HomeMy WebLinkAbout20110815.tiff DISTRICT COURT, WELD COUNTY, COLORADO FLED N V'__22 COUNTY
Court address: 901 9th Avenue,P. O. Box 2038 C COUF
Greeley, Co. 80623 - Ph: 970-351-7300
2G 1 MAR 23 P11 ^: '1
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS,
WELD COUNTY, COLORADO
Petitioner, COURT USE ONLY
v.
RIO GRANDE CANYON PROPERTIES, INC.,
a Colorado corporation,
Respondent
v.
BRUCE T. BAKER, STEPHANIE L. ARRIES,
BETHANY SALZMAN,
Third Party Defendants.
Trenton H. Parker,
111 E. Bridge Street, Case No. 11-CV-19
Brighton, Co. 80601 Division: 3
303-654-1048
RIO GRAND CANYON PROPERTIES' CORPORATE RESOLUTION
PURSUANT TO C.R.S. 13-1-127 (2)
COMES now, Rio Grande Canyon Properties, Inc. a Colorado corporation, by its corporate
Vice President, Trenton H. Parker, pursuant to C.R.S. §13-1-127 (1)-(a)-(2), and submits
the attached executed "Corporate Resolution" pursuant to the Court's Order of March 8,
2011.
Submitted By:
renton H. Parker,
111 E. Bridge St.,
Brighton, Co. 80601,
303-654-1048
•
C Gang m (hi eck oh S C ( -�Otira j 2011-0815
3/ 25/// 3 -r/
RIO GRANDE CANYON PROPERTIES, INC.
A Colorado corporation
111 East Bridge Street,
Brighton,Colorado 80601
303-654-1048
CORPORATE RESOLUTION
Pursuant to Article II,Paragraph 2. of the BY-LAW of Rio Grande Canyon Properties, Inc., a
"Special Meeting" of the Board of Directors was called at 11:00 a.m.,on Saturday, February 5,
2011 to conduct special business as a result of Marjorie A. Kessling,Rio Grande's corporate
Registered Agent, having been served a"Summons and Complaint" from the Weld County
Commissioners charging"Rio Grande" with various zoning code violations; Case No. 11-CV-19.
regarding its 50 acre ranch property located at WCR 8., in Weld County, Colorado.
With 20% or more of the outstanding shares of the Company's stock being represented,the
meeting of the Board of Directors of Rio Grande Canyon Properties, was called to order by
Marjorie A. Kessling,the Company's Secretary-Treasurer and member of the Board of
Directors. The meeting was conducted in person and by phone. After reviewing Weld County's
Complaint it was unanimously agreed by all present to appoint Trenton H. Parker to serve as
the Vice President and member of the Board of Directors of Rio Grande Canyon Properties and
to empower Mr. Parker to represent Rio Grande as its attorney pursuant to C.R.S. 13-1-127 (2).
since Rio Grande does not have more than three stockholders and their was no amount of
$10,000 or more being claimed in Weld County's law suit. Mr. Parker agreed that he would take
on the task of representing Rio Grande,"pro bono" and that he would prepare the necessary
responses and counter claims as was thought best by him. With no further business to be taken
up, the meeting of the Board of Directors was concluded at 12:15 P.M. 2/5/2011.
THEREFORE; It Was Resolved,By Unanimous Vote and Consent and by Corporate Resolution,
that: Trenton IL Parker be and is appointed to the post of corporate Vice President and a
member of the Board of Directors, of Rio Grande Canyon Properties, Inc. and is authorized,
forthwith,to act as Rio Grande's attorney in the Weld County v. Rio Grande 11-CV-19 law suit.
c 74V-atiAA .
MA . E A. KESSLING, Q. ; „s,CORPORATE SECRETARY, F Q f .`o 94 .r RIO GRANDE CANYON, : 0 ' y ;: = ,1
PROPERTIES, INC. ► :y t o �` :v f
pofre//
a �� Gn •o
a9 ,
DISTRICT COURT, WELD COUNTY, COLORADO
Court address: 901 9th Avenue, P. O. Box 2038
Greeley, Co. 80623 - Ph: 970-351-7300
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS,
WELD COUNTY, COLORADO
Petitioner, COURT USE ONLY
v.
RIO GRANDE CANYON PROPERTIES, INC.,
a Colorado corporation,
Respondent
v.
BRUCE T. BAKER, STEPHANIE L. ARRIES,
BETHANY SALZMAN,
Third Party Defendants.
Trenton H. Parker,
111 E. Bridge Street, Case No. 11-CV-19
Brighton, Co. 80601 Division: 3
303-654-1048
RIO GRANDE'S AMENDED ANSWERS TO VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR
PRELIMINARY AND PERMANENT INJUNCTION; MOTIONS TO DISMISS
FOR CAUSES; COUNTER CLAIMS,AND DEMAND FOR A JURY TRIAL.
COMES now, Rio Grande Canyon Properties, Inc. ("Rio Grande"), a Colorado
corporation, by its corporate Vice President, Trenton H. Parker ("Parker"), pursuant to
C.R.S. §13-1-127 (1)-(a)-(2), and files the following Answers to the Board of County
Commissioners,Weld County, Colorado's ("Weld") Complaint; Motions To Dismiss
Complaint; Counter Claims, and Demand for a Jury Trial:
RIO GRANDE'S ANSWERS TO WELD'S COMPLAINT
1. As to Paragraph 1. of Weld's "General Allegations," Rio Grande admits that Weld is
seeking relief under Rule 65 C.R.C.P. and C.R.S., §30-28-124. As to the rest of the
allegations contained in Paragraph 1.,Weld fails to state any specific facts supporting any
specific claim of"irreparable injury, loss or damage"as required by the aforementioned
Rule and Statute, to justify injunctive relief. Furthermore, while Weld alleges that,
unspecified County Codes are being violated, Weld failed to provide any specific facts to
support said allegations and further fails to state any claims upon which injunctive relief
could be granted. Thus, Rio Grande is without sufficient knowledge or information at this
time, to either admit or deny the allegations contained in Paragraph 1. of Weld's
Complaint, and therefore Rio Grande denies the same.
2. As to the allegations contained in Paragraph 2. of the Weld's Complaint, Rio Grande
is without sufficient knowledge or information at this time, to either admit or deny the
allegations contained therein, and therefore, Rio Grande denies the same.
3. As to Paragraph 4. of Weld's Complaint, Rio Grande admits the factual statements
referring to facts which are a matter of public record - including Weld's acknowledgment
that Rio Grande has been the true owner of the ranch property since July 14, 2006 which
Bruce T. Baker ("Baker") and Stephanie Arries ("Arries") have always known (See
Paragraph 6 of Weld's Complaint.).
4. As to Paragraph 5. of Weld's Complaint, Rio Grande acknowledges that on February
13, 2007 Weld County Commissioners authorized legal action against Land Home
Development and Trenton Parker (07CV189 - not- 07CV 179), neither of which were
legal owners of the subject property. Furthermore, Rio Grande claims that it has never
received legal notice of any zoning code violation(s) regarding the subject property by any
Weld County official. Furthermore, Rio Grande alleges that, Arries has never specifically
received any authorization from the Weld County Commissioners to bring this legal
action against Rio Grande—(In. Re. 11CV19). Rio Grande further alleges that, neither
Land Home or Parker ever received any notice of the Weld County Commissioners
hearing of February 13, 2007, as the notice of said hearing was intentionally sent to a
wrong address which had nothing to do with either Rio Grande, Land Home or Parker.
5. As to Paragraph 6. of Weld's Complaint, Rio Grande admits to the facts alleged
therein. Rio Grande claims that while Rio Grande's Deed to said property was recorded
on July 2, 2008, Parker informed Weld's agent, Bethney Salzman ("Salzman") by phone
in early March of 2007, after Arries filed the 07CV189 Complaint that, the owner of the
subject property was Rio Grande and not Land Home or Parker. However, Arries has
chosen to ignored said notices until late in November of 2010.
6. As to Paragraph 7. of Weld' Complaint, Rio Grande admits the facts, which are
contained in the public record and referred to as Weld's "Exhibit A and B".
7. As to Paragraph 8. of Weld's Complaint, Rio Grande, at this time, is without sufficient
knowledge or information to either admit or deny the allegations in said paragraph and
therefore, denies the same. Weld does not specify what company or whose employee.
8. As to Paragraph 9. of Weld's Complaint, Rio Grande admits in part and denies in part,
the allegations contained, therein.
9. As to paragraph 10. of Weld's Complaint, Rio Grande is without sufficient knowledge
or information to either admit or deny the allegations contained therein, and therefore
denies the same.
10. As to Paragraph 11. of Weld's Complaint, Rio Grande admits that Marjorie Kessling
("Kessling") is Rio Grande's Registered Agent but denies that Kessling has ever been
served with any notice regarding any specific zoning code violations on the subject
property; and denies Kessling is aware of the obligations referred to in Paragraph 11 of
the Complaint. Rio Grande denies said subject property is in violation of any zoning code.
11. As to Paragraph 12. of Weld's Complaint, Rio Grande denies the unsupported
allegations contained therein, and alleges that Weld fails to state specific acts or claims
under which injunctive relief could be granted
12. As to Paragraph 13. of Weld's Complaint, Rio Grande denies the unsupported
allegations contained therein, and alleges that Weld fails to state a claim on which relief
could be granted. Furthermore, Weld fails to give any specific facts, examples or details
as to how anything on the subject property has, is,will or might- cause any resident of
Weld County to have their person, health, safety and/or general welfare endangered.
Furthermore, Weld fails to provide any specific details, examples, or affidavits which
specifically supports the broad subjective allegations of Weld's claims.
13. As to Paragraph 14. of Weld's Complaint, Rio Grande is without sufficient knowledge
or information to respond to the phrase "That at all times material hereto, Rio Grande
has been the owner and possibly the occupant" of the subject property. Therefore, Rio
Grande denies the same. Weld fails to provide any specific dates or time frames for which
any informed answer can be given.
14. As to Paragraphs 15., 16. and 17. of Weld's Complaint, Rio Grande denies that it has
ever been given legal notice by Weld and furthermore, Rio Grande denies that it has
failed or refused to do or not do anything or/that there is anything on the subject property
that would constitute junk or/that Rio Grande is running or maintaining a"non-
commercial junk yard" or/that there is anything on said property that, would require Rio
Grande to screen off its property. Weld fails to state, offer or provide any factual basis to
support Weld's claims that anyone's health, safety, or well fair is being endangered, as
required by law, before the court can grant Weld's request for injunctive relief. Making
broad blood curtailing unsupported generalizations does not a fact make.
15. As to Paragraphs 19, 20, 21 and 22 of the Weld's Complaint, Rio Grande denies
Weld's unsupported claims that there are any "commercial vehicles" as defined by
Colorado state statutes, on said property; or/that there is currently or has there ever been,
any form of"commercial business" being conducted on or from said property.
16. As to Paragraphs 23, 24, 25, 26 and 27 of Weld's Complaint, Rio Grande denies
Weld's unsupported claims and allegations that notice has ever been given to Rio Grande,
regarding any violations of any Weld County zoning code. Rio Grande denies that,there
are any recreational vehicles or camper trailers on said ranch property which are being
used as dwelling or living units. Rio Grande denies that there is or will be any form of
irreparable harm to anyone in Weld County. Rio Grande further denies that, there is any
existing Colorado or Weld County law which prohibits anyone from "owning, using,
maintaining or storing" a recreational vehicle(s) and/or camper/trailer(s) on a 50 acre
agriculturally zoned property. Weld's recitation and request for relief pursuant to
Paragraphs A. through J. have already been address in Rio Grande's answers in
Paragraph 1. through Paragraph 16., as sat forth, herein.
MOTION TO DISMISS DUE TO LACK OF FORMAL AUTHORIZATION
FROM WELD COUNTY COMMISSIONERS TO BRING THIS ACTION
17. Upon reason, information and belief, Rio Grande, moves to have this case dismissed
because neither Baker or Arries ever received any formal authorization from the Weld
County Commissioners to file this action specifically against Rio Grande. What ever may
have taken place with Land-Home or Parker is not material to this specific case. Rio
Grande has never been contacted by anyone from Weld County during the past 5 years of
its ownership of said property even though Arries has had actual and constructive notice
of said ownership.
MOTION TO DISMISS
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL & RES JUDICATA
18. Rio Grande claims that, Weld is bared from bringing this action on the grounds that
Weld has already had is day in Court under Case No. 02CV-558. There is not a single
issue raid in the present case that was not raised in the 02CV558 case. During a hearing
in 2004 regarding said case, the Weld County Attorney moved to dismiss the case because
the County discovered that it had no case. It is an undisputed fact that there are no issues
which are being raised in the current case (11CV19) that were not litigated in the
02CV558 case and/or the 07CV189 case. Weld County is attempting to litigate the very
same issues in the present case as were litigated in the 02CV558 and 07CV189 cases.
During the trial which took place on 5/4/2004,Weld County, on its own motion, moved to
dismiss said case due to lack of evidence. Thereafter, Weld waited three (3) years before it
filed its 07CV189 case, which covered the very same issue that were addressed in the
02CV558. The current case (11CV19) covers the same claims and the same ranch
property which was addressed in the two previous cases. Additionally, public notice
regarding the purchase of said ranch property, by Rio Grande, was made known to
Baker and Arries in the early part of 2007. Yet, Baker and Arries waited for 4 years
before filing the current case which covers the very same issues that wear addressed in
the two previous cases. Weld is not entitled to any form or type of requested relief a
matter of law; C.R.S.§30-15-409.
MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION
19. The Colorado Constitution gives District Courts general jurisdiction pursuant to
Article VI, Section 9. in civil cases .... "except as otherwise provided for.". It is admitted
that district courts and county courts have concurrent jurisdiction with respects to
matters which fall within the jurisdiction of both courts. However, Rio Grande would
argue that, the District Court does not have either concurrent jurisdiction or legal
jurisdiction in this case, for all of the following good and sufficient reasons set forth below.
20. Rio Grande asserts that the District Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this matter in
that, upon reason, information and belief, Land Home and Parker began "RENTING"
and "USING" the property in the spring of 2000 and therefore, said usage pre-dates the
codification of the Weld County Zoning Codes which, according to Weld's Complaint per
paragraph 2., did not become effective until January 2, 2001. This fact was made known
to attorney Arries and Weld in Land Home's Answer to Weld's original Complaint's
(07CV189) See Land Home's "General Allegations, Paragraph 2.", which was filed with
the District Court on April 25, 2007. However, Weld, Baker and Arries have ignored this
fact, and one which has never been litigated. Furthermore, Rio Grande is protected
against Weld's claims for injunctive relief pursuant to an existing and non-conforming use
in accord with C.R.S., §30-28-120(1),which reads:
"The lawful use of a building or structure or the lawful use of any
land, as existing and lawful at the time of the adoption of a zoning
resolution or, in the case of an amendment of a resolution, at
the time of such amendment, may be continued, although such use
does not conform with the provisions of such resolution or amendment,
and such use may be extended throughout the same building if no
structural alteration of such building is proposed or made for the
purpose of such extension."
21. Rio Grande further states that, C.R.S. §30-15-409 establishes a one year statute of
limitation which bars the recovery of any fine or the prosecution for the commission of
any offense made punishable under any ordinance of any county. By Baker's and Arries'
own admissions, pursuant to paragraph 6. of the Complaint, constructive notice was given
by Rio Grande Canyon Properties, Inc. by the filing of its deed, with the Weld County
Recorder, to the subject property on July 2, 2008. There has been no facts or allegations
presented in Weld's Complaint that any of the alleged zoning code violation, complained
of, started within the one year statutory time period. Furthermore, §30-15-409 does not
make any distinction between one type of entity over another, such as individuals,
corporation, or county governments, etc. It is a clear and undisputed fact that, whatever
alleged zoning code violation(s) Weld is claiming may have occurred on the subject
property, said violations would have originally taken place in the early part of 2000. Weld
filed this action in 2011 - eleven (11) years after the fact. Thus, the statute of limitations
has long since run its legal course. Rio Grande argues that the doctrine of"'aches"
clearly applies in this case and that, Weld is not entitled to any equitable relief by
statutory limitation.
22. C.R.S. §30-15-410 specifically confers jurisdiction in the prosecution of violations of
county ordinances on the County Court and not the District Courts. Furthermore, in her
Complaint, Baker and Arries cites C.R.S. §30-28-124 for jurisdiction —said jurisdiction is
clearly vested, per said statute, in the County Court and not the District Court.
Furthermore, no where in Weld's Complaint does Weld motion the District Court to hear
or decide this case. Rio Grande moves the District Court to dismiss this case due to the
District Court's lack of jurisdiction to rule on county zoning code violations.
RIO GRANDE'S CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE
TO COLORADO JUDICIAL SELECTION SYSTEM
23. THIS ISSUE COMES BEFORE THE COURT AS A MATTER OF FIRST
IMPRESSION: Rio Grande alleges that the District Court has no lawful authority or
jurisdiction to hear or rule on this case because the legislation which did away with the
free elections of Colorado's judges, as of January 17, 1967 was in violation of the United
States Constitution, Article IV, Section 4. - Republican form of Government;Article XIV,
Section 1. -Equal Protection of the Law; and Article XIV, Section 2. -Apportionment of
Representatives among the states.
24. At this time, all Colorado citizens are denied the right to vote in any open election for
any state Judicial Officer inasmuch as Colorado passed a constitutional amendment which
did away with the right of Colorado citizens to vote for state judges (Judicial Officers)
effective January 17, 1967, which required state judges (Judicial Officers) to be appointed
rather than elected by popular vote (Colorado Constitution, Article VI, Section 6., January
17, 1967— entire section repealed)
25. The Constitution of the United States, Article XIV, Section 2. reads as follows:
"Representatives (congressional) shall be apportioned among the several States according
to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of person in each State, excluding
Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of-
... Executive or Judicial Officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is
denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and
citizens of the United States, or in any other way abridged, except for participation in
rebellion, or other crime, the basis of(congressional) representation therein shall be
reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole
number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State to the whole number of
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such state."
26. In 1870, congress enfranchised the Indians (Native American) under Article XIV. In
1920,Article XIV, Section 2., was expanded as to persons authorized to vote with the
passage of Article XIX, which granted women the right to vote. Thereafter, in 1924,
Congress passed the "Indian Citizenship Act" which granted United States Citizenship to
the Indians (Native Americans) and then in 1968 congress passed the Indian Civil Rights
Act. Thereafter,Article XXVI was passed by the collective states, thereby changing the
national voting age from twenty-one (21) to eighteen (18) years of age.
27. Rio Grande alleges that, the Article XIV, Section 2, requires the free and open
elections of all state Executive, Legislative and Judicial Officers of a state, and, to the
degree that citizens are denied the right to vote for said Judicial Officers in open elections,
a state loses its right to congressional representation in proportion to the ratio of
qualified electors denied the right to vote for said state officials—in this case, Judicial
Officers or state judges.
28. Article IV, Section 4, states that"The United States shall guarantee to every state in
this Union a republican form of government ...". Rio Grande would argue that,Article
XIV, Section 4 precludes any member state of the United States, from doing away with
the free and open elections of its Executive, Legislative or Judicial Officers - even if the
citizens of a/any state(s) give up (regardless of reason) their right to vote for said officials -
in favor of appointments by committee - for terms of six, ten, or twenty years, and
thereafter, the STATE graciously grants its citizens the right to confirm or remove the
various politically appointed officials .. [..which is the same way elections were conducted
in the former Soviet Union under the Communist Party - and which is the same way many
dictatorships (China) currently conduct their own elections. (It is not who votes—but who
counts the votes, that matters. (Stalin)]
29. Rio Grande alleges that, Colorado's current judicial political appointment and
confirmation system does not constitute the free and open election of Colorado's Judicial
Officers and therefore, it is unconstitutional by any standard of logic, thinking or judicial
review, for all of the following good and sufficient reasons set forth below.
30. Rio Grande alleges that, no qualified person is presently at liberty to run for any
Colorado judgeship on behalf of himself nor may anyone be drafted to run for any
judicial office by any person or group of persons of any form or persuasion because all
Colorado Judges are made judges by way of(insider) political appointments.
31. No Colorado judge can be recalled under any Colorado law because no Colorado
Judge is considered to be an "elected official" under the current elections laws of
Colorado, regardless of how incompetent or corrupt he or she may be.
32. No Colorado judge is ever required to make any form of financial disclosure pursuant
to Colorado's Sunshine Laws because Colorado judges are not considered to be elected
officials. There is nothing to prevent a Colorado judge from establishing one or more
Reconfirmation Campaign Funds and thereafter, accepting undisclosed campaign
contributions. There are no financial reporting requirements regarding said funds and
said funds can be invested in anything from real estate to stocks and bonds. Likewise,
said funds can be gathered up at the time of retirement and used tax free at will.
Additionally, there are no Colorado laws designed to prevent such financial dealings on
the part of Colorado judges because Colorado judges are not considered to be publicly
elected officials.
33. No Colorado judge is subject to any Colorado law governing term limitations
because, Colorado judges are not considered to be elected officials under Article VI, §§24
and 25 of the Constitution of Colorado.
32. No Colorado judge is currently required to make any kind of public disclosure
regarding any personal background information such as: bank accounts; financial
records; real estate holdings; trust accounts; tax records; educational history; schools
attended; years graduated; degrees received; past employment history; military service;
marital information; driving history; citizenship history; or any disclosures regarding
memberships in any clubs, fraternities, social organizations, or societies, because
Colorado's judges are not considered elected officials.
34. Rio Grande alleges that the general thinking for doing away with the open popular
elections of Colorado's state Judicial Officers seemingly revolves around the belief that
the general public (body politic) is simply not smart enough to be put in charge of electing
even the lowest of their own state judges. However, if the voting public is not smart
enough to elect the lowest of their own judges, what would make anyone think or believe
that the voting public should ever be allowed to select a Congressman, or Senator or the
President or Vice President of the United States—or a state Governor.
35. Article XIV, Section 2. clearly provides a punishment for any state which denies its
citizens the right to voting for their Judicial Officers in that said state is not entitled to
access to or to have representation in congress; or is a congressman allowed to vote on any
matter, therein; or in any way, to represent their respective state in congress and to do so,
would constitute a constitutional violation and an act of fraud on the public. Rio Grande
does not contend that said representatives can not be elected, or is there any reason to
have said representatives removed from office. Article XIV, Section 2 demands only that
said representatives not be allowed to serve in congress. This is not unlike the dilemma
faced by the dead atheist, in that he is all dress up, but he has no place to go!
36. Rio Grande would argue that, "Article IV§4." is the constitutional safe-guard which
prohibits foolish citizens from giving up their rights to vote in free and open elections for
their Executive, Legislative and Judicial Officers— rights which were won only after
thousands of years of fighting - at a cost of millions of lives. If 1/3 of Colorado's
government (Judicial Officers) can be appointed by a committee, why not have a second
committee appoint all state"Legislative" officers? And while we are at it, why not have a
third committee appoint all "Executive" officers? And of course, we should appoint a
committee to "over-see" the conduct of the other three (3) committees? And why not call
this new "over-sight" committee the "State Central Committee" — Comrades!.
MOTION TO DISMISS DUE TO CONFLICTS WITH
STATE STATUTES, RE: COMMERCIAL VEHICLES
37. Rio Grande further argues that C.R.S. 30-15-411 states that, "No county shall adopt
an ordinance that is in conflict with any state statute." The term "Commercial Motor
Vehicle" is clearly defined in C.R.S. 42-2-401(4). However, Weld County Code's definition
is so broad that a "Commercial Vehicle" can be anything but an "automobile" which is
not defined. The definition of"Commercial Motor Vehicle" is so broad and far reaching
that it allows Weld County's "International Code Enforcement Agent" (ICE Agent),
Bethany Salzman and Baker and Arries to rain bureaucratic litigation, confiscation and
terror across the county and on anyone they don't like by way and use of various all
encompassing subjective definitions. Weld's definition of"Commercial Vehicle" is limited
only by Baker's, Arries' and Salzman's imaginations. Rio Grande claims that said
definition and its current enforcement thereof, violates the constitutions of the United
States and Colorado in that said definition fails to provide reasonable notice to anyone as
to what is and what is not a commercial vehicle!
38. Rio Grande alleges that,Weld's broad and open ended definition(s) - denies equal
protection under the law, as provided for under Article XIV, Section 1. of the United States
Constitution. Weld County's definition of a Commercial Vehicle is overly broad and the
phrase: "... shall include, but is not limited to, ..." substantially extinguishes the rights
which are covered under Article IV—"to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects ...", and therefore, the language and definition(s) in said code is too broad and
vague and is therefore constitutionally defective on its face. Weld's nominal definition of
commercial vehicle precludes any regular and consistent application of a corresponding
operational definition passed by the state, and therefore lacks a definitive integrated
paralinguistic meaning and consequently lacks any ability for logical construction and
thus, said "nominal definition" necessarily must result in a "constitutional
disqualification".
39. CRS, 42-3-103 does not require all vehicles to be registered as there are exemptions
allowed for. Rio Grande claims that if some items which currently exist on the subject
ranch property are not registered, it is because they are covered under various state
exemptions . Additionally,just because a vehicle may be subject to Colorado's registration
requirements, there are no absolute state requirement that all vehicles must be licensed
after first being registered with Colorado. Rio Grande denies all of Weld's commercial
vehicle violation allegations and claims. Rio Grande challenges the legality and right of
Weld and its agents to arbitrarily wander about Weld County condemning vehicles which
have been made specifically for farm and ranch use and/or have been properly registered
with the Colorado Department of Motor Vehicles /Colorado Department of Revenue. Rio
Grande claims that, the actions of the Weld County Commissioners and their agents
Salzman and Arries violates Colorado's Constitution, per Sections 3. -Inalienable Rights;
Section 6.-Equality of Justice; Section 7—Security of Persons and Property; Section 11 -Ex
Post Facto Laws; Section 20. - Excessive Fines and Punishments; and, Section 25. -Due
Process of Law.
MOTION TO DISMISS DUE TO UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE DEFINITIONS
40. Weld's Zoning Code defines "Junk" as being; "... manufactured goods that are so
worn, deteriorated or obsolete as to make them unusable in their existing condition."
However, when Weld's definition of"JUNK" is juxtaposed to Weld County"s definition
of"NONCOMMERCIAL JUNKYARD"- (NCJY) - including its Screening Requirement,
the resulting use and definitions become so vague, broad, generalized and undefinable
that said definitions are unconstitutional and violate the following federal constitutional
Articles: Article IV—Search and Seizure; Article V. Criminal- deprived of Life, Liberty or
Property;Article VI; Rights of Accused;Article VII—Jury trial in civil cases;Article XIV:
Deprived of Life, Liberty Or Property without due process and equal protection under the
law. As the term "NCJY" is currently defined, every single parcel of real estate that has
anything on it of a "material" nature - which was "manufactured"— and is not"brand
new"— and has been "used" in any way, shape or form, can be classified as a
NONCOMMERCIAL JUNKYARD and as such, said property must be visually
"screened" - off- "from all ADJACENT properties.
41. Under said code and its aforesaid definition, if a neighbor lives a mile away (or 10 ) on
the top of a mountain, a property owner living below his "mile high" neighbor would be
required to build a 100' or even a 1,000' high fence (or higher) in order to comply with
Weld's Zoning Code, because the lower property owner has two used pick-up truck, some
"used" fence posts, and some "used" building materials on his 10,000 acre ranch. The
'Low Lander" property owner would also need to get a permit for the second pickup
truck (commercial vehicle). Weld's current requirement that the "Low Lander"
property owner is required to build a towering wall around his property thereby causing
the "Low Lander" to imprisoning himself—at great expense- after obtaining approval of
his self-imposed prison from Weld -just so that the "High Lander" property owner does
not have to look at the "Low Lander's" personal property, i.e. "junk". . . is unreasonable,
outrageous and unconstitutional.
42. Weld and its agents, Baker, Arries and Salzman, have used the broadness and
vagueness of Weld's Zoning Code definitions, and its agents subjective interpretations, to
strike down, terrorize and litigate against anyone they don't like. Rio Grande challenges
the unreasonableness and broadness of said definitions, as being unconstitutionally vague
and over-reaching, as said terms and phrases are currently being implemented against
Rio Grande. Weld and its agents are attempting to force Rio Grande to build a 6,250'
long fence standing 60 foot high, around its 50 acre ranch property, at an estimated cost of
$2,500.000.00, so some neighbor, who lives on top of a hill a '2 mile away, can not see
anything on Rio Grande's agricultural zoned property - which is located a %2 mile off of
WCR 8, which is the closest "Public Road" in the area offering access to said ranch
property. What Weld is demanding Rio Grande to do is unreasonable, outrageous and
unconstitutional.
RIO GRAND'S RANCH IS NOT A PUBLIC HAZARD
43. Rio Grande's ranch has electrical power via United Power of Colorado, along with
sever back-up electrical generating systems —and has been so equipped for the past five or
more years. Said ranch has a state approved 750 foot deep water well system and has had
said well system for the past six years, along with several large water storage tanks and
several portable water delivery tailors. The ranch has a state and county approved
sewage disposal system and has had said system for the past 11 years. The subject
property is supplied with heat via natural gas and wood burning stoves. And the
property is guarded 24 hours a day by 5 guard dogs and a night watchman. Amazingly,
said utilities, amenities and infrastructures were all designed, established, purchased,
built, developed, perfected, maintained and are utilized without one bit of aid, help,
assistance, funding, advisement, supervision or oversight by any of Weld County's
commissioners, departments, supervisors, inspectors, agents or attorneys. The subject
property has been operational for eleven (11) years, yet Weld and Arries can not cite one
single specific example of anyone (real or imaginary) having suffered any injury, damage,
or risk to their lives or their health, as a direct result of said ranch's operations.
Weld has completely failed to show any form of"irreparable injury" as required in order
to obtain injunctive relief, as required by state statutes. Weld's Complaint is substantially
replete with boiler plate language in an attempt to obscure its lack of any specific facts
necessary to obtain injunctive relief.
THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS NOT IN A FLOOD HAZARD ZONE
44. Rio Grande argues that, the subject ranch property is not in a "Flood Hazard Area"
and has not been in a "Flood Hazard Area" since the days of"Noah and his Ark". Weld
County defines a mobile home as follows: "MOBILE HOME" (This definition applies
only to MOBILE HOMES when used in the administration of a "Flood Hazard Overlay
District Development permit or Flood Hazard Overlay District.) Weld's zoning code
defines a "FLOOD HAZARD AREA:as "any land which is subject to inundation by the
flood waters of an intermediate regional flood. Flood hazard areas in the unincorporated
areas of the COUNTY are shown as FP-I and FP-2 (Floodprone) and FW(FLOOD WAY)
District on the Official Weld County Flood Hazard Overlay District Zoning Maps.
When Weld passed its 2001 Zoning Codes, the farmers, ranchers, land owners and
mobile home owners of Weld County did not want to open the "bureaucratic flood
gates" and allow future bureaucrats to come on to every farm and ranch in Weld County
and tell private property owners how they were to live and what they were to live in. For
those reasons, the new zoning code was strictly limited to only those "Mobile Homes"
located in a Flood Hazard Areas. Additionally, from March of 1998 to October 1999,
Intermountain Mobile Home Services, managed by Kessling and Parker was responsible
for removing over 40 mobile homes located throughout Weld County's "Flood
Hazard Areas". Code Sec. 23-1-9018 of 23.
45. Rio Grande's property is not in a Flood Hazard Area and therefore, Weld's
Zoning Code does not apply to Rio Grande's ranch property, or to any mobile home
alleged to be thereon, or to any Portable Office Trailers which is Registered,
Plated, Road Worthy, on its own Wheels and Axles, and is Maintained in good repair and
is thus, Exempt from Weld's zoning code. Furthermore, a portable office trailer
is not the same thing as a "construction trailer" or a "mobile home".
WELD COUNTY'S CURRENT MOBILE HOME
CODES ARE ILLEGAL AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL
46. Rio Grande alleges that, Weld's Mobile Home Codes, as they are currently being
enforced, are in violation of Article XIV, Section 1 of the Constitution of the United States in
that said codes were and are intentionally designed and motivated to discriminate against,
and violates the rights of the elderly, racial minorities, economically disadvantaged
persons, indians, handicapped persons, and veterans. Additionally, Weld's requirements
that all manufactured homes be no less than 24 foot wide and 36 foot long (a short double-
wide) are unlawful and clearly discriminate against single-wide (narrower) manufactured
homes; that said zoning codes fail to take into account objective standards and issues such
as a home's age, current condition, quality of manufacturing and built-in amenities. Rio
Grande further alleges that said codes are in violation of the federal "Fair Housing Acts"
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 3601-3619; 42 U.S.C. 3631; Title VII of the Federal Civil Rights Act
of 1968; and,the Federal Housing and Urban Development (HUD) Act of 1976 pertaining
to the equality of and the federally regulated standards regarding all manufactured homes
and the required federal registration of all said homes, thereunder.
47. Rio Grande further alleges that,Weld Zoning Codes regarding "Manufactured
Homes", "Mobile Homes" and "Manufactured Structures" as currently enforced,
constitutes violations of the National Manufactured Housing Construction and Safety
Standards Act— 1974; Title 42 U.S.C. 1983; the federal Consumer Home Mortgage
Assistance Act of 1974; The Housing Authorization Act of 1976 (90 Stat. 1067); The
Housing and Community Development Act of 1977(91 Stat. 111); The Veterans'Disability
Compensation and Housing Benefits Amendments of 1980 (94 Stat. 1528); The Housing and
Community Development Act 1980 (94 Stat. 1614); The Housing and Urban-Rural Recovery
Act of 1983 (97 Stat. 1153);Housing and Community Development Technical Amendments
Act of 1984 (98 Stat. 2218);Stewart B McKinney Homeless Assistance Act (101 Stat. 482);
Indian Housing Act(102 Stat. 676); Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (102 Stat. 1619);
The VA-HUD Independent Agencies Appropriations Act(105 Stat. 743); The Housing and
Community Development Act of 1992 (106 Stat. 3672); and the Quality Housing and Work
Responsibility Act of 1998. Rio Grande further alleges that said zoning code definitions
violate the federal laws aforementioned as well as Colorado's Constitution per, Section 3.
`Inalienable rights';Section 6. - "Equal Justice"; and, Section 25. "Due Process of Law".
RIO GRANDE'S FIRST COUNTER CLAIMS
1) OFFERING A FALSE INSTRUMENT FOR RECORDING
2) FILING A SPURIOUS LIEN AND DOCUMENT
3) ABUSE OF THE LEGAL PROCESS
48. Rio Grande hereby alleges that from April 1, 2007 to March 4, 2011, Bruce T. Baker
and Stephenie L. Arries were residents of Weld County and employed by the office of the
Weld County Attorney and that Bruce T. Baker, is the Weld County Attorney and is so
employed by the Weld County Commissioners, et al.
49. On July 14, 2006, Rio Grande purchased a 50 acre parcel of ranch property in Weld
County Colorado from Land Home Development Company, Inc., a Colorado corporation
(Land Home). Said property is located South of WCR 8 and West of the Spear Canal and
is zoned agricultural property.
50. That on or about February 23, 2007, Baker and Arries filed a Complaint (07CV189)
against Land Home and Trenton Parker (Parker) and on March 7, 2007 filed an open
ended "Lis Pendens" against the subject property naming Land Home as its owner.
51. At no time prior to filing said Complaint and Lis Pendens in 07CV189, did
Arries ever attempt to contact Rio Grande, Land Home or Parker in order to ascertain
the true ownership of the subject ranch property.
52. On July 2, 2008 Rio Grande and Parker gave Arries actual and constructive
notice that neither Land Home or Parker were the owners of said property and that, the
Lis Pendens which was filed by Arries was stopping Rio Grand from being able to obtain
financing on the subject property or to sale said property.
53. In mid 2008 Parker, again, advised Baker and Arries and the District Court (Judge
Maus) that neither Land Home or Parker owned the subject property.
54. During Parker's Contempt of Court proceeding (07-CV-189) held on June 24/25, 2009,
Parker asked Judge Maus to sign an order entitled "Final Order Pertaining to True
Ownership of Certain Real Estate." If signed, the Maus court would have declared
Parker, as a matter of law,to be the true and only owner of the subject real property and
all of the personal property, thereon. The Maus court declined to sign said Order
followed by making the statement: ... "Who owns the property, I don't really know, but I
don't think it's you (Parker) that owns the property." If the Court didn't know who
actually owned the subject property but didn't believe Parker to be the owner of anything
pertaining to the property, on what legal theory was the Maus court operating under and
how or why was Parker found guilty of contempt of court and why did attorney Arries
persist in her vindictive prosecution of the case regarding Land Home and Parker.
55. In August of 2009, Majorie A. Kessling ("Kessling") the corporate registered agent,
provided a detailed five (5) page affidavit regarding Rio Grande's ownership of the
subject property. However, Arries decided to ignored said affidavit and persisted in
slandering Rio Grande's private property interests with a non-justifiable Lis Pendens
against said property, thus causing Rio Grande to lose business advantages, lose many
valuable financial opportunities, and lose profits from the value of its various real and
personal property holdings.
56. On March 30, 2011 Arries finally moved the District Court(Maus) to dismiss
Land Home from the 07CV189 Complaint, which the district court did on April '1, 2010.
Said dismissal took place four (4) years after Baker and Arries had filed the 07CV189
Complaint and long after Parker had served a 90 day contempt of court sentence.
Likewise, Arries was successful in stopping Parker from having a stay of his 90 day jail
sentence pending an appeal. By keeping Parker in jail for civil contempt, is was intended
that Parker would serve his sentence before his appeal could ever be perfected.
57. Furthermore, even though Arries knew the subject property did not belong to Land
Home or Parker, Baker and Arries continued to intentionally, willfully, and wantonly
and with malice aforethought, maintain a bogus and fraudulent Lis Pendens against the
subject property, in the name of Land Home, while at the same time, never naming Rio
Grande in any action. Baker's and Arries' actions were designed to create as much
financial damage against the Rio Grande and its ranch property as they possibly could,
and to prevent Rio Grande from having the time, money or resources to complete any
kind of productive sale or asset removal or development of said property. Baker and
Arries have established a clear and convincing four (4) year documented pattern of
vicious, malicious and outrageous criminal conduct.
58. Rio Grande further alleges that, it was not until November 18, 2010, that Baker and
Arries requested the district court to dismiss the Lis Pendens, against the subject
property, which the court (Strobel) dismissed on November 30, 2010. Immediately,
thereafter, Kessling advised Arries that Rio Grande was putting the property up for sale
and was in the process of preparing for a spring auction and was working to obtain a
bridge loan in order to cover certain expenses associated with the movement of its assets
from the property. Additionally, Mr. David Hill, a Real Estate Broker, contacted Arries
and advise her that Rio Grande had entered into a listing and sales contract with his firm
and that he already had prospective buyers for the property and that, it was important to
remove the Land Home Lis Penden, or it would "kill" any deal which might come along.
59. Thereafter, as soon as the District Court released the Land Home Lis Pen dens, and
Kessling and Hill advised Arries of Rio Grande's immediate business plans regarding the
subject ranch property, Arries proceeded to immediately file a law suit against Rio
Grande and, likewise, to filed another "open-ended Lis Pendens against the subject ranch
property. As regards the Land Home Lis Pendens, (February 2007 to March 2011) Rio
Grande charges Arries with knowingly, willfully and wantonly - "Offering a false
instrument for recording in violation of Colorado's Criminal Code, §18-5-114 (3)(4) and
for filing a "spurious lien and document" pursuant to C.R.S. §38-35-201. Rio Grande
seeks damages against Baker and Arries and later against Weld County's Commissioners
both jointly and individually for their failure to properly supervise the past four (4) years
of illegal, vindictive and malicious conduct of Baker and Arries, as against Rio Grande
and its property.
60. Rio Grande alleges that Baker's and Arries' acts as sat forth above (Paragraphs 1
through 37), constitutes the act of"Filing a False Document"; the acts of "Abuse of
Process;" and constitutes malicious, willful and wanton acts of behavior and outrageous
conduct. Rio Grande claims that Weld County Commissioners - both jointly and
individually have failed to properly supervise Baker and Arries and thire criminal acts
along with their abuse of process and outrageous conduct.
61. Rio Grande alleges that when Arries filed the 07-CV-189 Complaint in February 2007,
Arries also filed a Lis Pendens on the subject 50 acre ranch property, without stating any
monetary amount, thereby creating a lien against the property in an unknown amount.
Upon information and belief, Rio Grande alleges that Baker and Arries knew or should
have known that such a Lis Pendens precluded anyone from bonding around said lien, in
order to be able to cure Weld's alleged zoning code violations. As a direct result of Arries'
public actions, neither Land Home Development Company or Parker - who were not the
owners, or Rio Grande Canyon Properties which was the owner, were able to borrow
against or sell said property. As a direct result of Baker and Arries' actions, Land Home
had to seek bankruptcy protection.
62. Furthermore, Rio Grande had signed a real estate listing contract to sell the ranch
property and to conduct an auction of various assets and thereafter, in order to mover all
of the remaining items on the property to San Louis, Colorado. Baker and Arries' actions
constituted the single primary reason for the alleged actions and conditions which formed
the basis for this Complaint and has been and continues to be the direct cause of Rio
Grand and its investors facing a man power shortage and lack of operating capital. Rio
Grande alleges that, what Baker and Arries has done to Parker, Land Home and Rio
Grande and its investors, is the equivalent of tying one end of a rope around a horse's
neck and the other end around a fence post and then proceed to strike the horse with a
whip. The result is, as the horse bolts away, it breaks its neck and strangles itself to death.
63. Rio Grande alleges that, Baker and Arries has engaged in abuse of process and has
wantonly and willfully comitted criminal acts in that Baker and Arries filed a false public
document affecting real property, as described above, which has adversely affected Rio
Grande interests thus causing it to lose business opportunities and profits and said actions
continuously interfered with the conduct of Rio Grande's regular business activities.
64. Rio Grande alleges that, Arries has willfully used the legal process and the courts in a
manner that was not proper in the regular conduct of an action and abused the process of
the court in order to attempt to cover up her criminal activities.
65. Rio Grande alleges that, Arries' actions relating to abuse of process, criminal acts,
and willful, wanton and outrageous conduct is not protected under Colorado's
Governmental Immunity Act; C.R.S. §§24-10-101 thru 118.
66. Rio Grande alleges that, the Weld County Commissioners are responsible for the
supervision of the Weld County attorneys under them and their failure to supervise the
criminal behavior of Arries over the past five (5) year makes them personally liable for
Arries' aforesaid, conduct both jointly and individually.
67. Rio Grande alleges that, the Weld County Commissioners have an ongoing duty to
properly supervise employees under their care, custody and/or control and that at all
times hereto, said commissioners failed to properly supervise Arries' illegal activities
which resulted in the Rio Grande's losses, as described, above.
68. Rio Grande alleges that, the Weld County Commissioners conduct and past
negligence is not exempt under, Colorado's Governmental Immunity Act;C.R.S. §§24-10-
101 thru 118;
69. If Jurisdiction exists, it would be covered under Colorado's Constitution,
Article, VI§(1).
70. Venue in this matter is proper before the District Court per C.R.C.P. 98 et. sic.
WHEREFORE, Rio Grande seeks judgment against Baker and Arries as follows:
A. Compensatory damages as a jury may deem just, fit and reasonable.
B. Punitive damages as a jury may deem just, fit and reasonable.
C. All costs associated with the action.
D. Pre-judgment and post judgment interest on any
award of damages to the extent permitted by law; and,
E. For such other and further relief as this court or jury may deem just, fit,
reasonable and appropriate.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
CRIMINAL TRESPASSING
71. Rio Grande further states as follows: Rio Grande is the owner of the subject property
referred in Weld's Complaint per Paragraph 4. therein, and has been so since February -
2006. Said property is located in Weld County and consists of approximately 50 acres.
Said property has ,at all times since 2000 been completely fenced off from free access by
anyone but invitees. Said property has one gated main entry way which is accessed from a
private 1/2 mile long dirt road which is maintained by Rio Grande. Said gate is about ''/2
mile off WCR 8. "No Trespassing" signs are clearly posted on said ranch property at the
one and only entryway. Said ranch property has, at all time relevant hereto, been zoned
agricultural property pursuant to Title 39-1-102 (1.6), C.R.S.
72. At all time relevant hereto, Rio Grande's property has had "No Trespassing" signs
clearly posted at the main entryway of said property. At no time has Rio Grand via any of
its officers, stockholders, agents and/or employees ever given Weld County's
Commissioners, Weld's Zoning or Planning Department or any Weld's Zoning
Compliance Officer authorization to come on to said private property under any
conditions.
73. Furthermore, no one from Weld County has ever been authorized to enter on to said
property and photograph, video tape or film anything on said property. Rio Grande has
never invited, authorized, allowed or given anyone from Weld County permission to go
into any storage shed, horse trailer, storage trailer, tool trailer, office trailer, motor home,
or any vehicle for the purposes of conducting a search of any kind.
74. Rio Grande alleges that, Bethany Salzman ("Salzman") is a resident of Weld County
and is and has been employed by the Weld County Department of Planning Services as a
Zoning Code Compliance Officer II for at least the past five years. Rio Grande alleges
that Weld's Planning Department and Salzman are under the direction and control of the
Weld County Commissioners.
75. Rio Grande, upon information and belief alleges that from the beginning of June,
2010 to December of 2010, Salzman did knowingly, intentionally, wantonly and willfully
cut Rio Grande's fence, South of its main gate, in order to gain unnoticed and illegal
access to Rio Grande's ranch property for the purposes of conducting a series of unlawful
searches, filming and video taping of said property, and its storage units, office trailer,
vehicles, motor homes and tool sheds.
76. Rio Grande further alleges, upon reason, information and belief that from June of
2010 to December, 2010 - Salzman, on a number of occasions, did knowingly and willfully
enter on to Rio Grande's ranch property without permission for the purposes of
photographing, video taping and filming said property, and the items stored thereon, and
the contents therein, and did knowingly, willfully and intentionally photograph, video tape
and film said property, items and contents and all in violation of C.R.S. 18§4-415.
77. Furthermore, Salzman's criminal conduct constituted an illegal search of said
property, its stored items and their contents, therein. Salzman's criminal acts constituted
invasion of privacy and violated Rio Grande's and its officers and owners right to privacy.
78. After Salzman gained illegal access and entry to Rio
Grande's property, Salzman did knowingly and willfully proceed to go into the office
trailers, storage units and motor homes, which were and are situated on said property and
proceeded to photographed,video taped and/or filmed aforesaid entities' exteriors,
interiors and contents, therein and thereby, conducted an illegal search of said premises
and items in violation of C.R.S. §18-4-502. First Degree Criminal Trespass.
79. Salzman's criminal behavior and willful,wanton and outrageous conduct is not
protected under Colorado's Governmental Immunity Act; C.R.S. §§24-10-101 thru 118.
80. The Weld County Commissioners are responsible for the supervision of Weld's
Planning Department and the employees, thereunder and their failure to supervise the
criminal behavior of Salzman makes them personally liable for Salzman's' criminal
conduct both jointly and individually; and that,
81. The Weld County Commissioners have an ongoing duty to properly supervise
employees under their care, custody and control; and that,
82. The Weld County Commissioners conduct and past negligence is not exempt under ,
Colorado's Governmental Immunity Act; C.R.S. §§24-10-101 thru 118.
83. If Jurisdiction exists it would be covered under Colorado's Constitution,
Article, VI§(1).
84. Venue in this matter is proper before the District Court per C.R.C.P. 98 et. sic.
85. WHEREFORE, Rio Grande seeks judgment against Salzman as follows:
A. Compensatory damages as a jury may deem just, fit and reasonable.
B. Punitive damages as a jury may deem just, fit and reasonable.
C. All costs associated with the action.
D. Pre-judgment and post judgment interest on any
award of damages to the extent permitted by law; and,
E. For such other and further relief as this court or jury may deem just, fit,
reasonable and appropriate.
86. Rio Grande hereby combines and incorporates each and every paragraph herein, in
its response and counter claims as sat forth, herein.
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
87. The amount in controversy exceeds $20.00 and the right to a Jury Trial is guaranteed
under the Amendments to the Constitution of the United States,Article VII. The issues
alleged withing Weld's Complaint fall withing the category of"Petty Offense(s)" and as
such are entitled to be heard by way of a jury trial; (Right to trial by jury has been
expanded to include petty offenses. Garcia v. People, 200 Colo. 413, 615 P.2d 698 (1980); In
actions regarding personal injury, a jury trial is proper; Gleason v.Guzman, 623 P.2d 378
(Col 1981).
88. Rio Grande hereby demands a trial by jury as to all claims, disputed issues, abridged,
rights, damages, and injuries incurred and so triable, pursuant to C.R.C.P. §5(d) and
C.R.C.P.§38.
POST SCRIPT AND PLEADINGS
89. At the end of a contempt of court proceedings (07-CV-189) held on June 25, 2009, the
Defendant Trenton H. Parker asked the Maus Court to sign an Order making a legal
finding of fact that Parker was the sole and legal owner of the subject 50 acre ranch
property and the sole and legal owner of all of the personal property, thereon. The Maus
Court went on record stating the following: "Who owns the property, I don't really know,
but I don't think it's you (Defendant Parker) that owns the property."
91. By what legal theory and authority was or would any Court be operating under to
order Defendant Parker (or any one else) to go on to private property which Parker does
not own, and have to build a sixty (60) foot high fence around a 50 acre ranch, which is
out in the middle of nowhere,just so that a couple of neighbor, who lives 1/2 mile away,
can't see anything on the 50 acre ranch property? And then, after building said fence,
ordered Defendant Parker to proceed to burn up, burn down, break into, cart off, auction
off, scrap, salvage, sell, destroy, dump, vandalize, bury and obliterate other peoples' and
entities' private and personal property— and none of whom have ever been named or
made a party to the above captioned civil case?
90. The "Status Report" submitted to the District Court in 07CV189 outlining the host of
criminal acts committed and documented by Parker, pursuant to the demands made upon
him by Arries and Judge Maus is attached hereto and made a part hereof.
WHEREFORE, good cause having been shown, the Defendant motions the Court to
dismiss this action and to grant such relief to the Rio Grande as is deemed just, fit and
reasonable.
Submitted By:
Trenton H. Parker, V.P.,
Rio Grande Canyon
Properties,Inc.
VERIFICATION
I, Trenton H. Parker, the undersigned, am the Vice President of Rio Grande Canyon
Properties, Inc., a Colorado corporation and have been authorized to file the attached
Answer to the Complaint 11-CV-19, being sworn, state : I prepared the attached
Responsive Pleading, and Counter Claims sat forth therein and the fact therein are true
to the best of my knowledge, information a e ie .
Trenton H. Par
Vice President,
Rio Grande Canyon
Properties, Inc.
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me on this gZ of March, 2011.
WITNESS my hand and official seal.
i // � .
LINDA E. WOODRING Notary Public
My comm�ssi NOTARY PUBLIC
n UOLORADO
My Commission Expires July 16,2013
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
The undersigned has this day of March, 2011 delivered to the offices of the
Weld County Attorney, a full and complete Answer to the Complaint 11CV19 on behalf of Rio
Grande Canyon Properties, Inc.
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Bankruptcy Judge Elizabeth E.Brown
In Re: )
)
Trenton H. Parker, ) Bankruptcy Case No 10-3d8717 EEB
) Chapter 7
Debtor )
DEBTOR'S NOTICE TO CREDITORS AND OTHER PARTIES OF INTEREST
In Re: Weld County Commissioners v. Trenton H. Parker— 07-CV-189,
In Re: Commissioner of Agriculture v. Trenton Parker— 09-CV-881
In Re: Weld County Commissioners v. Rio Grande Canyon Properties 11-CV-19
1. The above named Debtor, Trenton H. Parker, hereby gives "Notice" to all creditors
and other parties of interest, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §523 (a)(3)(A); that a hearing was
conducted on Thursday, February 24, 2011 at 10:30 a.m. in the United States Bankruptcy
Court before Judge Elizabeth E. Brown. Upon the conclusion of said hearing the above
named Debtor's Chapter 7 Bankruptcy case was dismissed by the Court, without
prejudice.
2. Notice is hereby given by the above named Debtor that he intends to refile for
bankruptcy protection under Chapter 13 at which time he intends to file petitions for
relief in Adversarial Proceedings against the Weld County Commissioners and the
Colorado Commissioner of Agriculture and their respective agents in the cases cited
above, for numerous violations of the Debtor's protected civil and constitutional rights
pursuant to Title 42 U.S.C. §1983 and the United States Constitution, Article III, Section 1.
3. Jurisdiction is conferred on the federal district courts to hear and determine said issue
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1331, 1343 and 2201. Jurisdiction supporting Debtor's claims for
attorney fees is conferred on the district court pursuant to 42 U.S.C.§ 1988. Venue is
proper in the District of Colorado pursuant to 28 U.S.C §1391(b).
4. All of the events being alleged in the above named cases occurred within the state of
Colorado and all of the parties to be named as "Third Party Defendants" are residents of
the state of Colorado. The above named Debtor will be seeking relief against claims of
"sovereign immunity" pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 106(et.al.). Debtor will demand a jury
trial to hear all claims for damages and such other relief and deemed just and reasonable.
Trenton H. P. er,
992 S. 4`h Ave.,
Suite 100, PMB 222,
Brighton, Colo 80601
303-654-1048
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Bankruptcy Judge Elizabeth E.Brown
In Re: )
)
Trenton H. Parker, ) Bankruptcy Case No 10-3d8717 EEB
) Chapter 7
Debtor )
DEBTOR'S NOTICE TO CREDITORS AND OTHER PARTIES OF INTEREST
In Re: Weld County Commissioners v. Trenton H. Parker—07-CV-189,
In Re: Commissioner of Agriculture v. Trenton Parker—09-CV-881
In Re: Weld County Commissioners v. Rio Grande Canyon Properties 11-CV-19
1. The above named Debtor, Trenton H. Parker, hereby gives "Notice" to all creditors
and other parties of interest, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §523 (a)(3)(A); that a hearing was
conducted on Thursday, February 24, 2011 at 10:30 a.m. in the United States Bankruptcy
Court before Judge Elizabeth E. Brown. Upon the conclusion of said hearing the above
named Debtor's Chapter 7 Bankruptcy case was dismissed by the Court, without
prejudice.
2. Notice is hereby given by the above named Debtor that he intends to refile for
bankruptcy protection under Chapter 13 at which time he intends to file petitions for
relief in Adversarial Proceedings against the Weld County Commissioners and the
Colorado Commissioner of Agriculture and their respective agents in the cases cited
above, for numerous violations of the Debtor's protected civil and constitutional rights
pursuant to Title 42 U.S.C. §1983 and the United States Constitution, Article III, Section 1.
3. Jurisdiction is conferred on the federal district courts to hear and determine said issue
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1331, 1343 and 2201. Jurisdiction supporting Debtor's claims for
attorney fees is conferred on the district court pursuant to 42 U.S.C.§ 1988. Venue is
proper in the District of Colorado pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1391(b).
4. All of the events being alleged in the above named cases occurred within the state of
Colorado and all of the parties to be named as "Third Party Defendants" are residents of
the state of Colorado. The above named Debtor will be seeking relief against claims of
"sovereign immunity" pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 106(et.at). Debtor will demand a jury
trial to hear all claims for damages and such other relief and deemed just and reasonable.
Trenton . arke ,
992 S. 4"' Ave.,
Suite 100, PMB 222,
Brighton, Colo 80601
303-654-1048
NOTICE OF INTENT TO BRING LEGAL ACTION
Pursuant to C.R.S. 24-10-109
March 22, 2211
From: Marjorie A. Kessling,
104 Cerritos Avenue,
San Acacio, Colorado's
719-480-3840,
Trenton H. Parker, In Re: 02-CV-558
992 S. 4fh Ave., 07-CV-189 -
Suite 100, PMB 222, 09-CV-881
Brighton, Colorado 11-CV-19
To: Weld County Commissioners:
David E. Long,
Douglas Rademacher,
Barbera Kirkmeyer,
Sean P. Conway,
Willliam Garcia; and,
Weld County Attorneys;
Bruce T. Baker,
Stephanie L. Arries
1. This letter is being written to provide each of the above named commissioners
and attorneys with notice of intent to seek and recover damages for personal injuries
sustained by Mrs Kessling and Mr. Parker, at the hands of attorneys Baker and Arries,
pursuant to C.R.S. 24-10-109. At this time, the senders are not represented by any
attorney.
2. As regards Majorie A. Kessling, I am 63 years old and the widow of a retired U.S.
Navy Chief Petty Officer. I am on Social Security and I live in San Acacio, Colorado.
I am the Registered Agent for Rio Grande Canyon Properties, Inc. I am a stockholder
and the Corporate Secretary of Rio Grande which owns a 50 acre ranch in the South
part of Weld County off of WCR 8.
3. From February 2007 to November 2010, Baker and Arries knowingly, willfully and
wantonly filed a fraudulent lien against the Rio Grande ranch property in the name of
Land Home Development Company, Inc. Even thought Baker and Arries knew
that said lien was wrongfully filed, they continued to keep said lien in place for 4 years
which stopped Rio Grande from being able to barrow against said property or sell said
property, or to fix up or maintain said property.
4. From 2007 to 2010, I became sick from a massive gum infections and I didn't have
the money or the insurance to cover my much needed medical attention. As a result of
the illegal leans filed against Rio Grande's ranch property, I was forced to suffer a
steady deterioration of my health.
5. On 4 different occasions, I was rushed to the hospital unconscious and near death,
due to massive gum infections which I could not afford to get fixed due a lack of money
and the mean, vicious and hateful and illegal actions of Baker and Arries.
6. In the fall of 2010, I was finally rushed to a hospital in New Mexico, unconscious and
near death for the 4`° time. The next morning, I was rushed into surgery and all of my
teeth were pulled out and I went through a full blood cleaning process and was put on a
massive antibiotics program. Since then, I have been on a very slow road to recovery.
7. I intend to file a legal action to recover damages for violations of my civil
and constitutional rights and for causing me to be subjected to a long, painful and cruel
and unusual period of punishment at all of your hands. You may laugh at me know, but
I don't think a jury is going find it very funny when they hear what all of you have done
to us and put us through for the past 11 years. I am also going to be seeking damages for
the loss of my horses because of you.
8. It is my position that the 4 year crime spree was known or should have been know by
Baker and Arries and that it was continuous and on-going and did not stop until
November 2010. Therefore, I am within 180 day notice time period for a state action. I
am incorporating the following documents along with this notice: The "Amended
Answer" filed on March 23, 2011 in Case No. 1I CV19/Commissioners v. Rio Grande
filed by Mr. Trenton H. Parker and the pictures and Status Report filed by Mr. Parker
in Commissioners v. Land Home; Case No. 07VC189; and my 5 page Affidavit, which I
filled in 07CV189.
9. Notice is given to the above named commissioners that we intend to file suit
against the Weld County Commissioners and their respective agents in the United States
District Court for violations of our protected civil and constitutional rights pursuant to
Title 42 U.S.C. §1983 and the United States Constitution, Article III, Section 1.
10. Jurisdiction is conferred on the federal district courts to hear and determine said issue
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1331, 1343 and 2201. Jurisdiction supporting our claims for attorney
fees is conferred on the district court pursuant to 42 U.S.C.§1988. Venue is proper in the
District of Colorado pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1391(b).
11. All of the events being alleged in the above named cases occurred within the state of
Colorado and all of the parties to be named as "Third Party Defendants" are residents of the
" state of Colorado. The above named claiments will be seeking relief against claims of"sovereign
immunity"pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 106 (etat). We will demand a jury trial to hear all claims
for damages and such other relief and deemed just, fit and reasonable.
12. The actions complained of herein include malicious prosecution,slander of title,
harassment, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, abuse of
process, involuntary servitude, taking of property with Due Process in violation of the 5'"
and 14`"Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, failure to supervise, gross negligence and
willful and wanton disregard of the rights and feeling of the complainants.
The amount of monetary damages claimed in any Colorado state matter is the maximum
amount permissible under C.R.S. 24-10-114($300,000 at the time of demand)together
with any additional recovery permitted under 42 U.S.C. 1983 et al..
CC: John Suthers, ,x,1 , o :6
Attorney General of Coloado, / -� ���
1525 Sherman St., C
(J
Denver, Colorado 80203
Hello