club [supra] . (Emphasis added. ) We agree with the county that the language a taxpayer uses in an abatement petition is not determinative. See Wvler/Pebble Creek Ranch v. Colo. Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 883 P.2d 597, 600 (Colo. App. 1994) (finding challenge to a reclassification of property was an overvaluation challenge rather than an appeal of an erroneous or illegal levy as the taxpayer asserted) . Therefore, we consider the substance of taxpayer' s argument, and we conclude that taxpayer properly characterized its abatement petition as based on an "erroneous valuation for assessment. " The phrase "erroneous valuation for assessment" as used in the current § 39-10-114 (1) (a) (I) (A) has not been interpreted by a Colorado appellate court. Cf. Bd. of Assessment Appeals v. Benbrook, supra (overruling decision that phrase "erroneous assessment" as used in former § 39-10-114 meant "more than mere over-assessment and referred to a tax levy that for any reason is wholly illegal or invalid") ; see also Gates Rubber Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 770 P.2d 1189 (Colo. 1989) . In Wyler/Pebble Creek Ranch, supra, 883 P.2d at 600, a 9 division of this court concluded that if the reclassification of property is "totally dependent upon a factual determination, i.e. , the actual use of the property at the time the taxes are levied, " the reclassification involves an issue of overvaluation. There, the taxpayer' s property was reclassified from agricultural to residential property. The taxpayer argued that the property continued to be used as agricultural property, despite its reclassification. Here, in contrast, whether taxpayer is entitled to an abatement does not involve a factual determination. Taxpayer' s abatement petition asserts that, as a matter of law, absent unusual conditions that are not at issue here, the assessments for 1999 and 2000 must be the same. Thus, its argument requires a legal, rather than a factual, determination. Therefore, we conclude the petition is based on an "erroneous valuation for assessment. " See Wyler/Pebble Creek Ranch v. Colo. Bd. of Assessment Appeals, supra, 883 P.2d at 600. To conclude that a taxpayer' s request to change the valuation of his or her property under the abatement procedure is always based on an overvaluation would encompass all abatement petitions and render the remaining bases for abatement petitions in § 39-1- 114 (1) (a) (I) (A) meaningless. See Colo. Ground Water Comm'n v. Eagle Peak Farms, Ltd. , supra. 10 Because we must read statutes as a whole and give each part of a statute consistent and harmonious effect, Pediatric Neurosurgery, P.C. v. Russell, 44 P.3d 1063, 1068 (Colo. 2002) , we reject the county' s argument that "overvaluation" as used in § 39- 10-114 (1) (a) (I) (A) is different from "overvaluation" as used in § 39-10-114 (1) (a) (I) (D) . Accordingly, we conclude that taxpayer' s petition for abatement and refund is not precluded by § 39-10-114 (1) (a) (I) (D) because it is based upon an erroneous valuation for assessment -- a legal issue -- rather than overvaluation -- a factual issue. Thus, "erroneous valuation for assessment" as used in § 39-10- 114 (1) (a) (I) (A) refers to a legal issue. In contrast, "overvaluation" as used in § 39-10-114 (1) (a) (I) (A) and (D) refers to a factual issue. The order is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. JUDGE CASEBOLT and JUDGE NIETO concur. 11 Hello